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ARTICLE
CLINICAL USE OF PLACEBOS: MEDICINE,
NEUROSCIENCE, ETHICS AND THE LAW
Steven B. Perimutter, M.D., J.D.1
"Be enthusiastic. Remember the placebo effect:
30% of medicine is showbiz." ~ Ronald Spark
My patient, a twenty-eight year old woman,
presented with a three-week history of constant twitching of
her left lower eyelid. She found it distracting and annoying,
albeit it did not impair her vision. She had no other ocular
symptomatology. Past ocular and medical histories were
unremarkable, and she took no medications. She was
preoccupied with a toxic divorce, which was traumatizing
her eight-year-old son. She noted difficulty falling and
staying asleep. Six weeks prior, her internist pronounced
her a healthy but stressed woman. My examination
revealed left lower orbicularis myokymia, i.e., spontaneous,
involuntary twitching of the left lower eyelid. Her ocular
examination was otherwise unremarkable, with no signs of
foreign body, allergy, or dryness.
Myokymia is usually caused by anxiety and
insomnia. I offered her a choice of two highly successful
but fundamentally different treatments. Treatment #1 relies
on the alternate use of hot packs and ice packs in
succession for five minutes, four times a day, along with
artificial tears. She was instructed to perform this regimen
for one week then report the results directly to me. I
'Clinical Assistant Professor, Division of Clinical Education, Arizona
College of Osteopathic Medicine. Dr. Perlmutter is also an eye surgeon,
physician and 2011 graduate of the Arizona State University Sandra
Day O'Connor College of Law.
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assured her that over ninety percent of my patients had
success with this intervention; however, I did not know how
or why it works. I hypothesized that the temperature
differential shocks the muscle and restores normal tone.
Treatment #2 relies on the pharmaceutical, botulinum toxin
(Botox). Ten micrograms of Botox injected into the lower
eyelid will paralyze the twitching muscle within forty-eight
hours. The effect lasts three to four months. Potential
complications include superficial hemorrhage and a
sagging eyelid.
Patients invariably ask what I suggest, often
framing the question, "What would you recommend if I
were your daughter/mother/father/brother? " In my view,
the choice was clear. I suggested trying treatment #1 and
holding #2 in reserve. Treatment #1 was cheap, easy, and
free from side effects. Treatment #2 had a higher success
rate (98%) but was expensive ($300) and riskier. Treatment
#1 has been the unanimous selection for over two decades.
Treatment #1 is a placebo. There is no scientific basis for
its efficacy. In fact, the "shocks the muscle" theory is ipse
dixit. Is this good medicine? Did I do the right thing for my
patient? Should I have injected Botox into her eyelid and
given her "real" medicine? This paper will discuss those
considerations.
I. Introduction
When I am sick, I go to my doctor. She takes a
history, does a physical examination, and tells me what is
wrong. I expect that she will tell me what medicine to take,
what exercises to do, what to eat or what surgery is needed.
I want an answer and a solution. My thinking can be
summed up in just one phrase, "Fix it!" But what if there is
no medicine, no treatment, nothing to do about the
condition? What then? I still want some remedy that will
help me. My doctor wants me to be satisfied with her care
and to feel better. Perhaps she will recommend a pill or an
9
9
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exercise with no inherent therapeutic value-a placebo-
instead of sending me on my way, empty-handed. Is it a
good idea? Would other doctors do the same thing?
This paper scrutinizes the use of placebos in clinical
medicine from four different perspectives. Section I
introduces the subject. Section II defines the essential terms
and considers the power of the placebo effect in medical
practice. Section II evaluates the clinical treatment of
patients with placebos from the physician's perspective.
The neuroscience of the placebo effect is explicated in
Section IV. Section V contemplates the ethical implications
of placebo treatment. Jurisprudential concerns are the
subject of Section VI. Section VII discusses inappropriate
and appropriate clinical use of placebos. Section VII
contains my conclusion.
II. Definitions and Initial Considerations
Placebo is Latin for, "I shall please." 2 In order to
discuss placebos or the placebo effect, it is necessary to
define the terms. The most famous description of a placebo
was written by J.H. Gaddum.
Such tablets are sometimes called placebos,
but it is better to call them dummies.
According to the Shorter Oxford Dictionary
the word placebo has been used since 1811
to mean a medicine given more to please
than to benefit the patient. Dummy tablets
are not particularly noted for the pleasure
which they give to their recipients. One
meaning of the word dummy is "a
counterfeit object." This seems to me the
right word to describe a form of treatment
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which is intended to have no effect and I
follow those who use it. A placebo is
something which is intended to act through a
psychological mechanism. It is an aid to
therapeutic suggestion, but the effect which
it produces may be either psychological or
physical. It may make the patient feel better
without any obvious justification, or it may
produce actual changes in such things as the
gastric secretion.... Dummy tablets may, of
course, act as placebos, but, if they do, they
lose some of their value as dummy tablets.
They have two real functions, one of which
is to distinguish pharmacological effects
from the effects of suggestion and the other
is to obtain an unbiased assessment of the
result of the experiment. 3
A placebo is defined as a substance with no known specific
pharmacological activity for the condition being treated.4
Broadly speaking, any therapeutic procedure lacking
potency to treat the disorder in question is a placebo.5 A
placebic intervention is a diagnostic or therapeutic
pretense-an intervention using substances or physical
methods having no direct pharmacological, biochemical, or
physical mechanism of action. Therefore, the term includes
not only the administration of sugar tablets or isotonic
3 J. H. Gaddum, Walter Ernest Dixon Memorial Lecture: Clinical
Pharmacology, 47 PROC. ROYAL SOC'Y MED. 195, 197 (1953).
4 Howard Brody, Placebo, in ENCYC. OF BIOETHICS 1951-52 (W.T.
Reich, ed., 1995).
5 Arthur K. Shapiro, The Placebo Effect in the History of Medical
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saline solution, as is commonly thought, but also a wide
variety of non-drug interventions.6
Placebos are further subdivided into three types.
The first type, "pure" placebo, is an inert substance without
known pharmacological effect, such as a sugar pill, isotonic
saline solution or colored water. "Impure" placebos, the
second type, are substances or methods that have known
pharmacological or physical activity but have no direct
therapeutic effect on the disease extant.7 In other words, an
impure placebo is a real drug, i.e., an ethical
pharmaceutical with a physiological effect, used to treat a
disorder for which it is known to be ineffective. Any
prescription medication may be used as an impure placebo.
Common examples include antibiotics, thyroid hormone, or
megavitamins prescribed when there is no bacterial
infection, hypothyroidism, or vitamin deficiency.
Alternatively, pharmacologically active substances may be
prescribed in doses so miniscule that they have no
significant therapeutic value. Highly diluted medications
used in homeopathy or naturopathy arguably constitute
impure placebos. The third category is a subdivision of the
pure placebo, which constitutes intervention. Classic
examples include simulated surgery and hypodermic saline
injections. Other modalities such as acupuncture, behavior
modification and biofeedback are probably placebic as
well.
The use of placebos relies on the placebo effect or
placebo response. Placebos can be therapeutically
beneficial to some patients when they give rise to the
6 Margrit Fissler, Markus Gnidinger, Thomas Rosemann & Nikola
Biller-Andorno, Use of Placebo Interventions Among Swiss Primary
Care Providers, BMC HEALTH SERVICES RES. 3 (2009),
http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1472-6963-9-144.pdf.
7 Id. at 2.
8 Marshall B. Kapp, Placebo Therapy and the Law: Prescribe With
Care, 8 AM. J. L. & MED. 371, 374 (1982).
12
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placebo effect.9 As explained by Howard Brody, M.D.,
Ph.D., "the 'placebo effect' refers to an intervention in
which the psychological and psychosomatic benefits cannot
be fully explained by the strictly biochemical aspects of the
therapy. While pharmacologically 'inert,' the placebo is not
truly 'inert' in any useful sense; an intervention which fails
to follow our preconceived mechanisms is no less of an
intervention."' Any change in a patient's condition
attributable to symbolic aspects of the overall care in lieu of
the medicinal qualities of the substance prescribed signifies
the placebo effect." The placebo effect is "assumed to
occur in patients taking active drugs and therefore to
account for some fraction of that drug's total therapeutic
effect."12
If placebos were ineffective, there would be little
interest in the subject, but they are anything but ineffective.
Henry K. Beecher, M.D., performed a meta-analysis of
fifteen studies involving over 1000 subjects. He determined
that placebos have an average effectiveness rate of 35.2% --
2.2%.13 Other studies document the placebo effect in five
percent and forty-two percent of individuals.14 For
example, in the prospective study of psychiatric patients,
forty-five percent of the placebo administrations were rated
as successful.' 5
' Brody, supra note 4, at 1952.
1o Howard Brody, On Placebos, 5 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 17, 18 (1975).
11 Howard Brody, The Placebo Response: Recent Research and
Implications for Family Medicine, 49 J. FAM. PRAC. 649, 650 (2000).
12 Arthur J. Barsky, Ralph Saintfort, Malcolm P. Rogers & Jonathan F.
Borus, Nonspecific Medication Side Effects and the Nocebo
Phenomenon, 287 JAMA 622, 623 (2002).
13 Henry K. Beecher, The Powerful Placebo, 159 JAMA 1602, 1604-05
(1955).
14 Margrit Fissler, Karin Meissner, Antonius Schneider & Klaus Linde,
Frequency and Circumstances of Placebo Use in Clinical Practice - A
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Conversely, not all physicians are convinced about
the power of the placebo. Asbjorn Hrobjartsson
systematically reviewed 114 clinical trials in which 8,525
patients with various clinical conditions were randomized
to placebo or to no active treatment. 16 Both groups actually
received a placebo but only one group was informed it was
a placebo; the other group was led to believe active
medication was being dispensed. Consequently, both the
placebo group and the "no treatment" group received
exactly the same treatment. The placebos used were: (1)
sugar pills; (2) procedures performed with nonfunctioning
equipment (e.g., transcutaneous electrical nerve stimulation
with the device unplugged); and (3) pseudo-psychotherapy
(nondirectional, neutral discussion between patient and
treatment provider). No treatment entailed observation only
or standard therapy only; when standard therapy was
employed, the placebo was additional.
Forty different clinical conditions were investigated
including, inter alia, pain, high blood pressure, high
cholesterol, smoking, depression and obesity. Only trials
involving analgesia showed a statistically significant
difference in effect between the placebo and the "no
treatment" groups. Slight but insignificant placebo effects
were observed for obesity, hypertension, and insomnia. No
effects were evident for all the remaining conditions. The
authors concluded that the "use of placebo outside the aegis
of a controlled, properly designed clinical trial cannot be
recommended."
16 Asbjorn Hr6bjartsson & Peter C. Gotzsche, Is the Placebo
Powerless? An Analysis of Clinical Trials Comparing Placebo with No
Treatment, 344 NEWENG. J. MED. 1594, 1594 (2001).
17 Id. at 1599 (The forty conditions investigated were hypertension,
asthma, anemia, hyperglycemia, hypercholesterolemia, seasickness,
Raynaud's disease, alcohol abuse, smoking, obesity, poor oral hygiene,
herpes simplex infection, bacterial infection, common cold, pain,
nausea, ileus, infertility, cervical dilatation, labor, menopause,
prostatism, depression, schizophrenia, insomnia, anxiety, phobia,
14
14
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The degree of placebo effect often depends on the
nature of the intervention, i.e., some treatment modalities
are more efficacious than others. In general, injections are
more potent than oral medication, capsules work better than
tablets, brightly colored remedies are more efficacious than
muted colors, and two pills work better than one.18
III. Placebos in Clinical Medicine
For practicing physicians, there are clear advantages
and disadvantages to the clinical use of placebos. Each
practitioner must weigh the benefits and risks in any given
circumstance and decide whether placebo use is indicated.
This section will consider the pros and cons of placebo use
as well as its impact on health care.
A. Pros
Placebos are arguably an ideal treatment. Numerous
studies demonstrate the efficacy of the little "sugar pill."
These inert substances or simulated treatments
fundamentally lack organic side effects.19 Placebos are
considerably less dangerous than genuine drugs because
they confer no direct toxicity.20 There is no physical risk;
thus, the dominant consideration is efficacy.
In general, doctors are acutely aware of the
vicissitudes of medicine and the challenge of giving
meaningful, comprehensible and correct answers to
compulsive nail biting, mental handicap, marital discord, stress related
to dental treatment, orgasmic difficulties, fecal soiling, enuresis,
epilepsy, Parkinson's disease, Alzheimer's disease, attention-deficit-
hyperactivity disorder, carpal syndrome, and undiagnosed ailments).
18 DAN J. TENNENHOUSE, 3 ATTORNEY'S MEDICAL DESKBOOK §
38.2.40 (4th ed. 2006 & Supp. 2010).
1 Brody, supra note 10, at 18.
20 Paul Enck, Fabrizio Benedetti & Manfred Schedlowski, New Insights
into the Placebo and Nocebo Responses, 59 NEURON 195, 202 (2008).
15
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patients. There are diseases that are untreatable but patients
insist on some instrumentality. If nothing is offered,
patients depart feeling dissatisfied, neglected, and
shortchanged. If they feel worse at the conclusion of the
visit than at its inception, the encounter has been a disaster
and the doctor-patient relationship is in peril. The placebo
effect can confer a therapeutic advantage even when there
is no effective treatment. When the disease is incurable and
the situation is hopeless, the placebo offers a "treatment"
option. When their physical or psychological needs remain
unattended, there is a danger that patients will go doctor-
shopping and receive inappropriate or overly aggressive
medical care from a less skilled or more self-serving
healthcare provider. Perhaps the patient will resort to
dangerous Google self-treatment.
Patients often present with vague, non-specific
complaints that are not pathognomonic for any particular
illness. Underlying psychological or situational difficulties
are frequently the genesis of these symptoms. Rather than
resort to speculative polypharmacy, a placebo may be both
less toxic and more effective. If the problem disappears
with the placebo, it was most likely psychogenic. Side
effects and drug habituation are avoided.
A study of Swiss healthcare providers revealed the most




4. risk of substance abuse
5. difficult or demanding patients
6. patient request
7. to invoke the placebo effect
8. to avoid conflict with patients
9. as a supplement to standard treatment
10. for non-specific symptoms
16
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11. to avoid informing patients that treatment
possibilities were exhausted. 2 1
B. Cons
When placebo use displaces comprehensive medical
evaluation and treatment, the placebo effect may mask
symptoms and delay the indicated treatment of the medical
22condition. One of the most egregious examples of placebo
use in lieu of well-established treatment occurred in rural
23Alabama between the years 1932 and 1972. During the
period, African-American men were screened for "bad
blood" and then lured into a government sponsored
"treatment" program. In reality, the United States Public
Health Service screened these men for tertiary syphilis.
Rather than receiving penicillin, 399 infected men were
treated with placebos. They were neither informed about
their syphilitic infection nor given information regarding its
treatment or prevention. The purpose of the study,
inconceivable in this day and age, was to study the long-
term effects of an untreated disease.24 Catastrophes like this
remind us of other dark periods in human history when
people were abused or tortured based solely on their race or
religion. Unfortunately, the use of placebos is sometimes
viewed through this lens.
The antithesis of the placebo effect is the "nocebo
phenomenon."25 While placebos produce beneficial results,
like genuine therapeutic agents, they can have associated
toxic, or nocebo, effects. Beecher observed thirty-five
21 Fissler, supra note 6, at 5.
22 Paul Hibert, Barry Hoffmaster, Kathleen Glass & Peter Singer,
Bioethics For Clinicians: Truth Telling, 156 CAN. MED. Ass'N J. 225,
226 (1997).
23 Amy L. Fairchild & Ronald Bayer, Uses and Abuses of Tuskegee,
SCIENCE, May 7, 1999, at 919.
24 id.
25 Barsky, supra note 12, at 622.
17
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different toxic effects of placebos. The incidence of side
effects was: dry mouth, nine percent; nausea, ten percent;
sensation of heaviness, eighteen percent; headache, twenty-
five percent; difficulty concentrating, fifteen percent;
drowsiness, fifty percent; warm glow, eight percent;
relaxation, nine percent; fatigue, eighteen percent; and
sleep, ten percent.26 Professor Marshall B. Kapp noted
placebo-related side effects in five to ten percent of
27
patients. His list of observed nocebo effects was even
more comprehensive: nausea, thirst, headache, dizziness,
sleepiness, insomnia, fatigue, depression, numbness,
vomiting, tremor, fast heart beat, hives, diarrhea, blood
pressure changes, pallor, skin rashes, swelling, and
unsteady gait.2
Medical students were evaluated in a clinical trial
using placebos to assess nocebo effects on otherwise
normal subjects.29 Twelve subjects were each given red and
white gelatin capsules with lactose, green, and yellow
gelatin capsules with lactose, or a drink of water.3 o The
students taking the colored capsules reported the following
fourteen symptoms: flushing of face, euphoria, anxiety,
irritability, restlessness, inability to concentrate, thirst,
tremors, sedation, headache, bradycardia, dysphoria,
flatulence, and diuresis.31 Moreover, eight of twelve of the
red/white group and ten of twelve of the 3reen/yellow
group reported side effects from the placebos.
Placebo treatment can be costly. Many individuals
correlate effectiveness with cost. In other words, the cheap
26 Beecher, supra note 13, at 1603.
27 Kapp, supra note 8, at 375.
28 id.
29 C.W. Gowdey, J.T. Hamilton & R.B. Philp, A Controlled Clinical
Trial Using Placebos in Normal Subjects: A Teaching Exercise, 96
CAN. MED. Ass'N J. 1317, 1317 (1967).30 id.
31 Id. at 1318.
32 Id. at 1319-20.
18
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stuff is garbage. Spurious procedures still require
equipment and professional time. Taken to extremes, the
cost of a fictitious surgical procedure complete with an
operating room, personnel, and surgical packs would be
enormous. Even when the patient pays the price, the
efficacy of the placebo effect is still questionable in any
given circumstance.
There are emotional risks to the long-term use of
placebos. In general, the potency of the placebo effect
diminishes with time, inducing something akin to
tachyphylaxis. Psychological dependency may develop,
requiring increasingly large doses of placebo and
withdrawal sym toms when administration ceases.33
Fissler extensively analyzed the frequency of
placebo use in clinical medicine by reviewing twenty-two
studies conducted from 1973 to 2009. The percentage of
physicians who reported using placebos at least once was
highly variable. Between seventeen and eighty percent used
pure placebos; fifty-four to fifty-seven percent used impure
placebos; and forty-one to ninety-nine percent used pure
and/or impure placebos. Saline injections, sugar pills or
prepared placebo tablets were the most popular modalities.
Impure placebos included antibiotics for viral infections as
well as vitamins and analgesics for problematical
indications. The results indicated that a significant
proportion of physicians and nurses have used pure
placebos at some point in clinical situations, but the number
of frequent users was de minimis. Impure placebos,
especially superfluous antibiotics, were more likely to be
used with frequency.
Placebo use amonf Swiss primary care providers
has been closely studied.3 Seventy-six percent of the two
33 Oldrich Vinar, Dependence on a Placebo: A Case Report, 115 BRIT.
J. PSYCHIATRY 1189, 1190 (1969).
34 Fsser, supra note 14, at 2.
35 Fdssler, supra note 6, at 1.
19
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hundred doctors polled have used bland ointments and/or
bandages for contusions without any apparent skin
damages. Sugar pills and saline injections were only used
by ten percent. Almost two thirds of doctors have
prescribed therapies, such as vitamins or antibiotics,
without an approved indication or an expectation of
efficacy. Regarding diagnostic exams, the sophistication of
the test was inversely proportional to the frequency of its
use. Eighty-nine percent of physicians admitted to
performing unnecessary physical exams; sixty-nine percent
ordered non-essential technical exams with no inherent risk
(e.g., ultrasound, MRI); and thirty-one percent prescribed
non-essential technical exams with some inherent risk (e.g.,
CT scans).
Americans receive a considerable amount of
placebo-related care without being cognizant of it. One-
third of Americans turn to alternative medicine, including
massage, homeopathy, spiritual healing, and
36megavitamins. Evidently, the total number of visits to
non-allopathic care providers each year exceeds the number
of visits to primary care physicians. While self-styled
healers and their patients are convinced of the efficacy of
megavitamins and herbal potions, these popular remedies
derive their benefit predominantly from the placebo
effect.37
There is considerable evidence to suggest that
homeopathy is placebo medicine. Dr. Wayne B. Jonas
analyzed four independent, comprehensive reviews to
evaluate whether homeopathic remedies and placebos were
equivalent in double-blind, randomized studies. 38Al
homeopathic remedies are highly diluted; a small quantity
36 Walter A. Brown, The Placebo Effect, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Jan.
1998 at 90, 95.
37 Id.
3 Wayne B. Jonas, Ted J. Kaptchuk, & Klaus Linde, A Critical
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of either a 1:10 or 1:100 solution is further diluted six to
twelve times. 39 For the higher dilution (1:100 x 12), the
probability of finding a single molecule of the "active"
ingredient in a one-liter volume is sixty percent. In other
words, if you drink a quart of the concoction, about one
half of the time you will ingest a single molecule of the
"active" ingredient. Because the doses are virtually non-
existent, most authorities assume that homeopathy is safe
and its elixirs will not interact with conventional drugs.40
This is invariably true since the compounds are not
pharmacologically active. Jonas' study concluded that there
is scant evidence that homeopathy is effective for any
specific clinical condition. In other words, the
homeopathic remedy itself functions as a placebo.
IV. Neuroscience
A neurologist injures her knee skiing and visits the
orthopedist. The orthopedist asks, "Where does it hurt?"
The neurologist smiles and says, "In my head, of course."
Neuroscience has taken a perspicacious look into
the effects of placebos on the brain, usually in the context
of pain relief. A considerable amount of information has
already been amassed. Tor Wager is widely recognized for
studying the nexus between placebos, the experience and
anticipation of pain, and functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) changes.42 His work was further confirmed
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 397.
42 Tor Wager, James Rilling, Edward Smith, Alex Sokolik, Kenneth
Casey, Richard Davidson, Stephen Kosslyn, Robert Rose & Jonathan
Cohen, Placebo-Induced Changes in fMRI in the Anticipation and
Experience of Pain, SCIENCE, Feb. 20, 2004, at 1162.
21
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by Dr. Jon-Kar Zubieta using positron emission
tomography (PET scan).43
Wager found that placebo manipulations decrease
brain activity in regions known to be pain-sensitive, and
that this decrease correlates with a reduction in subjective
pain." Two studies involving induced pain with electric
shock or thermal stimulus demonstrated these findings.
Previously identified placebo responders were randomized
into two groups.45 The placebo group was told that they
were getting a pharmacologically active analgesic; the
control group was told that their pill was ineffective against
pain. Only the placebo group evinced a statistically
significant reduction in perceived pain and a divergence in
brain activity. First, placebo analgesia was correlated with
decreased brain activity in pain-sensitive brain regions,
including the thalamus, insula, and anterior cingulate
cortex, and with increased activity in the prefrontal cortex.
Second, there was an increase in prefrontal activity even
before the pain stimulus was administered. The anticipation
of a painful stimulus coupled with expectations of pain
relief was associated with heightened activity in the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (associated with cognitive
control) and the orbitofrontal cortex (associated with
allocation of control).46
Placebo analgesia is mediated by both opioid and
non-opioid pathways. Analgesia can be partly blocked by
the drug, Naloxone, a competitive antagonist of the g-
opioid receptor frequently used to treat opioid overdose.
The blockade confirms the importance of endogenous
opioids in the placebo response. Moreover, the effect of
43 Jon-Kar Zubieta, Joshua A. Bueller, Lisa R. Jackson, David J. Scott,
Yanjun Xu, Robert A. Koeppe, Thomas E. Nichols & Christian S.
Stohler, Placebo Effects Mediated by Endogenous Opioid Activity ony -
Opioid Receptors, 25 J. NEUROSCIENCE 7754, 7755, 7760 (2005).
4 Wager et al., supra note 42, at 1165.
45 Id. at 1162-66.
46 Id. at 1163-64.
22
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Naloxone was greater when the subjects had strong
expectations regarding the pain relieving effects of the
placebo. This was consistent with the notion that
expectations of analgesia were associated with increased
local release of endogenous p-opioids. On the other hand,
even when subjects had no expectation cues, the placebo
still manifested pain relieving effects not blocked by
Naloxone, supporting the existence of the non-opioid
pathway.47
Neuropharmacologists have further differentiated
placebo analgesia pathways based on whether the analgesia
was activated by the expectation of relief or by prior
conditioning. Experimental subjects underwent
pretreatment conditioning with morphine or Ketorolac, an
anti-inflammatory medication with analgesic effects, prior
to the application of painful tourniquet pressure. Groups
were then given morphine, Ketorolac, Naloxone, or a
placebo to attenuate the pain. Two main findings emerged
from the study. Those subjects who believed they had
received an analgesic and expected relief of pain noted
significantly less pain. Therefore, endogenous opioid
systems are triggered by cognitive factors, specifically
verbal expectation. In contrast, placebo responses induced
by conditioning were not exclusively mediated by
endogenous opioids. While placebo analgesia after
morphine conditioning did utilize the opioid pathway,
Ketorolac conditioning did not. Ketorolac used the cyclo-
oxygenase pathway characteristic of all non-steroidal anti-
inflammatory drugs at the level of peripheral and central
sites in the spinal cord.48
47 Fabrizio Benedetti, Helen S. Mayberg, Tor D. Wager, Christian S.
Stohler, and Jon-Kar Zubieta, Neurobiological Mechanisms of the
Placebo Effect, 25 J. NEUROSCIENCE 10390, 10390 (2005).
48 Martina Amanzio & Fabrizio Benedetti, Neuropharmacological
Dissection of Placebo Analgesia: Expectation-Activated Opioid
Systems versus Conditioning - Activated Specific Subsystems, 19 J.
NEUROSCIENCE 484, 490 (1999).
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In 2011, Wager reanalyzed his original studies to
assess individual variations in the robustness of placebo
effect. fMRI activity was observed at two points - during
the anticipation of pain and while experiencing pain. The
fMRI showed that increased anticipatory activity in the
frontoparietal network and decreased activity in the
posterior insular/temporal network were predictive of the
magnitude of placebo analgesia. The most predictive
regions were those associated with emotional appraisal
rather than cognitive control or pain processing. Wager
concluded that engagement of emotional appraisal circuits
is the driving force behind the perceived individual
variation in placebo analgesia, rather than early suppression
49of nociceptive processing.
While most placebo-related neuroscientific inquiries
have considered analgesia, there is growing interest in the
effect of placebo on motor control in Parkinson's disease.
Patients who exhibited improved motor control after
placebo administration demonstrated activation of
endogenous dopamine release on Positron Emission
51Tomography (PET) scans.
PET scans were obtained on a group of clinically
depressed men who participated in an inpatient,
randomized, placebo-controlled study of the antidepressant,
Fluoxetine (Prozac). Scans were performed at three
separate intervals: before treatment (baseline), at one week,
and at six weeks. After six weeks, subjects who
experienced a clinical response were assessed and change
patterns for each individual were determined; then scans
from the treatment and placebo groups were compared.
Anatomically overlapping changes were evident at six
49 Tor D. Wager, Lauren Y. Atlas, Lauren A. Leotti & James K.
Rilling, Predicting Individual Differences in Placebo Analgesia:
Contributions of Brain Activity during Anticipation and Pain
Experience, 31 J. NEUROSCIENCE 439, 439 (2011).
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weeks between the Fluoxetine and placebo groups. Both
groups manifested corresponding increases in glucose
metabolism in the prefrontal, parietal, and posterior
cingulate regions, as well as a decrease in subgenual
cingulate. The only variation was that the regional changes
in the Fluoxetine-treated group were of greater magnitude
than the placebo group. 52
In summary, placebo analgesia is mediated by both
opioid and non-opioid pathways, just like
pharmacologically active substances. The placebo effect in
Parkinson's disease and depression correlates with altered
metabolic activity in neuroanatomical areas known to be
impaired in these conditions.
V. Ethics
The use of placebos poses four ethical questions
regarding deception, autonomy, malfeasance, and justice.
Ethicists find deception the most problematic.
Conceptually, many individuals maintain that deception of
any kind is morally objectionable. Truth in disclosure is a
fundamental aspect of the autonomy and dignity of human
beings. Deontology considers manipulation and deception
to be a manifestation of disrespect between people.
Deception is condemned because it "violates an a priori
moral rule-a priori because the rule appeals to the very
nature of our beings (that is, persons deserving respect)
rather than to the good or bad consequences of our
actions." 53
Most people believe that doctors should be
prescribing genuine medication. The prescription of
52 Helen S. Mayberg ET AL., Regional Metabolic Effects of Fluoxetine
in Major Depression: Serial Changes and Relationship to Clinical
Response, 48 BIOLOGY PSYCHIATRY 830, 836 (2000).
53 Howard Brody, The Lie That Heals: The Ethics of Giving Placebos,
97 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 112, 113 (1982).
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placebos can be deceptive in three ways. Doctors may: (1)
lie about what the medication is; (2) make vague statements
about the medication; and (3) say nothing about the
medication. 54 The utilitarian responds, "So what? Who
cares as long as it works?" The utilitarian summates all the
favorable consequences attributable to placebos, and argues
(or assumes) that these outweigh the evils of deception. To
prove value, it is necessary only to show that using
placebos will increase the sum total of happiness in the
world.ss
Armageddon occurs when the patient discovers that
a placebo has been used. Physicians who endeavor to
deceive patients by representing placebos as
pharmacologically active medications risk undermining
their patients' trust.56 Once trust and confidence are
undermined, any hope for a productive physician-patient
relationship is decimated. Every treatment or intervention is
suspect. The motives and candor of the doctor will always
be uncertain. The consequences go well beyond individual
relationships. Patients, in general, may relinquish trust and
confidence in the entire medical profession. The efficacy of
bona fide prescription pharmaceuticals will be suspect.
Other options, such as medication with greater toxicity or
frank quackery, may be selected. In addition to rejecting
proper care, patients may opt for uninformed or
misinformed self-care.57 A computer trip to "Dr. Google"
could supplant a visit to the old style, bricks and mortar
medical office when illness strikes. Deception is a two-way
street; the doctor deceives the patient, and the patient
deceives the doctor. Future care would be based on
inadequate patient histories and failure to disclose self-
54 Kapp, supra note 8, at 376.
ss Brody, supra note 53, at 114.
56 Irwin Kleinman, Peter Brown, Larry Librach, Placebo Pain
Medication: Ethical and Practical Considerations, 3 ARCH FAMILY
MED. 453, 453 (1994).
5 See Kapp, supra note 8, at 377-78.
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treatment. The public may perceive doctors as charlatans,
and charlatans are not likely to promote healing with caring
explanations or the laying on of hands. To paraphrase
Simon and Garfunkel, "[Deception], like a cancer,
grows."5 By their very nature, deceptive practices fester,
and, as a result, defeat the conventional restraints of
obligation. Other parties in the healthcare system, such as
the nurse, pharmacist and medical assistant, become co-
conspirators.
Placebos are not simply inconsequential "white
lies." The monetary cost of prescription placebos is
considerable. In order to be "potent," placebos cannot be
free of charge. If the fee for the placebo prescription is
considerable, someone will be making an unjustifiable
profit. If it is too low, the patient may be suspicious of a
contrivance.59 Large expenditures of both time and money
may be required for placebo therapy. There is evidence that
increasing the cost of a prescription, thus making the
remedy appear more valuable and exotic, enhances the
placebo effect. This can result in financial loss to private
and public third-party insurers who pay the pharmacy fees.
The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the
American Medical Association concluded that, "the
deceptive use of placebos is not ethically acceptable
because it may harm patients to a greater degree than it
helps them."60 Using placebos in a duplicitous fashion is
disfavored because it fundamentally conflicts with a
58 See generally SIMON & GARFUNKEL, The Sound of Silence, on
WEDNESDAY MORNING, 3 A.M. (Columbia Records 1964).
59 See Brody, supra note 53, at 114.
6 Robert M. Sade, Placebo Use in Clinical Practice, CEJA Report 2-1-
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doctor's professional obligation to promote patient welfare
and respect patient autonomy. The Council has elucidated
the three most objectionable circumstances where placebos
are utilized: (1) to serve the convenience of the physician
rather than to promote patient welfare; (2) to mollify the
demanding and difficult patient; and (3) to assuage a
patient with a complex problem that frustrates the
physician.61
Since the emergence of the movement away from
paternalistic medicine, patient autonomy has become of
paramount importance in the physician-patient relationship.
Placebos are the antithesis of patient autonomy. Autonomy
and dignity are violated when the patient is deprived of an
opportunity to play a meaningful role in her care. It is the
patient's prerogative to make significant life decisions, to
participate fully, and to cooperate effectively. The
physician has an ethical and fiduciary duty to disclose
material facts and the patient has a duty to share
responsibility for the treatment. 62
Malfeasance is a concern when physical harm is
directly or indirectly inflicted. Placebo-induced side effects
are considered a direct harm. Harm is also caused when a
doctor prescribes a placebo to ameliorate subjective
symptoms either before or in lieu of a comprehensive
medical or psychiatric examination, when that examination
would have revealed a significant, treatable illness.
Placebos can induce dependency on a number of levels. By
its very nature, the dependency is psychological and,
arguably, a falsity. This dependency is unhealthy and may
result in actual addiction. Individuals may evolve into
"professional patients" - every symptom must be treated;
unexplained maladies come and go with the assistance of a
doctor who uses her sample closet and prescription pad
liberally. Constant treatment with magical liquids or
28
61 Id.
62 See Kapp, supra note 8, at 378-79.
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capsules can supplant the preventative paradigm. No longer
will people feel the need to maintain a healthy lifestyle and
use common sense.63
It is axiomatic that similar individuals with similar
medical problems should be treated equally, or at least
similarly. This basic principle of justice is easily violated
when placebo therapy leads to disparate treatment. The risk
is especially acute in the context of overly demanding and
querulous patients who are given placebos based on the
likelihood that they are overstating their level of pain.
Physicians ma feel the need to prove that the patient is not
actually sick.
There are, however, a number of arguments in favor
of the ethical acceptance and use of placebo. First,
contemptible deception can be eliminated by telling the
patient the nature of the treatment. Once prevarication is
eliminated, the ethical problem is defused. While the
outcome for an informed patient may not be comparable to
one who is deceived, undisguised placebo treatment is still
associated with a modest rate of success. The earliest
empirical rejection of the traditional deception-based
heuristic of the placebo response was a non-blind placebo
trial of fourteen psychiatric outpatients with somatic
symptoms. Each was treated for one week with sugar pills.
Subjects were candidly informed that they were taking
sugar pills with the caveat that many patients experienced
relief with such medication despite the absence of active
ingredients. Thirteen patients (ninety-three percent)
experienced some degree of subjective or objective
symptom reduction.
63 See id. at 380.
6 James S. Goodwin, Jean M. Goodwin & Albert V. Vogel, Knowledge
and Use of Placebos by House Officers and Nurses, 91 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 106, 109 (1979).
65 Lee C. Park & Uno Covi, An Exploration of Neurotic Patients'
Responses to Placebo When Its Inert Content is Disclosed, 12 ARCH.
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 336, 338 (1965).
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Certain levels of deception may be acceptable.
Placebo treatment can be used without the need for an
outright verbal lie. It may be more palatable to deceive a
patient in a nonverbal fashion using gestures or visual
clues. The placebo effect can be enhanced by the
environment in which the prescription is written. "The
setting in a doctor's office or hospital room, the impressive
terminology, the mystique of the all-powerful physician
prescribing a cure - all of these tend to give the patient faith
in the remedy." 66
If a deception is benevolent, is it any less
objectionable? Physicians use placebos for benevolent
purposes, i.e., to improve the well-being of their patients. A
benevolent lie used to evoke a placebo effect may be
sufficiently virtuous for some.6 7  In addition, patients
sometimes prefer to be lied to. It is not improper to oblige
them. Patients commonly return decision-making power to
physicians by not asking for information or
recommendations, "but instead pledge - by word or
conduct - to follow whatever course of action the physician
feels is appropriate."68 A patient's implicit or explicit
consent to be deceived renders a lie ethical. There are
situations in which lying to a patient is considered humane
if it fulfills the patient's wishes. For some, maintaining
hope or even the illusion of hope even in the face of near
hopelessness improves the quality and duration of life over
the short term by eliciting a placebo effect.6 9
Swiss health providers have tried to justify placebo
use by differentiating between pure and impure placebos.
They contend that use of pure (inert) placebos is ethically
unacceptable because it dupes the patient and promotes an
66 See Bok, supra note 2, at 19.
67 Kathleen M. Boozang, The Therapeutic Placebo: The Case for
Patient Deception, 54 FLA. L. REV. 687, 725 (2002).
68 See Kapp, supra note 8, at 385.
69 See Boozang, supra note 67, at 753.
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outdated, unduly paternalistic relationship. These
practitioners justify the use of impure (pharmacologically
active) placebos with the casuistic argument that active
drugs, even those not indicated for the disease in question,
could conceivably confer a positive effect on the health of
the patient.70
VI. Law
Legal issues regarding placebo treatment have not
materialized in court cases, legislation, or federal and state
regulation because patients have not been informed that
they are taking placebos. The law does not specifically and
overtly regulate the use of placebos except in the context of
the patient's right to pain management. 7  When the United
States Supreme Court considered an individual's right to
choose physician-assisted suicide, it affirmed an
individual's right to refuse pain management and
appropriate palliative care. 72
Timothy Quill, M.D. challenged the illegality of
prescribing lethal medication to terminally ill, mentally
competent patients in Vacco v. Quill.73 The United States
Supreme Court held that physician-assisted suicide was
impermissible based on the theory of causation and intent.
Justice O'Connor, concurring in another "right-to-die"
case, affirmed that a terminal patient in great pain "has no
legal barriers to obtaining medication . . . to alleviate that
suffering, even to the point of causing unconsciousness and
70 See Fissler, supra note 6, at 7.
7' Karen J. Nichols ET AL., AOA's Position Against Use ofPlacebos for
Pain Management in End-of-Life Care, 105 J. AM. OSTEOPATHIC
ASS'N S2, S3-4 (2005) (discussing legislation regarding a patient's
right to pain management).
72 Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 808 (1997).
73 Id. at 793.
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hastening death." 74 Placebo substitution for active analgesic
medication, however, without the express informed consent
of the individual violates the precepts of the American Bar
Association.7 5
A cause of action for placebo-related damages can
be brought under the theories of fraud, false advertising,
lack of informed consent and medical malpractice.
A. Fraud
The elements of fraud giving rise to the "tort action
for deceit are: (a) misrepresentation (false representation,
concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity
(or 'scienter'); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance;
(d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage." 76 It is
apparent that each element of the cause of action is
potentially present in a case where placebos are
mendaciously used, regardless of whether an outright lie, a
vague and non-committal statement, or silence concerning
the nature of the treatment is involved. Intent to harm the
plaintiff is not requisite.7 7
In Jurcich v. General Motors Corp., an employee
brought an action in fraud and deceit against the
corporation and its nurse employee for repeatedly treating
him for pain with sugar pills, without his knowledge, after a
job-related injury.7 8 The issue for the court was whether
this case should be brought under the rubric of fraud or
74 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 737 (1996) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion also applies to
Vacco, 521 U.S. at 809).
75 Nichols, supra 71, at S4.
76 Southern Union Co. v. Southwest Gas Corp., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1021,
1030 (D. Ariz. 2001) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
77 See Kapp, supra note 8, at 388.
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medical malpractice. 79  The court held that medical
malpractice was the appropriate theory, not fraud and
deceit. Further, the court observed that the prescription of
placebos "is, in appropriate cases, a recognized form of
medical treatment." The court concluded that the plaintiff
was not injured by the placebo by holding that "[t]here is
not a scintilla of evidence in this record that by the
dispensing of placebos to him his back injuries were
worsened nor that any new injuries resulted. He simply
obtained no relief from his pain."81 The court viewed the
use of a placebo as proper under certain circumstances, and
the issue in the case was the medical standard of care. 82
B. Fraudulent Advertising
Courts have strongly disfavored the promotion and
advertising of over-the-counter placebos. The Federal
Trade Commission filed an action against the promoter of a
worthless hair loss product in FTC v. Pantron I Corp..83
The defendant-promoter asserted that there was scientific
evidence to support his claim of efficacq, but the court
established that any benefit was placebic. A seller may
not claim that a product is effectual when its effectiveness
is predicated solely on the placebo effect. That
representation "constitutes a 'false advertisement' even
though some consumers may experience positive results."85
The court in FTC v. QT, Inc. arrived at a similar
conclusion.86 The defendants used infomercials and print
advertising to market the Q-Ray Ionized Bracelet@ as a
'
9 Id. at 600.
80 Id.
81Id. at 601.
82 Boozang, supra note 67, at 740.
83 FTC v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 1088, 1088 (9th Cir. 1994).
4 See id. at 1097.
Id. at 1100.
FTC v. QT, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 2d 908, 908 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
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device that provided significant, immediate, and complete
pain relief for conditions such as migraines and back pain
by emitting an unspecified ionizing force. The court found
no scientific evidence to substantiate the claims and held
that the bracelet was advertised in a dishonest and
materially misleading manner since any benefit from the
product was based solely on the placebo effect. The court
quoted United States v. An Article.. .ACU-DOT, "[a] kiss
from mother on the affected area would serve just as well
to relieve pain, if mother's kisses were marketed as
effectively...." 88
C. Informed Consent
Under the professional standard of informed
consent, a physician is required to make disclosures that a
reasonable physician would make under the circumstances.
The patient-oriented standard, on the other hand, "requires
physicians to provide patients with that information which
the 'reasonably prudent person would find material to
making a decision."'89 To establish a prima facie case
against a physician for failure to obtain informed consent,
the plaintiff must prove that:
1. the physician had a duty to disclose sufficient
information about a proposed treatment to
obtain the patient's informed consent;
2. the physician breached that duty;
3. the physician's failure to disclose adequate
information was the proximate cause of the
patient's decision to consent to a treatment to
which the patient would have withheld consent
if he or she had been adequately informed; and
87 See id. at 965.
88 Id. at 964 (citing United States v. An Article... ACU-DOT, 483 F.
Supp. 1311, 1315 (N.D. Ohio 1980)).
89 Boozang, supra note 67, at 739.
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4. a potential adverse consequence of the treatment
materialized, resulting in a detriment to the
patient.90
Hospital organizations promote the concept of
informed consent to their patients through brochures
distributed at the time of admission. The American
Hospital Association's brochure entitled, "The Patient Care
Partnership," urges patients to be actively involved in their
care:
INVOLVEMENT IN YOUR CARE
You and your doctor often make
decisions about your care before you go to
the hospital. Other times, especially in
emergencies, those decisions are made
during your hospital stay.
When decision-making takes place, it
should include:
* Discussing your medical condition and
information about medically appropriate
treatment choices.
To make informed decisions with your
doctor, you need to understand:
* The benefits and risks of each treatment.
* Whether your treatment is experimental
or part of a research study.
* What you can reasonably expect from
your treatment and any long-term effects
it might have on your quality of life.
* What you and your family will need to do
after you leave the hospital.
9 Bennett v. Surgidev Corp., 710 A.2d 1023, 1026 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1998) (citing Largey v. Rothman, 540 A.2d 504 (N.J. 1988);
Caputa v. Antiles, 686 A.2d 356 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996)).
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* The financial consequences of using
uncovered services or out-of-network
providers.91
The use of placebos creates a number of problems
with informed consent. In general, informed consent for
placebo use is not sought for two reasons: (1) the
usefulness of a placebo is abrogated when the patient
knows what it is; and (2) placebos have been considered
sufficiently harmless and beneficial to render disclosure
unnecessary.92 Some legal professionals surmise that
informed consent does not apply to the use of placebos. An
intervention must be potentially hazardous for issues of
informed consent to apply. Since placebos are prescribed in
clinical practice solely for symptomatic relief and not for
disease treatment, it has been argued that no ongoing harm
will result from substituting a placebo in place of a
prescription drug.93
Several other reasons circumventing full disclosure
have been articulated. First, one may construe a patient's
initial consent to treatment as ongoing consent to all
specific treatments that a physician employs, including the
use of a pure placebo. 94 Second, under existing consent
law, a patient does not need to be informed when a
physician chooses Treatment A over Treatment B, because
of the added placebo effect. 95 Third, when considering the
explication of potential treatment side effects, it is the
prerogative of the patient to decide whether he/she would
like to hear about them. Both legal and ethical ideations of
9' The Patient Care Partnership, BROCHURE (AMER. HosP. Assoc.
2003).
92 Bok, supra note 2, at 19.
9 DAN J. TENNENHOUSE, 3 ArrORNEYS MEDICAL DESKBOOK § 38:2.50
(4th ed. 2006 & Supp. 2010).
94 Anup Malani, Regulation with Placebo Effects, 58 DUKE L.J. 411,
449 (2008).
9 See id. at 450-51.
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informed consent should provide for patients who truly
want to be deceived, or for whom the truth would be
therapeutically counterproductive.96 The physician may
also take into account whether the side effects are material
and whether current medical custom demands their
disclosure. 97
When enough physicians use placebos for
therapeutic purposes without disclosure, the lack of
disclosure evolves into the professional standard of care
and reframes notions of informed consent. 98 In other words,
the absence of disclosure will be consistent with the
"exercise [of] that degree of care, skill and learning
expected of a reasonable, prudent health care provider in
the profession or class to which he belongs within the state
acting in the same or similar circumstances." 99 Neither will
physicians encounter legal hurdles under a patient-oriented
standard. If, as previously argued, the reasonable patient
would opt to experience the benefits of placebo therapy
without having the truth revealed to her, then the legal
standard of disclosure, as determined by the reasonable
patient, would abide the deception.
D. Medical Malpractice
In Arizona, there are two elements of proof
necessary to show that an injury resulted from the failure of
a health care provider to follow the accepted standard of
care:
1. The health care provider failed to exercise that
degree of care, skill and learning expected of a
reasonable, prudent health care provider in the
96 Boozang, supra note 67, at 737.
9 Malani, supra note 94, at 452.
98 Boozang, supra note 67, at 739.
9 ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 12-563 (LEXIS through 2011 legislation).
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profession or class to which he belongs within the
state acting in the same or similar circumstances.
2. Such failure was a proximate cause of the
injury. 00
Plaintiffs must present facts from which negligence and a
causal relation between the injury and the defendant's acts
may be reasonably inferred. 01 The court "must find for the
defendant unless [it] finds a probability that defendant's
negligence was a cause of plaintiffs injury."102
With regard to the use of placebos, the basic rules
of medical malpractice hold. The issue in malpractice cases
is whether a doctor's treatment of a patient was negligent.
The answer hinges on whether the treatment works, not on
how it works.10 "The test for negligence is the same in all
cases: does the treatment conform to medical custom, or,
would a reasonable physician administer this treatment?"l04
There are three major considerations when a malpractice
action is based on the use of a placebo: (1) when a patient
suffers a negative placebo reaction reasonably foreseeable
to a competent doctor; (2) when appropriate treatment is
improperly impeded by the use of a placebo; and (3) when
the doctor's treatment of the patient with a placebo deters
the patient from obtaining effective treatment from another
practitioner.'os
E. Defenses
There are four main defenses to a placebo-related
claim. First, the patient suffered no harm; it is necessary to
' See id.
1o1 Harvey v. Kellin, 566 P.2d 297, 302 (Ariz. 1977).
102 Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., Inc., 688 P.2d 605, 616
(Ariz. 1984).
103 Melani, supra note 94, at 455.
104Id.
105 See Kapp, supra note 8, at 395.
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prove injury caused by the placebo treatment itself.'06
Second, use of the placebo was not negligent; similarly
trained professionals would also have prescribed a placebo
under comparable circumstances, consistent with the
accepted standard of care.107 Third, treatment without
informed consent and disclosure is conditionally
permissible where there is a reasonable likelihood that
exposing the nature of the treatment will cause
psychological harm, hinder or complicate treatment, or
impair the patient's ability to assent to treatment.' Thus,
therapeutic privilege is a well-recognized exception to the
objective standard of disclosure, and excuses the
withholding of information where disclosure would be
unhealthy to the patient. The privilege is applicable only if
disclosure of the information would complicate or hinder
treatment, cause such emotional distress as to preclude a
rational decision, or cause psychological harm to the
patient."' 09
Fourth, while the patient has the right to know the
risks, benefits and alternatives of a medical intervention,
the patient similarly possesses "the prerogative to waive or
relinquish that right.""l0 According to the California
Supreme Court, "a medical doctor need not make
disclosure of risks when the patient requests that he not be
so informed... Such a disclosure need not be made if the
procedure is simple and the danger remote and commonly
appreciated to be remote."' 1
'0 See id. at 396.
' See id.
108 See id. at 397.
109 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
110 Kapp, supra note 8, at 399.
"' Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 12 (Cal. 1972).
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VII. Recommendations
Each Monday, hundreds of thousands of doctors
return to work, evaluate patients, and select the most
effective treatment available under the circumstances. At
some point in her professional practice, a doctor has to
decide if and when a placebo might be appropriate. This
section will look at possible uses of placebos that may be
sanctioned by ethicists and legalists.
A. When Placebos May Not Be Used
There is a consensus against placebo therapy being
used as a tool of convenience for the practitioner. Placebo
therapy is not a tool of mollification for demanding patients
or those with frustrating and complex medical problems.11 2
It is not a profit center for dispensing physicians. It is not a
substitute for practicing medicine.
Bona fide treatments that are safe and effective for
the patient's condition are preferable to placebos. The use
of a placebo is unwarranted before a careful history and
physical exam is performed, a differential diagnosis is
established, the appropriate laboratory and radiological
investigation have been carried out, and necessary
consultations have been obtained. No impure placebo
should ever be used.
When the placebo treatment has been selected, it
should only be used for a specific purpose. Therapeutic
results must be carefully monitored and the duration of
treatment must be strictly defined. Placebos should be
dispensed or administered by a doctor's orders. There is no
place for over-the-counter placebos.11 3 Healthcare facilities
112 Kapp, supra note 8, at 381-82.
"13 Christie Aschwanden, Experts Question Placebo Pill for Children,
N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2008, at F5 (Jennifer Buettner successfully
treated her hypochondriacal niece with a placebo in order to avoid the
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need written policies governing their use." 4 Outright lies
are unacceptable and patient questions must be answered
candidly." Placebos should not be dispensed to patients
who specifically ask not to receive them. 16
B. When Placebos May Be Used
Placebo treatment has been suggested in the
following situations:
(1) Patient shows no benefit from standard therapy;
(2) Patient is dependent on morphine or other
addictive narcotics or sedatives and needs to be
gradually weaned off of them;
(3) Patient has a mild condition and the risk-to-
benefit ratio militates against the use of potent
medications with significant risks of toxicity or
addiction;
(4) Patient is psychologically unable to deal
rationally with candid evaluation of their medical
condition;
(5) Parents who insist that treatment must be
prescribed for their children;
(6) Patients who demand treatment preceding a
thorough diagnostic evaluation;
potential side effects of unnecessary antibiotics or other medications.
She started Efficacy Brands, a company that markets a supplement,
Obecalp (placebo spelled backwards). It is a cherry-flavored sugar pill
designed to simulate the texture and flavor of medication and is
marketed as a dietary supplement with no active drug. The placebo was
supposed to be available on the website, http://www.
inventedbyamother.com/, at fifty tablets for $5.95 or in liquid form at
retail locations across the country. However, as of January 8, 2012, it is
not. The only available placebo is "PlacebO Pilules," sold by Universal
Placebos, $20 Australia for 700 small pills, available at http://
www.placebo.com.au).
114 Kapp, supra note 8, at 402.
"' See id.
116 See id.; Bok, supra note 2, at 22.
41
41
8.1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 42
(7) Patients who are terminally ill and require
reduction in analgesic medication due to severe side
effects; and
(8) Patients who may benefit from an adjunct to
standard therapy." 7
For example, the following are circumstances where a
placebo may prove exceedingly helpful:
* An overly anxious patient who recently sustained a
myocardial infarction and is at risk for a fatal
arrhythmia, but refuses tranquilizers to reduce her
stress level.'1 8
* A patient who presents with significant symptoms
from a treatable condition but refuses medication
because of potential side effects. An example is a
post-menopausal woman with irritability and
depression who refuses estrogen replacement.119
* A child with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
who requires progressively more medication with
attendant side effects. The placebo is given to
enhance the effect of smaller doses of the active
drug.120
117 Kapp, supra note 8, at 383-84.
118 See id. at 402.
"9 See id. at 403.
120 Adrian S. Sandler, Corrine E. Glesne, James W. Bodfish,
Conditioned Placebo Dose Reduction: A New Treatment in Attention-
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder?, 31 J. DEV. & BEHAV. PEDIATRICS 369,
372-73 (2010) (Children with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
who took half their usual dosage of active medication in conjunction
with an undisclosed placebo had the same therapeutic effect as their
prior full dosage. Patients who took half their dose without placebo
showed a reduced therapeutic effect).
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VIII. Conclusion
Placebos will always have a place in clinical
medicine. They are useful for individuals who manifest a
significant placebo effect, especially when their symptoms
do not justify intervention with potent medications. But,
there will never be a substitute for a competent and
comprehensive diagnostic evaluation. The neuroscience of
placebos shows activation and inhibition of the same
anatomical pathways and receptors that are targeted by
standard pharmaceuticals.
Most of the ethical objections focus on the issue of
deception and its capacity to destroy both the doctor-patient
relationship and the standing of physicians in society.
Placebo law is not well developed, but placebo use does
raise issues of fraud, lack of informed consent, and medical
malpractice. Their use may be defended by their relative
safety and efficacy. There are solutions to deception and
informed consent problems, including the use of limited or
full disclosure. In certain circumstances, where treatment is
not warranted or not possible, the placebo effect can be
utilized to make certain patients feel better. Any
intervention in medicine is always a question of whether
the benefits outweigh the risks. There are numerous cases
in which placebos confer enormous benefits with minimal
risk. They should be used sparingly and circumspectly, but
they should be used.
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ARTICLE
JOINT AUTHORITY? THE CASE FOR STATE-BASED
MARIJUANA REGULATION
Matthew ShechtmanI
Over the past several decades the United States
government has cast an intimidating shadow over the states
in the drug policy arena. Congress inaugurated the "War
on Drugs" in 1970 through the Controlled Substances Act,
banning the possession, consumption, and distribution of a
host of narcotic substances, including marijuana. The past
decade, however, brought a revolution in the form of state-
based marijuana regulation. Ranging from
decriminalization to medical licensing, more than a dozen
states have enacted laws contradicting the blunt legalist
strictures of the CSA.
Relying on the tenets of public choice theory and
jurisdictional competition for law, this article addresses a
range of regulatory frameworks for marijuana regulation,
concluding that decentralization in favor of the states
provides the most efficient and pragmatic mechanism for
marijuana policy. Though relatively uncommented on, the
incoherent federal-state stance on drug policy leaves
citizens and enforcement agencies in a troubling
predicament regarding the legality of marijuana use and
possession. After covering traditional externalities and
"Race to the Bottom" scholarship, this article hypothesizes
a possible "Race to Nowhere" conundrum wherein states
contemplating drug policy may be faced with an all-or-
nothing dilemma, forced to choose between a complete ban
and outright legalization. While analogy to Prohibition and
alcohol regulation gives some insight that this race exists,
1 Matthew Shechtman is currently serving as a judicial law clerk for the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
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federal oversight is a poor regulatory mechanism when
accounting for a variety of balanced incentives and
extensive interest group influence.
Ultimately, America's "War on Drugs" has left its
populace confused and disenfranchised, unable to employ
their preferences to foster innovative and effective social
policies. Decentralized regulation, on the other hand,
provides states the ability to liberalize marijuana policy or
maintain the status quo, leaving the choice over tax
revenues, drug crime, prison overpopulation, and interest
group lobbying to state lawmakers and their constituents.
The United States' ongoing "War on Drugs" has
reached a new level of confusion as several states have
deviated from the unremitting federal policy against
2marijuana use and sale. Contributing to the confusion are
the co-extensive, yet sometimes conflicting Constitutional
tenets of interstate commerce, 3 Tenth Amendment state
sovereignty,4 and historic principles of federalism in state
criminal enforcement.5 While there is no apparent end in
sight for this overarching battle of federal versus state
control, this article focuses on the highly controversial
issue of what level of government should take
responsibility for the formation of marijuana policy.
Though much attention has been paid to the
constitutionality and wisdom of drug enforcement,
2 See infra Part III.
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
5 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) ("This federalist
structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people numerous
advantages. It assures a decentralized government that will be more
sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogenous society; it increases
opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes; it allows
for more innovation and experimentation in government; and it makes
government more responsive by putting the States in competition for a
mobile citizenry.") (citations omitted).
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relatively little "has been paid to [the] level-of-government
issues [present] in current drug policy discussions."6
This article begins with a brief overview of the
current regulatory background in the drug enforcement
landscape, followed by a description of the regulatory
dynamic at work from a jurisdictional competition
perspective. Part II of this article discusses the currently
established federal regulatory framework and ultimately
argues that federal authority should be disbanded and
decentralized in favor of state policymaking and
enforcement authority. Part II thus suggests a state-based
regulatory framework, arguing that competition between
jurisdictions will benefit the market for marijuana policy
and should result in state authority akin to alcohol
regulation following the enactment of the Twenty-First
Amendment. Part III presents a critique of the state
consolidation posited by Michael O'Hear and his
"Competitive Alternative" regulatory framework found in
Federalism and Drug Control.7 Part III also rebuts
O'Hear's criticisms, arguing that the market for marijuana
law is not conducive to the market failures he posits.
Finally, Part IV sets forth a previously undeveloped theory
of state-based market failure, discussing a hypothetical
"Race to Nowhere," in which jurisdictions may be faced
with an all-or-nothing choice between legalization and a
complete ban on marijuana. Though ultimately concluding
that the assumptions necessary to engender the "Race to
Nowhere" are unlikely to be found in a market for
marijuana policy, Part IV concludes by noting the
possibility for such a polarizing problem and the need for
informed regulatory decision making.
6 FRANKUN ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SEARCH FOR
RATIONAL DRUG CONTROL 159 (1992).
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I. The Federal Government's "War on Drugs"
and State Divergence in Marijuana Policymaking
The origin of today's "War on Drugs" emanated
from Richard Nixon's 1968 presidential campaign, where
he cited growing drug use as the next great problem facing
the nation.8 Just a few years later, the Nixon Administration
created the federal Drug Enforcement Administration
("DEA") and increased the drug enforcement budget to
nearly $800 million.9 Though Nixon was primarily
concerned with the more potent and destructive heroin
epidemic,10 marijuana use was easily subsumed into the
United States' drug war following three decades of
haphazardly implemented anti-marijuana criminal and tax
laws."
The "War on Drugs" fire was stoked once again by
a republican presidential campaign in 1980.12 Backed by
the powerful "parents' movement,"l 3 Ronald Reagan re-
established the "War on Drugs" through the "Just Say No"
campaign and increased the federal drug-enforcement
budget to nearly $6 billion within the next three years.14
The anti-drug establishment continued to escalate through
the 1990s, enlisting almost $20 billion in federal anti-drug
8 See TED GEST, CRIME & POLITICS: BIG GOVERNMENT'S ERRATIC
CAMPAIGN FOR LAW AND ORDER 110 (2001).
9 See SAM STALEY, DRUG POLICY AND THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN
CITIES 188 (1992).
1o CAROLINE JEAN ACKER, CREATING THE AMERICAN JUNKIE:
ADDICTION RESEARCH IN THE CLASSIC ERA OF NARCOTIC CONTROL
217-18 (2002).
11 See O'Hear, supra note 7, at 796-97.
12 GEST, supra note 8, at 113.
13 ERIC SCHLOSSER, REEFER MADNESS: SEX, DRUGS, AND CHEAP
LABOR IN THE AMERICAN BLACK MARKET 23-24 (2003).
14 GEST, supra note 8, at 115. Without turning the "War on Drugs" into
a partisan political manifesto, it is interesting to note that President
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coffers by 1998.15 The 21st century has seen little retreat
from the legalist regime of the past three decades as the
political ante continues to intensify. A modern example is
exemplified by the Bush Administration's National Drug
Control Strategy, aimed at "healing America's drug
users."l6
Most relevant to today's marijuana legalization
debate is the Controlled Substances Act ("CSA"), which
incorporates marijuana among its many listed illicit
substances.' 7 Maximum penalties for marijuana possession,
cultivation, and distribution range from one year to life in
prison, with maximum fines from one thousand to eight
million dollars depending on the amount of marijuana at
issue and the circumstances underlying the conviction.' 8
The CSA is undoubtedly one of the most salient
consequences of current Supreme Court jurisprudence
regarding Congress' interstate commerce power. Notably,
the Court found in Gonzales v. Raich that Congress did not
overstep its Constitutional authority by regulating the trade
of illicit substances, including marijuana. 19 Relying on
Wickard v. Fillburn,20 the Court held that even purely
intrastate cultivation and distribution of marijuana is
subject to federal regulation under the interstate commerce
15 GEST, supra note 8, at 115.
16 THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY (2003);
see also O'Hear, supra note 7, at 802.
7 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vii) (2006).
8 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 844(a) (2006); see Vijay Sekhon,
Comment, Highly Uncertain Times: An Analysis of the Executive
Branch's Decision to not Investigate or Prosecute Individuals in
Compliance with State Medical Marijuana Laws, 37 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 553, 553-54 (2010).
19 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005).
20 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (establishing that
Congress has the power to regulate purely local activities that make up
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clause-and hence constitutionally controlled under the
CSA.21
Even before Supreme Court jurisprudence
dramatically extended Congress' ability to regulate illicit
substances in interstate commerce, several commentators
decried a federal "monopoly" over drug policy.22 Though
the federal government has always possessed "an
impressive array of tools to influence policymaking at
lower levels of government," 23 recent developments in
academia and state-based drug policies, suggest that state
authority and policy innovation has established a solid
footing in the marijuana law paradigm, ranging from
medical-use licensing to decriminalization. While
recognizing the federal government's oversight role in drug
enforcement policy, this article ultimately argues for
horizontal competition-at the expense of federal
supremacy 25-in marijuana policy for several reasons.
21 Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 18, 33.
22 See DANIEL K. BENJAMIN & ROGER LEROY MILLER, UNDOING
DRUGS: BEYOND LEGALIZATION 97, 217, 219 (1991); Sandra Guerra,
The Myth of Dual Sovereignty: Multijurisdictional Drug Law
Enforcement and Double Jeopardy, 73 N.C. L. REv. 1159, 1192 (1995)
("In the fight against drugs ... the federal government is effectively the
only government.").
23 See O'Hear, supra note 7, at 806.
24 See O'Hear, supra note 7, at 806-20 (noting that the federal
government maintains considerable media control and sway over the
citizenry, formidable direct enforcement capabilities, conditional
monetary spending, control over forfeiture and equitable sharing laws,
and multi-jurisdictional task forces).
25 Even if the federal government can utilize its preemptive power to
force states to institute marijuana enforcement laws, there is good
reason to argue that it should not. As discussed infra, unlike other
crimes with no clear societal benefit, marijuana legalization arguably
provides significant societal benefits. In contrast to the "Race to the
Bottom" proposed by Teichman in the market for penal laws aimed at
sex crimes, marijuana laws provide a wide array of consequences, both
positive and negative, to lead to an arguably efficient market for
marijuana laws. Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice:
49
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First, it is not clear that the federal government has
constitutional authority to mandate state drug policy.26
Though preemption, through properly enacted federal law,
plays an important role in drug enforcement, the federal
government cannot require a state to enforce federal laws.27
Second, though the mere presence of federal enforcement
undoubtedly affects state policymaking, the lack of federal
enforcement resources strongly limits the feasibility of
effective wide-scale federal enforcement. To be sure, drug
laws are almost exclusively implemented and policed by
Federalism, Crime Control, and Jurisdictional Competition, 103 MICH.
L. REV. 1831, 1867 (2005). Given the small likelihood of a "Race to
the Bottom" effect, federal preemption and the necessity for
centralization to pursue optimality is reduced, if not eliminated. Cf
William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of
Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-
Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 217 (1997). Though the supplemental
argument to the preemption point is aimed at legal uniformity and
avoiding the added informational costs, this consequence of
disuniformity may be limited given the publicity of marijuana laws and
extensive consumer knowledge in a unique area of consumer lifestyle
choice. Cf id. at 273.
26 Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana
and the States' Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62
VAND. L. REV 1421, 1422 (2009) ("Contrary to conventional wisdom,
state laws legalizing conduct banned by Congress remain in force and,
in many instances, may even constitute the de facto governing law of
the land."). In an interesting preemption caveat, carved by the Tenth
Amendment, a congressional attempt to preempt state "inaction"-state
failure to enact laws banning the use of marijuana-would be an
effective command for the states to take an action to proscribe medical
marijuana, in violation of the Supreme Court's anti-commandeering
rule established in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188
(1992). Id. at 1424. This article does note, however, the likely
counterargument that state enactment of medical marijuana laws may
conflict with the CSA, thereby invoking established conflict
preemption principles. But for the purposes of this limited foray into
jurisdictional competition, this article presumes that Congress cannot
force the states to enact drug laws, nor preempt states' medical
marijuana regulatory mechanisms.
27 New York, 505 U.S. at 188.
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28state and local governments. As such, the likelihood of
vertical competition from the federal government is
reduced.29 Lastly, federal regulation is inefficient and
burdensome, diminishing citizen autonomy, while
hindering innovation and consumer choice. 30
Regardless of the federal government's involvement
in drug policy, current state innovation in marijuana
legislation is undoubtedly significant. Presently, sixteen
28 The Obama administration has indicated through Executive Order
that it no longer wishes to prosecute users or dispensaries unless they
violate both federal and state law, effectively leaving the legalization
choice up to states, while their citizens can feel comfortable they will
not be prosecuted by the federal government. Josh Meyer & Scott
Glover, Medical Marijuana Dispensaries Will no Longer be
Prosecuted, U.S. Attorney General Says, L.A. TIMES, (Mar. 19, 2009),
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/19local/me-medpotl9; see also
Devlin Barrett, Attorney General Signals Marijuana Policy Shift,
MSNBC.COM, (Mar. 18, 2009), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/29760656/ns/politics-white house/t/attorney-general-signals-
marijuana-policy-shift/#.TrC5g3EYfYY; Memorandum from David W.
Odgen, Deputy Att'y Gen., to Selected United States Attorneys (Oct.
19, 2009), http:// www.justice.gov/opa/documents/medical-
marijuana.pdf. Though the federal government governs enormous
resources, it only manages one percent of the nearly 800,000 marijuana
cases generated each year. Mikos, supra note 26, at 1424. As such,
most regular users under a state-enabled medical marijuana regime are
very unlikely to be prosecuted by the federal government. Id.
29 Harvard Professor, Mark Roe, has recognized that vertical
competition in the corporate legal model may disrupt the traditional
theory of corporate law rules in a jurisdictional competitive framework.
Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 635
(2003). In this vertical competition model, Delaware's real competition
for corporate legal rules comes not from sister states, but from the
federal government where "Delaware corporate law can be displaced
by, and is often influenced by, federal authorities, thereby rendering
any pure race .. . impossible, however attractive it might be in theory."
Id. Realistically, Roe's vertical competition argument is fundamentally
viable outside of the corporate framework. Given the two
aforementioned federal regulatory limitations, however, it seems less
likely to apply to the marijuana debate.
30 See infra Part III.
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states as well as the District of Columbia have enacted
legislation legalizing the possession, cultivation, and use of
marijuana for the treatment of certain illnesses.3 1 Against
this state regulatory backdrop loom the CSA and the
potential for DEA and FBI enforcement. As previously
mentioned, however, the federal government plays a very
small role in the enforcement and prosecution of marijuana
users, growers, and dispensaries-the United States
Attorney only manages about one percent of all marijuana
cases, leaving the rest to state enforcement. 32 Given that
federal resources are unable to manage the overwhelming
drug caseload, and that many states have already shown
their unwillingness to cede power over drug regulation and
enforcement, there is significant room for states to
implement and experiment with new marijuana laws. With
state experimentation comes the possibility for competition
between states in the enactment of innovative marijuana
regulatory schemes and legalization policies. This dynamic
is known as jurisdictional competition, or more simply, the
market for laws.33 The basic premise of the jurisdictional
competition paradigm is that governments compete to
supply laws in order to support the influx of business and
economic benefits, taxes, and citizenry. 34 This legal market
31 These states include Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado,
Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey,
New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington, and Vermont, in
addition to the District of Columbia. Nat'l Org. for the Reform of
Marijuana Laws, Medical Marijuana, NORML.ORG, (last visited Nov.
1, 2011), http://norml.org/legal/medical-marijuana-2. Maryland has
decriminalized the possession of less than one ounce of marijuana by
individuals who can demonstrate, as an affirmative defense, that their
use of marijuana is out of medical necessity. Nat'l Org. for the Reform
of Marijuana Laws, Maryland Medical Marijuana, NORML.ORG, (last
visited Nov. 1, 2011), http://norml.org/legallitem/maryland-medical-
marijuana?category-id=835; see also Sekhon, supra note 18, at 553.
32 See Mikos, supra note 26.
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concept has been applied most extensively in the corporate
law context, focusing on Delaware's market dominance.
The market concept has, however, found a receptive
audience in the fields of environmental law, tax,
bankruptcy, trusts, and family law.35
This article embarks on an analysis of the
competitive framework over drug lawmaking authority and
enforcement. While recognizing the historic dominance of
federal authority in the field,36 it argues against the efficacy
of federal authority and in favor of decentralized regulation
over marijuana policy. Using alcohol regulation as a
guiding example, this article argues for state authority over
marijuana regulation, with localized enforcement and state
discretion over local policymaking authority.
Notwithstanding the ban on possession, cultivation,
distribution, and use, there are a number of regulatory
mechanisms states can implement outside of absolute
illegality. For instance, states can institute penalty schemes,
by varying sentencing guidelines or establishing statutory
penalty frameworks that differentiate between
35 Id. (citing, inter alia, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the
Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate
Law, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1435 (1992); Richard L. Revesz,
Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-
Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1210 (1992); Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the
Deductibility of State and Local Taxes Under the Federal Income Tax,
82 VA. L. REV. 413 (1996); Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The
Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York:
Empirical Evidence of a "Race to the Bottom," 54 VAND L. REV. 231
(2001); Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law's Race to
the Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035 (2000); Jennifer G. Brown,
Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to Recognize
Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 745 (1995)).
36 See Roe, supra note 29, and accompanying text (while the CSA is
technically the supreme law of the land regarding drug possession, use,
and distribution, it is rarely enforced, though recognizably could be
with the proper resources).
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misdemeanor and felony violations. 37 In addition, some
states have employed alternative sentencing schemes,
experimenting with drug treatment courts and probation
dependent upon the successful completion of a
rehabilitation program. Outside of varying penalties,
states have an array of legalization options, ranging from
39 40full legalization to marijuana licenses for medical use.
Not to mention, several states have instituted
decriminalization laws wherein possession and use is either
legal or considered a misdemeanor, while distribution and
41trafficking remains criminal.
Enhanced forfeiture is also an interesting option for
reform that has potential incentive effects not only for
37 For example, the famous 1973 Rockefeller drug laws included very
strict mandatory minimum sentences. GEST, supra note 8, at 199. Even
as early as the 1970s, however, many states decriminalized marijuana
possession to some extent, providing minimal fines for first offenders.
Albert DiChiara & John F. Galliher, Dissonance and Contradictions in
the Origins of Marihuana Decriminalizations, 28 LAW & Soc'Y REV.
41, 48 (1994). This trend has continued today in California, which
makes marijuana possession a misdemeanor. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 11357 (LEXIS through 2011 legislation). Possession of less
than one ounce is punishable by a maximum $100 fine. Id.
38 Both Miami's Dade County and the city of Denver implemented
specific drug courts for the purpose of expediting drug case
management and instituting alternative treatment paradigms in an effort
to reduce the caseload and burgeoning prison populations. O'Hear,
supra note 7, at 823-28. These programs met with mixed success and
general federal hostility. Id.
39 No state has completely decriminalized marijuana, though there have
been initiatives in Alaska, Nevada, Arizona, and South Dakota.
O'Hear, supra note 7, at 836-37.
4 The most visible medical marijuana law is undoubtedly California's
Proposition 215, which legalizes the possession or cultivation of
marijuana for any patient or primary caregiver who has "the written or
oral recommendation or approval of a physician." CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (LEXIS through 2011 legislation).
41 Nat'l Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, Marijuana
Decriminalization and Its Impact on Use, NORML.ORG, (last visited
Nov. 1, 2011), http://norml.org/index.cfm?GroupID=3383.
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42criminal possessors but for state coffers. As most state
laws currently stand, asset forfeiture "provides a significant
incentive for state and local governments both to allocate
substantial resources to drug enforcement and to cooperate
with federal agencies."43 On the other hand, from a
marijuana user's perspective, reform initiatives aimed at
limiting state and federal ability to confiscate property in
conjunction with drug seizures may be a considerable
incentive to relocate.4
Given the myriad of potential decentralized
alternatives for marijuana regulation, there is significant
room for jurisdictional competition among state and
municipal governments for citizens, businesses, tax
revenues, and reduced violent crime. On the other hand, the
drug debate is never quite so clear-cut; there are significant
political45  and moral considerations-e.g. addiction,
rehabilitation, and health care expenditures, as well as the
potential for decreased economic productivity in the wake
42 See O'Hear, supra note 7, at 834-35.
43 Id. at 834.
4 Oregon and Utah have both proposed laws aimed at limiting asset
forfeiture laws in an effort to reduce the potential for abuses and
conflicts of interest "that arise when police get to keep the proceeds of
their own drug busts." O'Hear, supra note 7, at 835. "Imagine if IRS
auditors were paid a commission for every deduction they threw out."
Libertarian Party of Or., Argument in Favor of Oregon's Measure 3,
STATE.OR.US, (last visited Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.sos.state.or.us/
elections/pages/history/archive/nov72000/guide/mealm3/3fa.htm.
45 Though outside the scope of this article, the underground drug trade
is a hotly debated political issue, both domestically and abroad. United
States' demand for drugs has drastic effects on both Central and South
American countries, including El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mexico,
Panama, and Columbia. The Drug War Hits Central America, THE
ECONOMIST, Apr. 14, 2011, available at http://www.economist.
com/node/18560287 (noting that despite efforts to stem the tide of
violence in countries south of the border, United States drug policy has
an enormous effect on the underground influence of organized drug
crime, making many Central American provinces "deadlier . . . than
most conventional war zones").
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of potentially rampant drug abuse. Given the complex
considerations involved, the next Part will introduce a new
theory of decentralized marijuana regulation modeled
partly after state alcohol regulation, while accounting for
possible spillover effects, interest group influence, and
political incentives unique to the market for marijuana.
II. Invigorating the Market for Marijuana Laws
- Embracing a Decentralized Role for Regulation
With fundamentally different individual and
political viewpoints in the marijuana debate, citizen
autonomy should be at the forefront of the regulatory
policymaking agenda, providing an avenue for increased
individual choice and more efficient and innovative
lawmaking. Accordingly, the core argument in this article
promotes the redistribution of marijuana regulatory
authority away from the federal government and into the
hands of the states and local authorities.
After first outlining the current regulatory
framework, this Part argues for the rejection of federal
control over marijuana policymaking. Noting the federal
government's failure to account for state innovation and
autonomy, the first section utilizes public choice theory to
establish a state-based framework akin to alcohol
regulation following the Twenty-First Amendment. The
following section explains criticisms of such a position, but
ultimately dispels these analyses in favor of the state as
central decision-maker. The following section, however,
points out, and expands upon, two well-founded critiques
of consolidated state control so as to build on the
decentralization framework; placing state and local politics
at the forefront of the marijuana regulatory regime.
56
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A. Federal Involvement in Drug Policy
Ironically, current drug policy can best be described
by the "Cooperative Federalism" framework. This
regulatory depiction is "a combination of federal policy
mandates and inducements (such as conditional grants) that
require or provide strong financial incentives for states to
implement the federal policy."4 6 National policy issues that
are not only resource intensive, but also respond to
hypothetical state-to-state externalities further buoy the
federally dominated regulatory regime.47 Sparked by states
enacting reactive policies to a particular problem, the
federal government responds at the behest of states and
- 48interest groups most invested in the issue.
On one hand, states concerned about the capacity to
fund these programs and the ability to successfully
implement the program if other states do not conform push
the federal government to enact a national program. On
the other hand, federal politicians can garner the political
support of vocal interest groups,50 while only paying for
part of the overarching program. ' In the context of drug
policy, "Cooperative Federalism" is illustrated by the
pioneer states that first prohibited marijuana, and the
resulting federal program, implemented through the CSA
and the "War on Drugs." As the "Cooperative Federalism"
framework predicts, the drug regulation dynamic balances
46 O'Hear, supra note 7, at 843-44.
47 Id. at 844-45.
48 See Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 MIss.
L.J. 557, 558 (2000).
49 Id.
5 ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 6, at 167. This framework is
undoubtedly played out in the drug policy arena, where federal
enforcement accounts for roughly one percent of marijuana
prosecution, and the "War on Drugs" has been a steadfast political
soapbox.
5 Id. (estimating that the federal government pays somewhere between
thirty-five and fifty percent of the total cost of the "War on Drugs").
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"federal desires for control (and hence political support)
and . . . engagement of state and local law enforcement in
the war on drugs (and hence minimization of costs to the
federal budget)."52
Extensive federal involvement, however, does not
leave adequate room for state innovation in the drug policy
arena. 5 3 Rather, this paradigm is only responsive to the
dynamic wherein states and the federal government express
views that are in agreement, or at the very least, that can be
squared through political compromise.54 As a result, states
are left to either venture on their own, in defiance of federal
policy initiatives, or maintain some complicity with the
"War on Drugs."
B. Federal Drug Regulation is Hampering the
Market for Marijuana Policy
Amidst the federal drug policy debate, there are
abundant theories for optimal policymaking and response
to population preferences. These theories are based on
principles of federalism, public choice, and efficient
competition, and range from strong federal control to
variations of hybrid state-federal policymaking that either
attempt to explain the current dynamic or argue for a shift
in regulatory policy to better engender efficient drug
policy.
This article advocates for decentralized drug
policymaking in an effort to promote democracy,
autonomy, and efficiency. The federal government has
instituted a "War on Drugs," stemming from political and
moral opposition that predominantly began in the 1970s.
Out of political necessity and increasing violence attributed
to drug trafficking, the federal executive branch invested
58
52 O'Hear, supra note 7, at 848.
5 3 See id. at 853.
54 See id.
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ever-increasin resources into drug regulation and
enforcement. Rather than promoting uniformity, curing
hypothetical negative externalities, or stemming drug-use,
the federal drug regime led to divergent state drug
policies56 and an Executive Order that retreats from the
strictures of the CSA.57 This drug regime also confuses the
citizenry and retail merchants as to how the federal
government will react to marijuana use, possession, and
distribution.
In contrast to federal marijuana laws, alcohol polic
covering use and distribution is largely left to the states.
60Given the similarities between these two substances, it is
relevant, if not absolutely necessary, to compare the
maladies documented from alcohol prohibition in the 1920s
in an effort to engender a new era of efficient and
autonomous marijuana policymaking in the hands of state
and local governments.
1. The Pitfalls of Prohibition
The federal government has three basic positions it
can take in response to a given state policy: active support,
ss See GEST, supra note 8, and accompanying text.
56 See Nat'l Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
5 See Memorandum from David W. Odgen, supra note 28 and
accompanying text.
58 See, e.g., Marijuana USA (CNBC television broadcast Dec. 8, 2010);
Marijuana Bill in Congress: Barney Frank, Ron Paul Legislation
Would End Federal Ban on Pot, HUFFINGTON POST, (June 22,
2011 http://www.huffingtonpost.con/2011/06/22/marijuana-bill-
barney-frank-ron-paul-n_882707.html (noting several prominent
federal drug raids despite an Executive Order purportedly ending
enforcement of the CSA).
5 BENJAMIN & MILLER, supra note 22, at 187.
6 Id. at 15 ("The enactment of the Eighteenth Amendment in 1920
began the era known as Prohibition, whose parallels to the present are
simply too compelling to ignore.").
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neutrality, or active discouragement. In the drug
regulation arena, the federal government's traditional
stance has been based almost entirely on how closely state
policy resembles the "War on Drugs" paradigm. 6 2 In
contrast, the federal government's role in the alcohol arena
strongly supports state efforts at policymaking, 63 where the
only inde endent roles for the federal government lie in
labeling, taxation, and interstate distribution. 6 6
Current United States alcohol policy is hardly
surprising given Prohibition's sordid past. On January 16,
1920, the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution went
into effect and prohibited "the manufacture, sale, or
transportation of intoxicating liquors . . . for beverage
purposes. . . ."67 Within a few short years, alcohol use once
again became rampant, but was now unregulated,
dangerous, and controlled by organized crime; prisons were
overpopulated, and corruption in public officials was
68
unprecedented.68 Prohibition's failure is distinctly ironic,
61 O'Hear, supra note 7, at 853.
62 Id.
63 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2; see BENJAMIN & MILLER, supra note
22, at 187 ("[Plrohibition was not repealed in 1933; only federal
prohibition was repealed. The states and their local jurisdictions were
free to exercise whatever degree of regulation, control, or prohibition of
alcohol they felt appropriate. Indeed, the Twenty-first Amendment
went one step further to reaffirm and strengthen the states' power to
control alcoholic beverages: Section 2 of the amendment expressly
prohibits the transportation or importation of alcohol into any state
whenever and wherever such actions violate state and local laws.").
6 See The Federal Alcohol Administration Act ("FAAA"), 27 U.S.C. §
205 (2006).
65 BENJAMIN & MILLER, supra note 22, at 188.
66 See FAAA, 27 U.S.C. §§ 201 - 219a. The federal government has,
however, used financial incentives over highway funding to establish
what amounts to a national minimum drinking age. See 23 U.S.C. § 158
(2006).
67 U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII.
68 Mark Thornton, Alcohol Prohibition Was a Failure, CATO INSTITUTE
POLICY ANALYSIS No. 157, 1 (July 17, 1991).
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given its lofty social and public health goals. Indeed, the
"noble experiment" as it came to be known, "was
undertaken to reduce crime and corruption, solve social
problems, reduce the tax burden created by prisons and
poorhouses, and improve health and hygiene in America."69
These goals are similarly idealized by the CSA,70 which has
been espoused as no less than the protector of the nation's
health and public welfare.7 1
Ignoring the pitfalls of Prohibition and the social ills
befalling blind adherence to rigid moral high ground not
only ignores potential economic boons due to product
taxation and retail sale, but also leaves "controlled"
substances to be bartered for in the underground market,
adulterated by drug dealers, and subject only to regulation
72through the criminal underworld. To be sure, despite the
noble ideals pushed by Prohibitionists in an effort to rid
society of the social ills created by alcohol, the homicide
69 Id.
70 CSA, 21 U.S.C. § 801(2) (2006) ("The illegal importation,
manufacture, distribution, and possession and improper use of
controlled substances have a substantial and detrimental effect on the
health and general welfare of the American people.").
71 David E. Joranson & Aaron Gilson, Controlled Substances, Medical
Practice, and the Law, in PSYCHIATRIC PRACTICE UNDER FIRE: THE
INFLUENCE OF GOVERNMENT, THE MEDIA, AND SPECIAL INTERESTS ON
SOMATIC THERAPIES 173-187 (Harold I. Schwartz ed., 1994) ("Today's
war on drugs is distinguished by intense media coverage of drug-
related crime, new antidrug laws, and efforts to educate schoolchildren
and the public to 'just say no' to drugs. The message is clear: Drugs are
dangerous and must be avoided.").
72 The theory known as the "Iron Law of Prohibition" posits that as
drug and alcohol enforcement increases so does the potency,
variability, and adulteration of the substances. See Richard Cowan,
How the Narcs Created Crack, NATIONAL REVIEW, Dec. 5, 1986, at
30-31. Further, the drugs will not be produced or consumed under
normal market constraints, potentially destroying any possible benefits
attributed to the decrease in consumption ascribed to the law in the first
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rate increased by seventy-eight percent during Prohibition,
all other crimes increased by twenty-four percent, and
arrests for drunkenness and disorderly conduct increased by
forty-one percent.73 In essence, "[m]ore crimes were
committed because [P]rohibition destroy[ed] legal jobs,
create[ed] black-market violence, divert[ed] resources from
enforcement of other laws, and greatly increase[d] the
prices people ha[d] to pay for the prohibited goods."74 The
analogy to marijuana is striking considering the enormous
rate of violent crime attributed to drug trafficking, yet the
exorbitant number of inmates in United States prisons are
incarcerated as a result of simple drug possession.75
2. A State-Based Solution to Federal Marijuana
Prohibition
In response to the historically apt analogy to
Prohibition and the arguable shortcomings inherent in the
current federal drug regime, some commentators argue for
adoption of the "Constitutional Alternative."76 Finding
support in basic public choice theory, supporters of the
"Constitutional Alternative" argue for a basic reversion of
authority to the states, wherein "the power to control the
manufacture, distribution, and consumption of all
psychoactives" would be under state control. Strongly
resembling the current federal-state dynamic over alcohol
distribution, this dynamic, however, would leave the
regulation of interstate drug distribution to the federal
government. 79 Rather than purporting to legalize marijuana
distribution, this power-shift is "intended to provide states
n Thornton, supra note 68, at 6.
74 Id.
7 See Ahdieh, infra note 187 and accompanying text.
76 BENJAMIN & MILLER, supra note 22, at 186-249.
77 Id. at 194.
78 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
7 BENJAMIN & MILLER, supra note 22, at 194.
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with greater autonomy by 'permitting the states to choose
drug-control strategies more in line with the preferences
and circumstances of their citizens."' 80
This state-based framework is supported by two
overarching policy rationales: 1) citizen choice; and 2)
policy innovation. 1 Decentralization would promote more
autonomy among the United States population to choose
the laws and regulations that fit their lifestyle preferences
so that if a "resident of one state does not like the rules
imposed by the majority there, he is free to move to a state
whose laws better suit his preferences or circumstances." 82
For example, if a nation consisted of one hundred people,
forty of whom want marijuana to be legalized and sixty
who would opt to retain the status quo, the ban on
marijuana possession will remain in place-as it is in the
CSA-leaving forty citizens unhappy with the law. 83f,
however, the nation were divided into separate states, each
with the power to enforce its own laws, then more citizens
would be content with the nation's regulatory policy. 84 For
instance, if one state contains fifty residents who favor the
status quo and ten residents who would opt for legalization,
while another state contains ten residents favoring
continued illegality, and thirty who would opt for
legalization, then one state will opt to maintain marijuana's
illegal status, while the other will opt for some form of
legalization. Simple arithmetic provides that eighty of the
nation's citizenry will be satisfied, while twenty are still
80 O'Hear, supra note 7, at 854 (quoting BENJAMIN & MILLER, Supra
note 22, at 196).
81 BENJAMIN & MILLER, supra note 22, at 192-93.
82 Id. at 193.
83 This example is analogized from O'Hear, supra note 7, at 857
(adapted from Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the
Court's "Unsteady Path": A theory of Judicial Enforcement of
Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1447, 1467-68 (1995)).
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unhappy with the policy. 86 Adding in the option for citizen
mobility and minimal transactions costs, the net benefits
could be even greater. 87
Decentralization also promotes policy innovation
where states with divergent political considerations
experiment with new-and possibly more optimal-
regulatory policy. In stark contrast, a purely unitary
federal policy only gives the political process one shot to
respond to social needs.89 As Justice Brandeis' famous
dissent points out, "[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous state may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country." 90 The simplistic example above shows us how the
policy innovation rationale easily fits into the public choice
model wherein two states adopting different policies can
adapt, amend, or reject their own policies in response to the
consequences-both positive and negative-displayed by
their peer state's policy choices.91
Policymakers should take heed; just as Prohibition
failed to cure, and even exacerbated, the social ills it
attempted to curtail, the federal reign over marijuana law
could do the same; it has already created an enormous
taxpayer burden while leading to increased violent crime
and addiction. 92 Though federal legislators may lose the
political soapbox federal regulation so conveniently
provides, repeal of the CSA (as it relates to marijuana) will
lead to the same benefits we saw following enactment of
86 See id.
8 See id.
8 See BENJAMIN & MILLER, supra note 22, at 193.
89 See id. at 193.
9 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting). -
9 O'Hear, supra note 7, at 858.
92 Thornton, supra note 68, at 8-9.
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the Twenty-First Amendment:9 3 reduced corruption and
organized crime, job creation, and invigorated addiction
support programs.
III. Spillover Effects and Negative Externalities:
Evaluating the Criticisms of Consolidated State Control
Commentators have not unanimously rejoiced at the
prospect of bolstering state power in drug policymaking.
Rejecting the "Constitutional Alternative" approach to
United States drug policy, Michael O'Hear argues that the
federal government must "adopt a clear, coherent policy
towards state innovation"95 through the adoption of a
theory of government control he labels the "Competitive
Alternative." 96 O'Hear critiques the purely state-based
policymaking approach, arguing that it may actually
"reduce the degree of decentralization in national drug
policy by consolidating state control, and . . . [producing]
perverse incentives that warrant federal intervention."97
The first section to this Part outlines O'Hear's concerns
with an outright reversion of federal power to state
regulatory authority. The following section attempts to
rebut O'Hear's most salient critiques by utilizing traditional
theory in the field of jurisdictional competition. The next
section follows with an analysis of the focal points of
O'Hear's "Competitive Alternative," evaluating the federal
media machine and asset forfeiture laws. Finally, this Part
attempts to reconcile and incorporate some of O'Hear's
most salient and practical points with this article's approach
to state control over marijuana regulatory policy.
93 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI; see also Thornton, supra note 68, at 1
("The evidence affirms sound economic theory, which predicts that
prohibition of mutually beneficial exchanges is doomed to failure.").
4 Thornton, supra note 68, at 8-9.
95 O'Hear, supra note 7, at 853.
96 Id. at 873.
97 Id. at 859.
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A. O'Hear's Critique
Perhaps counter-intuitively, O'Hear argues that
carte blanche state control could lead to less local
autonomy than under the "Cooperative Federalist"
regime. This is so because much of the support for federal
drug control goes directly to localities-e.g. monetary
grants, referral for federal prosecution, and equitable
sharing statutes that allow local enforcement to keep some
of the proceeds of drug confiscations. 99 Local autonomy
may be engendered due to federal prosecutorial incentives
as well, where United States Attorneys are subject to
political pressures and must address local needs. 00 At the
very least, O'Hear argues that state regulatory control
would not clearly do a better job of regulatory
policymaking than the current regime by stating that,
"[n]otwithstanding the benefits of decentralization, federal
control may still be justified on the basis of 'Race to the
Bottom' pressures or spillover effects."' 0' He argues that
dominant state regulatory authority may create a "Race to
the Bottom" market failure wherein states will create
continually relaxed marijuana regulation laws in an effort
to garner tax revenues from legalized sale and
distribution.102
The critique further predicts that "spillover effects"
may undermine the workability of such a decentralization
framework because states that relax their drug policy may
create problematic negative externalities in "neighboring
get-tough states." 03 O'Hear points out that a significant
" Id. at 862.
99 Id.
10 See Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional
Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 790
(1999).
101 See O'Hear, supra note 7, at 866.
102 See id. at 866-67.
103 See id. at 867.
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part of the cost of marijuana lies in the risk and subterfuge
involved in the illegal trafficking regime, which inflates the
price.104 Consequently, when states legalize the process,
prices will deflate, attracting potential users in neighboring
states-states that maintain the illegality of marijuana use,
possession, and distribution.'0 5
In response to the alleged failings of state regulatory
dominance, O'Hear argues for implementation of his own
"Competitive Alternative." Though still grounded in a
presumption of decentralized policymaking, O'Hear
additionally focuses on reducing federal distortion of drug
policy information, increasing local political control over
federal drug enforcement decisions, and increasing local
law enforcement accountability.106
B. Countering the Critique
Despite O'Hear's reasoned criticisms, state-based
regulatory authority is in many ways hard to dispute.
Moreover, hypothetical fears can be assuaged, and state-
based authority validated, by analogy to the current alcohol
regulation framework, which would take nothing more than
repeal of the CSA as it relates to marijuana control. Further,
the main argument for federalization -07and one
104Id.
1os Id.
106 See id. at 873-74.
107 Another argument for federal regulation in a given area is
economies of scale in regulatory policy. Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids
of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196,
1211 (1977). While the DEA certainly centralizes the economies of
interstate enforcement and drug trafficking, more than ninety-five
percent of enforcement is done at the state and local level as it stands
now. As such, the economies of scale argument is largely inapplicable
in the Cooperative Federalism framework. Not to mention, the
argument posited in this article would maintain federal enforcement of
67
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recognized by O'Hearl 0 8-often lies in an attempt to curtail
negative externalities and potential "races to the bottom"
among states.109 It is unclear, however, that federal
regulation would be the answer, even if these market
failures existed. More relevant to this discussion is the
uncertainty that state-based marijuana policy is likely to
lead to the problems highlighted in O'Hear's critique.
1. Federal Regulation May Not be the Answer to a
Race to the Bottom for Marijuana Laws
As previously discussed, O'Hear points out the
likelihood of a "Race to the Bottom," and potential
spillover effects resulting from the decentralization of drug
policy.' 10 A common solution to these state-based market
failures is preemptive federal regulatory authority."
Picking up, however, on Richard Revesz's work in the
environmental market for laws, federal regulation is not
alwa s the quick fix to market failure that it is presumed to
be." The typical argument for federal authority is simple;
where federal regulation preempts state policymaking in
interstate trafficking and international crime, maintaining the existing
economies of scale where they are utilized most effectively.
108 See supra Part III. A.; O'Hear, supra note 7, at 866-67.
109 The "Race to the Bottom" has even been utilized to justify
overarching federal regulation on mobile capital. See Alfred C. Aman,
Jr., Administrative Law in a Global Era: Progress, Deregulatory
Change, and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, 73 CORNELL L.
REv. 1101, 1194 (1988). Preeminent legal scholars have even cited the
"Race to the Bottom" as the impetus behind The New Deal. See Cass
R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV.
421, 505 (1987).
110 See O'Hear, supra note 7, at 866
"' See, e.g., id.
112 Outside the environmental realm, and quite applicable to the market
for criminal laws, many commentators have simply noted that the
federal government is a poor conduit for creating and maintaining
efficient penal laws. See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, Crime, Criminals, and
Competitive Crime Control, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1733 (2006).
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the field, states will no longer be able to engage in an
inefficient policy battle with negative social utility." 3
Revesz used federal authority in environmental policy to
rebut the preemption rationale:
[Flederal environmental standards can have
adverse effects on other state programs.
Such secondary effects must be considered
in evaluating the desirability of federal
environmental regulation. Most importantly,
the presence of such effects suggests that
federal regulation will not be able to
eliminate the negative effects of interstate
competition. Recall that the central tenet of
race-to-the-bottom claims is that
competition will lead to the reduction of
social welfare; the assertion that states enact
suboptimally lax environmental standards is
simply a consequence of this more basic
problem. In the face of federal
environmental regulation, however, states
will continue to compete for industry by
adjusting the incentive structure of other
state programs. Federal regulation thus will
not solve the prisoner's dilemma.114
113 See Revesz, supra note 35, at 1211-12. But see Daniel C. Esty,
Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996).
It is also interesting to point out another claim about the necessity of
federal law based on public choice theory: "state political process[es]
systematically undervalue the benefits of environmental protection or
overvalue the corresponding costs, whereas at the federal level the
calculus is more accurate." See Revesz, supra note 35 at 1212. Revesz
rebuts this claim by pointing out that rather than a failure in the market
for industrial locational decisions, this rational is really about failures in
the political process and proper information. Id. at 1223-24.
114 Revesz, supra note 35, at 1246.
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Revesz simply points out that regulation and social welfare
are not created in a vacuum. The government should, and
does, regulate in a complex matrix of policies involving a
number of different variables that all impact each other. To
take one of the variables that suffers from market failure
and impose a uniform federal standard upon it does not
necessarily lead to increased social welfare on the whole. In
essence, desirable regulation is too complex to achieve
through piecemeal centralization; it is akin to plugging the
dam with a federal forefinger while watching the wall
fissure just out of reach. Unfortunately for federalism and
state autonomy, the theoretical result from such an
approach is complete centralization in the federal
government.115
So what is to be made of the environmental-
marijuana analogy? Revesz points to competing regulatory
variables in the environmental arena, like workers' rights
and corporate taxation, which are inevitably tied to industry
location decisions.116 Thus, when several variables play
into corporate decision-making, one state-based regulatory
change is unlikely to provide the incentives necessary to
propagate a "Race to the Bottom."
A possible counterargument to the application of
this analogy here may elucidate a number of distinctions in
marijuana regulation. For example, political decisions in
the environmental arena are often aimed at maintaining the
status quo-keeping industry in place or simply combating
more stringent environmental policies-while progressive
marijuana regulation runs against the status quo. Thus,
rather than Revesz's world of environmental regulations
"' Id. at 1247 ("The prisoner's dilemma will not be solved through
federal environmental regulation alone, as the race-to-the-bottom
argument posits. States will simply respond by competing over another
variable. Thus, the only logical answer is to eliminate the possibility of
any competition altogether. In essence, then, the race-to-the-bottom
argument is an argument against federalism.").
"6 Id. at 1245-47.
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playing a small factor in business incentives, marijuana
regulation may play out differently. To be sure, political
inertia is undoubtedly an important consideration when
confronting change. Here, however, it is less than certain
that the pivotal "status quo" distinction makes a difference
in the theoretical argument; or practically speaking,
whether it creates a barrier at all. Rather, it seems that the
anti-drug status quo is less of a political fallback and more
of a public perception and interest group driver that would
be balanced in a jurisdictional competition framework. In
fact, it is more likely that the complexities of regulatory
dynamics would be more robust in the market for
marijuana than contemplated in Revesz's critique of federal
oversight in the environmental arena.
Comparing the market for marijuana laws to the
environmental law patchwork, there are several apparent
variables in a complex regulatory scheme that would play
against a centralization argument. Simply speaking, one
such variable lies in economic growth itself. Much like
pollution, if a state is not allowed to provide for legal
marijuana sales-and hence benefit from economic growth
and taxes-the state may loosen standards in other areas to
compensate. Further, drug tourism is not an unheard of
phenomenon; it is seen internationally, as well as in states
that allow for purchase without local citizenship." 7
Federalized drug prohibition could thus lead to overly lax
enforcement in tourism related to other vice goods like
gambling or prostitution. Furthermore, it is plausible that,
given the extensive prison overpopulation and the
overwhelming burden faced by enforcement authorities,
policymakers will institute overly lenient penalties for non-
117 See Yaniv Belhassen, Carla Almeida Santos & Natan Uriely,
Cannabis Use in Tourism: A Sociological Perspective, 26 LEISURE
STUDIES 303-19 (2007); See also Avelardo Valdez & Stephen J.
Sifaneck, Drug Tourists and Drug Policy on the U.S. -Mexican Border:
An Ethnographic Investigation of the Acquisition of Prescription
Drugs, 27 J. OF DRUG ISSUES 879-97 (1997).
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drug crimes or prosecutors may simply not enforce crimes
to the extent of the law. In sum, just as Revesz argues that
federal oversight is an unwise option for corrective
regulation in the environmental arena, preemptive
regulation in marijuana regulation is similarly disjunctive.
Even if a "Race to the Bottom" does exist for marijuana
laws, federal oversight may lead to inefficient regulation in
other economic areas, especially tourism, in addition to
penal laws and their enforcement.
2. It is Not Clear that Jurisdictional Competition for
Marijuana Laws Will Lead to a Race to the Bottom Among
States
The preceding discussion may be largely irrelevant,
however, if marijuana policy is not conducive to "Race to
the Bottom" or negative externality market failures. In fact,
there are several reasons we would not expect to see these
economic failures play out in the realm of marijuana policy.
In the criminal justice arena, scholars focus
extensively on the effects of penalties on crime
displacement and jurisdictional infighting that may lead to
inefficient collective-action problems. This market failure
contemplates peer jurisdictions "spending increasingly high
resources on their criminal justice system[s] simply to
deflect crime to their neighbors."" 8 Indeed, "in recent
decades [states] have shown increasing awareness of the
criminal justice policies of their sister states."1 9 Scholars
utilizing this approach are apt to recognize the need for
federal oversight to eliminate the state "race" to overly
harsh criminal penalties.'20 As previously discussed, a
similar argument has been heavily cited and remarked upon
118 Teichman, supra note 25, at 1835; see also Logan, supra note 112,
at 1733 (arguing against a federal approach to criminal policymaking).
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in the environmental field; noting the argument for federal
regulation to circumvent a state-industrial "Race to the
Bottom" over pollution standards. 12 1 The clearly
established "Race to the Bottom" argument in other areas
can certainly be applied to criminal justice standards,
wherein criminals are assumed to be rational actors and
will commit crimes in the jurisdictions where the costs
associated with illegal activity are the lowest.122 When one
state implements stricter criminal laws or penalties, it is
posited that criminals will at least consider relocating to a
jurisdiction with more lenient standards. 12 3 In the face of
criminal displacement, recipient states that presumably do
not want the social ills associated with more criminals
among its populace will respond in-kind and institute even
harsher penalties in an effort to displace the criminal
population within its borders.1 This established model,
however, only reasonably applies to criminal activities with
little to no societal benefits; for instance, violent crimes,
sex crimes, and larceny.
In contrast, regardless of the negative effects of
drug-use itself, a large proportion of the negative societal
consequences of criminal drug activity are due to the nature
of illicitness itself. To be sure, while drug use may lead to
community costs in the form of increased health care
outlays, rehabilitation, and reduced economic productivity,
121 See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Development of Administrative
and Quasi-Constitutional Law in Judicial Review of Environmental
Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 62 IOWA L. REV.
713, 747 (1977); Stewart, supra note 107, at 1212 ("Given the mobility
of industry and commerce, any individual state or community may
rationally decline unilaterally to adopt high environmental standards
that entail substantial costs for industry and obstacles to economic
development for fear that the resulting environmental gains will be
more than offset by movement of capital to other areas with lower
standards."). But see Revesz, supra note 35.
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the overwhelming demand for drugs creates an enormous
underground market,125 policed by drug dealers, street
gangs, organized crime syndicates, and drug cartels.
Whereas government-sanctioned markets are transparent
and regulated, underground "shadow economies"1 26 lead to
regulation by the hand of distribution, the criminal
underworld and organized crime syndicates. The end result
is a drug trade that leads to overwhelming violence, not just
in manufacturing countries, but also in developed countries,
which fuel the demand for these illicit substances. 127
On one hand, federal regulation of drug markets has
led to remarkable societal consequences in the form of
crime and violence. On the other hand, criminal justice
theorists suggest a potential "Race to the Bottom," leading
to overly harsh criminal penalties. It is not clear, however,
that a "Race to the Bottom" will occur in the marijuana
market. Empirics and logic suggest a successful and
societally beneficial market for drug legalization.128 For
125 U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, WORLD DRUG REPORT 2010,
U.N. Sales No. E.10.XI.13 (2010), available at http://www.
unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/WDR-2010.html (estimating the
world drug economy to be near $400 billion, ranking alongside oil and
arms as the world's largest traded goods).
126 See Friedrich Schneider & Dominik Enste, Hiding in the Shadows:
The Growth of the Underground Economy, 30 ECON. ISSUES 1 (2002).
127 The Federal Bureau of Investigation has estimated that roughly five
percent of United States murders are drug-related. U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, NCJ-149286, FACT SHEET: DRUG-RELATED CRIME (Sept.
1994) available at bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/DRRC.PDF. Even
more astoundingly, the violence fueled by Mexican drug cartels has
been estimated to account for ninety percent of killings in Mexico.
Traci Carl, Progress in Mexico Drug War is Drenched in Blood,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, (Mar. 10, 2009, 6:28 PM), http://msnbc.msn.com/
id/29620369/ns/world-news-americas/t/progress-mexico-drug-war-
blood-drenched/#.TpW6kHKyDaO.
128As an example, Colorado alone generated 2.2 million dollars in tax
revenue from marijuana sales directly, and another 2.2 million dollars
from increased sales tax revenues. John Ingold, Medical-Marijuana
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example, in contrast to state exile of pedophiles and violent
criminals, states stand to benefit from increased tax
revenues,129 less violent crime,130 and significant economic
growth by taking an already existing market
aboveground.131 In order for the "Race to the Bottom"
theory to attach, there must be negative externalities
sufficiently realized to incentivize states to change their
laws in an attempt to remedy those externalities.
First, consider Teichman's theory of overly strict
regulation to effectively exile criminals from within a
jurisdiction. This is hardly a far-fetched theory. Rather,
state and local policies regarding ex-convicts have shown
just such an effort to exile criminals through bussing and
relocation efforts. 132 Taking the next step, altering penal
laws to move criminals to other jurisdictions is also
plausible. However, this theory's application in the realm
of marijuana laws is less than certain and seemingly far-
Sales Tax Nets $2.2 Million for Colorado This Year, DENVERPOsT.COM
(Nov. 23, 2010, 6:36 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/news
/marijuana/ci_16688199. Colorado Springs, a city with under 500,000
residents, received $380,000 in sales tax attributed to marijuana
dispensaries. Id.
129 See Ingold, supra note 128; Projected Marijuana Tax Revenues,
CNN MONEY (last visited Nov. 1, 2011), http://money.cnn.com/
pf/features/lists/taxes-marijuana/table.html (citing JEFFREY MIRON,
BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF MARUUANA PROHIBITIONS (June 2005),
available at http://www.prohibitioncosts.org/mironreport.html).
130 See U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, supra note 127.
131 An independent financial analysis firm projected medical marijuana
sales to reach 1.7 billion dollars in 2011. The State of the Medical
Marijuana Markets 2011: First Ever Investor-Grade Analysis Report of
the Marijuana Marketplace in the United States, FRESHNEWS.COM,
(Mar. 24, 2011, 7:20 AM), http://freshnews.com/news/470983/-the-
state-medical-marijuana-markets-20 11-first-ever-investor-grade-
analysis-report-mar. The report projects that medical marijuana sales
will reach 8.9 billion dollars-nearly half the estimated illegal market
for marijuana, if 20 more states allow its sale for medical use. Id.
132 See Roger Roots, When the Past is a Prison: The Hardening Plight
of the American Ex-Convict, 3 JUSTICE POL. J. 1 (2004).
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fetched. The negative externalities associated with criminal
activities seemingly stem mostly from violence and
economic losses through theft. Though addiction, medical
problems, homelessness and vagrancy undoubtedly
contribute to the attacks against legalization, these factors
exist whether marijuana is legal or illegal, as we have seen
for decades. But if a jurisdiction legalizes marijuana, the
violent crime variable will presumably be eliminated as the
market moves out of the hands of organized crime and into
retail outlets.' 33
The more relevant question is whether marijuana
use will increase with legalization; and if it does, whether
the negative impacts of citizen use will outweigh the
benefits, such that the jurisdiction will seek to move users
outside its boundaries. Even assuming that most of the
populace will begin to use, or even abuse, marijuana, it
does not necessarily follow that there will be far-reaching
negative public impacts. Though it is certainly possible that
worker productivity may decrease, while accidents, DUIs,
and addiction rehabilitation needs increase.
It is also necessary to consider moral stigma and
negative externalities associated with inter-jurisdictional
trafficking. 134 Policymakers must balance these negative
implications with the possible benefits of taxation, reduced
prison populations, increased citizen autonomy and
happiness, and reduced violent crime through elimination
of the drug underworld. In contrast to the unsavory criminal
activities noted by Teichman, where the criminal element
moves from one jurisdiction to another, unwanted by all,
marijuana users and would-be distributors would bring both
benefits and possible detriments to a jurisdiction, leaving
133 See Schneider & Enste, supra note 126, at 1.
134 Assume that State A legalizes marijuana and State B maintains the
status quo of illegal use, possession, and distribution. While citizens of
State B could move to State A to reap the benefits of legal marijuana
use, many will choose not to if the costs of transporting marijuana back
to their home State remain low enough.
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state and local government to make the decisions
jurisdictional competition theorists argue should be made
by decentralized government in order to further efficient
and innovative lawmaking.
Even if Teichman's "Race to the Bottom" for
overregulation does not apply to the market for marijuana
laws, an argument could be made that the opposite may be
true-under-regulation incited by jurisdictions competing
for tax revenues, drug tourism, and economic growth. But
just as liquor laws faced the Teetotalers in the early 20th
century, progressive drug policy faces a strong check
through opposition in the religious right and parent
advocacy groups, among many others. The marijuana
policy battlefield offers a multitude of variables for
policymakers to balance as they attempt to appease and
attract a presumably mobile populace. As they have been in
the federal regulatory framework, interest groups will be at
the forefront of marijuana policymaking instituted by the
states, with constituencies influenced by a variety of
considerations including corporate, retail, and direct
taxation; citizen autonomy and happiness; economic
growth; and reduced crime and prison populations.135
135 "No more than 25 percent of Americans arrested for drugs are
involved in "trafficking," and almost all of those are petty, small-time
dealers. The remaining 75 percent of the arrests are for simple
possession, often for marijuana." BENJAMIN & MILLER, supra note 22,
at 3. It should be noted that traditionally tough-on-crime states-also
generally conservative-like "hang-em-high Texas," have led the way
in drug sentencing reform in an effort to reduce the size of their prison
populations. See Right and Proper: With a Record of Being Tough on
Crime, The Political Right Can Afford to Start Being Clever About It,
THE ECONOMIST, (May 26, 2011), http://www.economist.
com/node/18744617 (noting that the experimentation with alternative
forms of punishment for drug crimes has emanated from the fact that
"[m]ore people have been jailed for more crimes-particularly non-
violent drug-related crimes-and kept there longer"). Texas, for
instance, has instituted mandatory probation for first-time, low level
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Driving anti-marijuana legislation are various interest
groups intent on entrenching the status quo. For example,
the biggest contributors to Partnership for a Drug-Free
America are the Prison Industrial Complex, Big
Pharmaceutical, Big Tobacco, and the alcohol
manufacturing industry.' 36 If under-regulation is the
concerning factor in a "Race to the Bottom" analysis, these
major interest groups will play a strong role in combating
increasingly lenient marijuana policy. Considering a "Race
to the Bottom" may end in overly restrictive or overly
lenient lawmaking depending on the interests, the
aforementioned competing interests should be robust
enough to avoid a "race" in either direction. Given the
extent of politically salient variables in play, state
autonomy in policymaking would seem particularly apt in
the context of marijuana policy. Indeed, principles of
federalism suggest that states be able to choose the laws
most applicable to the characteristics of the jurisdiction
"thereby giving mobile citizens many different regulatory
regimes from which to choose when selecting a place to
live."l 37
Stepping outside the realm of theory, reality has
similarly not played out the way an under-regulating "Race
to the Bottom" would dictate. Only sixteen states138 have
made progressive marijuana regulation in the face of the
offenders, and devoted more than $200 million to drug treatment
programs in lieu of traditional prison sentences. Id.
136 The main contributors to Partnership for a Drug-Free America
included Proctor and Gamble, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Johnson &
Johnson, Merck, Philip Morris, RJ Reynolds, and Anheuser-Busch.
Partnership for a Drug Free America, Sources of Funding 1988-1991,
SCHAFFER LIBRARY OF DRUG POLICY, (Dec. 31, 1991),
http://www.druglibrary.org/schafferlibrary/pdfal.htm.
137 Todd E. Pettys, The Mobility Paradox, 92 GEO. L.J. 481, 481
(2004).
138 See Nat'l Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, Medical
Marijuana, supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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current administration's tolerant Executive Order' 39 and
general federal reliance on state enforcement.140 Though
this article's proposed solution would remove the supposed
federal barrier, possibly giving hesitant states the last push
necessary to enter the "race" to legalization, a map of
current drug laws indicates that the impetus for progressive
marijuana laws is likely more strongly tied to geographical
ideologies and preferences than fear of the federal
government's stance on drug laws.14 1 For instance, the most
progressive laws tend to be on the West Coast: California,
Nevada, Oregon, Washington, Hawaii, Alaska, Montana,
and Colorado.14 2 In contrast, southern "bible belt" states
have the strictest stance on marijuana with essentially zero-
tolerance laws in Texas, Louisiana, Alabama, South
Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and
Tennessee. 143 While hardly conclusive evidence of
ideological preference influencing marijuana policymaking,
the religious, tobacco, and prison industrial interest groups'
stranglehold over the Southeast may well keep states in this
region from entertaining progressive legalization laws,
even if the federal government leaves the picture. This is
not surprising given that analogous alcohol bans in counties
and municipalities lie almost exclusively in the
Southeast.'"
139 See Meyer & Glover, Medical Marijuana Dispensaries Will no
Longer be Prosecuted, U.S. Attorney General Say, supra note 28.
140 See Mikos, supra note 28 and accompanying text.
141 Nat'l Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, Marijuana Law
Reform in the United States: April 2010, NORML.ORG, (last visited
Nov. 1, 2011), http://stash.norml.org/wp-content/uploads/medipot-
states-2010-04.jpg.
142 Id.
143 The sole outlier in this southeastern geographic area is Mississippi,
which has decriminalized marijuana use and possession. Id.
144 Gary Schulte et al., Consideration of Driver Home County
Prohibition and Alcohol-Related Vehicle Crashes, 35 ACCIDENT
ANALYSIS AND PREVENTION 641-48 (2003).
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Despite the uncertainty inherent in jurisdictional
competition for marijuana laws, state autonomy seems to
be the best alternative in an effort to achieve the greatest
public welfare. In the absence of over-burdensome negative
externalities and a race to overly strict or overly lax
marijuana laws, the federal government's role should be
limited to international traffic cop and interstate referee.
Even if the aforementioned market failures do exist
in a competitive framework for marijuana regulation, it is
wholly unclear that the federal government's role as
uniform legislator is the proper solution where states have
other regulatory avenues to exploit in an effort to establish
economic growth and constituent appeasement. Even
Teichman concedes that "the U[nited] S[tates] government
has a dismal track record when it comes to criminal justice,
very often manifesting an irrational 'tou h on crime'
attitude irrespective of legislative context."1 4 Prohibition's
catastrophic failure should give policymakers keen
background insight into marijuana's current federal
regulatory future, opening the door for state and local
authority with the repeal of the CSA's prohibition on
marijuana use, possession, and distribution.
C. The Competitive Alternative's Practical
Concerns
Though the market for marijuana policy likely
includes the competing interests necessary to avoid the
problems encountered in state-based market failures,
O'Hear nonetheless makes several salient suggestions for
creating an efficient model for decentralization of
marijuana policy and enforcement, regardless of the federal
government's ultimate policymaking role.
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The "Competitive Alternative" first highlights
federal policies and practices that distort the political
debate over drug policy, hampering state and local efforts
that conflict with the federal "War on Drugs." 46 Federal
control inhibits state-based policy on a number of fronts.
For instance, the federal marketing machine places an
overwhelmingly negative spin on marijuana and
progressive drug enforcement policy.14 7 This federal
message stifles alternatives to the current status quo,
including decriminalization or medical marijuana
programs.148 In response, the "Competitive Alternative"
posits that federal funds for advertising and marketing
might be decentralized and turned over to the states to use
at their discretion, or at the very least, with minimal federal
funding conditions attached.14 9
In addition to revamping the federal media machine,
O'Hear articulates a need for local oversight over federal
enforcement.o50 This point harkens to the limited federal
resources for drug policy implementation, yet
acknowledges the overarching need for occasional federal
enforcement and prosecution. O'Hear proposes a possible
reform, requiring a local official, such as a District
Attorney, to approve federal prosecutions within municipal
boundaries so as to establish "systematic checks on federal
enforcement discretion."'1
5
While O'Hear maintains some federal control, he
does not discount the need for local policymaking and
enforcement. The "Competitive Alternative" keenly looks
to the incentives driving municipal actors who forge drug
146 O'Hear, supra note 7, at 875.
147 See id.
148 See id.
149 Id. at 875-76.
'so Id. at 876.
1 Id. at 877. Though the example does include a federal "safety valve"
for cases involving interstate commerce or those that are accompanied
by unnecessary risks of substantial jurisdictional spillover concerns. Id.
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policy at the ground level, and points to the need for
increased accountability of local law enforcement
authorities.152 O'Hear cites the current dilemma over
equitable sharing laws and the ability for local law
enforcement to take property seized during drug
transactions. 153 This scheme perversely incentivizes local
law enforcement to over-enforce drug laws, while ignoring
community preferences. 154 In response, the "Competitive
Alternative" regime focuses on forfeiture law reform,
redirecting the assets seized rather than simply eliminating
equitable sharing laws.' 5 5 Instead of pocketing forfeiture
proceeds into local coffers, funds would be redirected to a
state general fund, in which the state would have an
incentive to redirect most of the funds back to the localities
in an effort to reward enforcement, while maintaining a
check on abuse of police authority.156
Theories abound as to the best policy mechanism
for drug policy; ranging most clearly from the recognizable
regulatory framework invoked by today's federal paradigm,
to the sovereign-based proposal espoused herein. What
today's federally supreme drug law regime lacks, however,
is the ability to adapt to, or account for, state innovation in
drug policy. In response, this article calls for a public-
choice mechanism of basic decentralization, empowering
states at the expense of federal oversight. This type of
argument has its potential critics, namely in Michael




156 Id.; see also David W. Rasmussen & Bruce L. Benson,
Rationalizing Drug Policy Under Federalism, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
679 (2003) (positing a similar argument). Note also that some states do
already have these state general funds in place to direct equitable
sharing forfeitures, but with federal involvement, local authorities can
turn to the federal government who plays hand in hand with local
forfeiture, possibly evading the checking measure sought by the fund
redirection in the first instance.
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O'Hear and the "Competitive Alternative" model.
Highlighting the danger of spillover effects or a potential
"Race to the Bottom," the "Competitive Alternative" calls
for continued federal supremacy, with local control in the
political and enforcement regimes, while systematically
overhauling the federal media machine. In the end, there
may be no perfect regulatory scheme, but if the past several
decades of drug regulation have shown us anything, the
United States fosters a vastly inefficient and over-budgeted
federal drug regime imposed at the expense of state
innovation. Recent state reforms have shown expansive
state-based marijuana law reform and the federal
government should respond in turn, ceding regulatory
authority to the states and local governments.
D. The Give and Take - Putting the Competitive
Alternative to Work
"[W]ithin our system of government, state control
stands not as an endpoint on the decentralization spectrum,
but as a midpoint between federal and local control."' 57
Indeed, O'Hear argues that the same tenets justifying
decentralization to the states support further reversion to
local governments.' 58 For example, citizen mobility is
greater at the local level than across state lines and, rather
than fifty state-level policy innovators, localities would
provide tens of thousands of opportunities for
experimentation.1 59 O'Hear's "Competitive Alternative"
makes local authorities the gatekeepers to federal
enforcement authority.160 Further, disassembling the federal
media machine and eliminating the misaligned forfeiture
157 O'Hear, supra note 7, at 860.
158 Id. (citing Robert A. Dahl, The City in the Future of Democracy, 61
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laws are central propositions of the "Competitive
Alternative."'61 While the previous section made the case
for the "Constitutional Alternative," supporting a strong
decentralization framework, this section analyzes the
applicability of O'Hear's "Competitive Alternative" in an
attempt to improve the state-based framework and respond
to some of the likely shortcomings inherent in over-
expansive decentralization.
1. Questioning the Localist Paradigm
The "Competitive Alternative" pushes strongly for
extensive decentralization, past the state level and on to
local authorities, while maintaining a co-extensive federal
regime.162 Local governments, however, lack the financial
resources of states and have insufficient economies of scale
to justify expensive enforcement mechanisms.163 In
addition, while it is easier for criminals to cross
municipality lines, local enforcement jurisdiction only
extends to local boundaries.164 Most importantly, local
governments rely on the state to provide an overarching
criminal code and prison system. In O'Hear's defense, he
does acknowledge these problems, and notes a possible
solution of state funding, while allowing for local
implementation at municipalities' discretion. 166 O'Hear
argues that municipal decentralization accounts for local
implementation instead of the state in the same way it does
for state authority vis-A-vis the federal government;
essentially the argument is that if some decentralization is
good, then more is better.167 The consequences, however,
161 Id.
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of policymaking authority may not affect local
governments in the same way they do state governments.
Indeed, citizen autonomy is undoubtedly benefited by even
more localized policymaking, increasing the policy choices
of United States citizens from fifty states to tens of
thousands of counties or municipalities. But the ultimate
answer may lie in the incentives already encountered by the
entrenchment and proliferation of the federal "War on
Drugs" in the first place; policymakers seek to gain
political clout with their constituencies while paying for as
little of the program as possible.168 Just as federal
legislators do not want to foot the bill for drug enforcement
without the political windfall that comes with it, state
legislators do not want to provide the implementation funds
for policies that they may not agree with.
Given that the states currently enforce the majority
of marijuana violations, implement and fund the penal
institutions, and would be the main beneficiaries of state
corporate, sales, and direct drug taxes, the lawmaking
authority and implementation should remain with the states,
rather than localities that do not have the means to
implement their own policy choices. This is not to say that
states could not relinquish exclusive control, leaving
authority with the local government, just that they would
not be forced to do so, as O'Hear seems to argue. Just as
the Twenty-First Amendment places plenary control in the
hands of the states, repeal of the CSA's marijuana
restrictions would leave authority and implementation
solely to state discretion. While some states may pass
policymaking authority down to localities, such an outcome
would not be required, allowing state legislators to make
the decision as to where state funds and the resulting
political consequences go.
It is also unclear why O'Hear posits the need for
local authorities to serve as gatekeepers to federal
168 See supra Part I. A.
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enforcement authority' 69 as opposed to a purely state-based
mechanism, removing the need for federal enforcement in
intrastate marijuana policy. While the local-federal
cooperative would put more power in the hands of local
authorities, the "Competitive Alternative" uses a
roundabout mechanism for empowering local politicians,
while still supporting federal entrenchment. Indeed, rather
than bolstering extensive bureaucracy and the resulting
squabble between state and federal officials-not to
mention the looming threat of federal bullying of local
District Attorneys-an alternative would be for states and
local governments to maintain concurrent enforcement
authority, keepinf the federal government out of intrastate
marijuana issues.
In sum, O'Hear's localized enforcement regimes
seem less responsive to the shortcomings of state-based
regulatory authority, and more to amending some pitfalls in
the federally dominated regulatory model. For instance,
O'Hear argues for localization on one hand in making local
law enforcement accountable to the local community, yet
his framework notes that "local police would become
answerable not only to federal law enforcement authorities,
but also to local leaders who stand outside the law
enforcement establishment."l 7 1 Rather than decentralization
and the workability of a state-local dichotomy in
incentivizing efficient enforcement allocation, the
"Competitive Alternative" seemingly adapts the current
federal framework by instituting a more localized federal
regime, appeasing decentralization advocates while
tiptoeing around the status quo.
169 O'Hear, supra note 7, at 860.
170 This is not to say, however, that the federal government would not
maintain an enforcement agency, like the DEA, to oversee interstate
and international trafficking, or to enforce at the behest of the states as
the need arises.
171 O'Hear, supra note 7, at 880.
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2. Learning From the Competitive Alternative
The "Competitive Alternative" does, however,
make a good point about the perverse incentives generated
by current forfeiture laws and articulates a very workable
idea in the form of redirection to a state general fund. 17 2
Because municipal actors respond to drug policies at the
ground level, forfeiture and sharing laws incentivize local
enforcement personnel to over-enforce drug laws in an
effort to boost local coffers with the proceeds from drug
busts. Rather than redirecting all enforcement to the state,
O'Hear smartly recognizes the ability to redirect assets to
the state level.173
The "Competitive Alternative" also cogently points
to the problems inherent in the federal framing of the drug
issue to the American public.174 The federal propaganda
machine and its "War on Drugs" distorts the issues
surrounding marijuana legislation and pits reform groups
against politicians responding to the federal anti-drug
stance. O'Hear sensibly argues for federal advertising
funding to be directed instead to state marketing budgets or
to Congressional spending bills.s75 The importance of this
directive, however, may be limited under a "Constitutional
Alternative" framework, as the federal government plays
such a limited role in marijuana enforcement that continued
federal advertising spending would be unlikely. Unlike the
alcohol regulatory context, however, there are still many
other drugs that would fall under the guise of the CSA,
maintaining the federal government's incentive to continue
its campaign against illegal drugs. Thus, it does appear that
some control over the federal media machine is necessary,
and directing at least a portion of its funds as it relates to
172 See supra Part III. C.
173 O'Hear, supra note 7, at 870.
174 See id. at 875.
171 See id. at 875-76.
87
87
8.1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 88
marijuana is imperative. In addition, stipulations as to the
federal content and the overarching "War on Drugs"
message would be essential to fostering state innovation
and adoption of progressive marijuana policies.
Ultimately, O'Hear's "Competitive Alternative"
argument, while putting forth strong ideas for specific
reforms, is seemingly unresponsive to any purported
shortcomings of state-based regulatory authority. Instead of
elucidating the decentralization regime he purports to stand
behind, O'Hear makes adjustments to much of the federally
entrenched framework we see in place today, without
accounting for the reality, and necessity of, state innovation
and competition in the market for marijuana. Nonetheless,
O'Hear makes cogent points about the federal role in
enforcement, incentives, and media content. Accordingly,
this article recognizes the need to adopt reformed forfeiture
laws, asset redirection, and redistributed government media
funding so as to properly set the stage for state-based
jurisdiction over marijuana laws.
IV. A Final Concern Raised by Decentralization:
The "Race to Nowhere"
The previous Part set out to raise, and refute, some
of the most salient concerns surrounding state consolidation
of marijuana policy. Among the most prominent arguments
against divergent state-based policymaking is the "Race to
the Bottom" effect garnered by individualized competition
for (or against) an identifiable social policy repercussion.
As discussed previously, the variety of interests inherent in
the market for marijuana do not lend it to a race to overly
stringent or lenient regulation and increasingly inefficient
outcomes inherent in one-upping neighboring states.
Interestingly though, is the possibility not for a "Race to the
Bottom," but simply to one extreme or the other, giving a
jurisdiction an all-or-nothing choice, legalization or a
complete ban. This Part will first explain a previously
88
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undeveloped theory of market failure and inefficiency in
state policymaking. The following section will outline the
assumptions necessary for this market failure to come to
fruition, ultimately concluding that the marijuana
marketplace is not conducive to establishing a "Race to
Nowhere."
A. The "Race to Nowhere"
This hypothetical "Race to Nowhere" can best be
envisioned through a basic example. Take, for instance, a
state (State A) that chooses to maintain the status quo,
keeping marijuana use, possession, and distribution illegal;
presumably incentivizing users and illegal distributers to
leave the jurisdiction. In contrast, another state (State B)
legalizes and taxes marijuana, garnering the benefit of
reduced crime and increased tax revenues. Both states will
get what they want from their policy choices. But there still
may be a middle jurisdiction; lest we forget, there are more
than two options for marijuana regulation. For instance, a
third state (State C) may simply decriminalize marijuana
(make possession and use legal, but not distribution or
trafficking) or institute misdemeanor possession laws,
attracting users who no longer face criminal penalties. But
in a regulatory framework where State A disincentivizes
users and State B eliminates the market for criminal
distribution, the organized criminal aspect of marijuana
distribution will be faced with one option to stay in
business-State C. All the marijuana users will be in State
B or State C and the market for illegal distribution will be
curbed in State B by legalized retail outlets.
Given this dilemma, a centrist state will reap few
benefits of decriminalization, while attracting much of the
unwanted criminal activity displaced by the other states. In
this situation, centrist states may enter their own race, but
not to the bottom or the top; rather to full legalization or
89
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illegalization in an effort to avoid the criminal element
entrenched in illegal drug distribution.
B. Undercutting the Assumptions Necessary to
Effectuate a "Race to Nowhere"
Clearly, the aforementioned result is not optimal for
a state that, all else being equal, chooses decriminalization,
medical marijuana, or drug treatment programs over full
legalization or a complete ban. Policymakers faced with an
all or nothing choice will opt for the lesser of two evils,
whatever that choice might be, but inefficient regardless.
This hypothetical, however, rests on several assumptions,
none of which can be fully realized in a world of bundled
laws and complex regulatory frameworks. For the "Race to
Nowhere" to occur there must be citizen mobility, full
information, and unrealized benefits from the centrist
choice.
First, consider the ability and willingness of citizens
to move from one jurisdiction to another based on the
marijuana policies within the state. With more than
fourteen million marijuana users in the United States, this is
hardly a trifling variable.176 But of those fourteen million
users, it is entirely unclear how many would choose to
move based on the legality of their marijuana use when all
they have ever known is a complete ban. Moreover, it is
questionable how many would choose to relocate at the
expense of families, jobs, and geographic ties. Assuming
that many users choose to remain in a total-ban jurisdiction,
State A, criminal distributors would have a market in both
State A and State C, the intermediate, decriminalized,
jurisdiction. Given this counterargument to full mobility,
we can expect a viable criminal distribution market spread
across both abolitionist and intermediate jurisdictions. One
176 Overview of Drug Use in the United States, INFOPLEASE.COM, (last
visited Nov. 1, 2011) http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0880105.html.
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part of the hypothetical should remain true, however, in
that the criminal element would remain displaced in State
B, where distribution is legal, because the criminal
distribution chain would be overwhelmed by regulated
retail sales.
Unlike mobility, full information is more likely to
come to fruition in this hypothetical. With the
overwhelming use of the Internet and the salience of the
marijuana policy debate, both consumers and distributors
are likely fully aware of the relevant policies in place. On
the demand side, any consumer making a decision to move
jurisdictions based on the marijuana policy is undoubtedly
informed of the law when making such a decision. Even if
not making a mobility decision based on another
jurisdiction's marijuana laws, it seems likely that a drug
user, accustomed to illicit substance use and avoiding
enforcement, will be aware of current policy and upcoming
changes to policy. On the supply side, just as we would
expect a businessman to know the regulations and laws that
apply to the business, drug dealers or legal dispensaries will
know the law, how to avoid or comply with it, and surely
be abreast of changes in policy. The true uncertainty in full
information is more likely to be through the lens of the
policymaker. A legislator faced with battling interest
groups may be more informed on highly specific issues and
less apprised of the indirect criminal costs associated with
marijuana distribution and displacement from other
jurisdictions.
The costs and benefits of proposed intermediate
policy is probably most difficult to project and account for
in a hypothetical "Race to Nowhere." For such a race to
occur, the hypothetical assumes that the benefits associated
with a centrist marijuana policy choice would be
outweighed by criminal activity within its borders based on
the policy actions of State A and State B. However, given
uncertain citizen mobility and possible criminal
disbursement between State C and State B, the costs
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associated with such a choice may be limited. Further, state
policymakers may not have full information on the
consequences of their decisions relative to increased
criminal distributor influx into the jurisdiction. Moreover,
even if these two factors are fully realized, legislators may
find that the benefits of an intermediate policy outweigh the
costs of any criminal influx. For instance, reduced
enforcement costs on minor possession may be
redistributed to enforcement on distributors and trafficking
or simply used for drug treatment. The intermediate policy
itself may be focused on public health, instituting drug
courts, or rehabilitation,'77 rather than turning a blind eye to
addiction as many abolitionist states do, or simply
promoting use as a legalization state does.
The "Race to Nowhere" is likely not a foregone
conclusion, albeit relying on several assumptions that are
almost impossible to predict. Focusing on the analogy to
alcohol regulation leads to the conclusion that the race is at
least plausible, though limited. While states are free to
implement their own alcohol policies, none has kept
alcohol completely illegal; some states, however,
maintained prohibition for several years following
enactment of the Twenty-First Amendment. But some
states do allow counties and municipalities to enact their
own alcohol restrictions, and many have done so, opting for
complete bans within county lines; restricted alcohol sales
on certain days of the week; or requiring distribution
through government suppliers. 7 9 While some of these
limitations are less than a complete ban, and clearly not full
legalization, neither are they akin to decriminalization
where one side of the economic chain, consumption, is
legalized and the other side, distribution, is criminal.
Centrist alcohol ordinances, such as Sunday sales and
177 See O'Hear, supra note 7, and accompanying text.
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government distribution, would not be expected to garner a
bootlegging criminal element. Criminals are unlikely to
move to take advantage of a one-day black market or to
attempt to circumvent government distribution when
consumers can easily accommodate the law and still
consume alcohol. Liquor law regulation in this context has
not progressed toward decriminalization or substance abuse
programs in lieu of criminal punishment. Rather, alcohol
policies reflect complete bans or legalization with retail
restrictions. The alcohol analogy, though not perfectly
aligned to marijuana regulation, seems to support a "Race
to Nowhere."
Even if a "Race to Nowhere" exists, the cure is not
federal regulation. The Prohibition and its aftermath tells us
that much. Beyond the alcohol regulatory analogy, the past
generations of over-enforcement; billions of dollars of
federal taxpayer money; seeming absence of a "Race to the
Bottom" or substantial negative externalities; exceedingly
high violent crime rates associated with illicit drugs; and
unclear federal enforcement policy lead to the conclusion
that decentralization is the best regulatory stance for
marijuana laws.
IV. Conclusion
Currently, more than 24.8 million people are
eligible to receive medical marijuana licenses under state
laws, and approximately 730,000 people actually do.180
Medical marijuana markets exist in seven states: California,
Colorado, Michigan, Montana, Oregon, Washington and
New Mexico and five more will open this year in Arizona,
Maine, New Jersey, Rhode Island and the District of
180 Teresa Novellino, Will Pot Sell Better Than Sex?, PORTFOLIO.COM,
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Columbia.' Economically speaking, the marijuana
marketplace is projected to more than double within the
next five years.1 2 Outside of the capitalist retail market for
marijuana, the question remains whether there is a viable
market for innovative state laws. As addressed in Part II.A.-
B., the federal regime over marijuana laws is hampering
innovation and efficient policymaking, leaving overly harsh
federal laws that go largely unenforced in practice and by
Executive Order. State legislators and enforcement
authorities are left in the dark, and United States citizens
are faced with an unclear state-federal dichotomy by which
distribution may be illegal but consumption is
decriminalized. Even more striking, dispensary operators
may be legally licensed by the state and yet subject to
federal enforcement for violation of the Controlled
Substances Act.183 Even outside the lack of clarity and poor
suitability of federal authority, we should expect a fairly
robust "market" for marijuana laws where there are
competing interests, an informed and reactive populace,
and a primed state-to-state competition for economic
growth and citizenry.184 Further, as discussed in Part III.B,
there does not seem to be reason to expect marijuana
policies to be ill-suited for efficient competition, by
promoting a "Race to the Bottom" 85 through imperfect
181 Id. Note that of the sixteen states enacting progressive marijuana
laws, not all support medical marijuana licensing.
18 id.
183 MARIJUANA USA (CNBC television broadcast Dec. 8, 2010).
184 See generally Roberta Romano, Is Regulatory Competition a
Problem or Irrelevant for Corporate Governance?, 21 OXFORD REv.
ECON. POL'Y 212 (2005) (arguing against Mark Roe's characterization
of a vertical competitive dynamic prompted by federal oversight and
the threat of preemption).
185 See generally William Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:
Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L. J. 663 (1974) (arguing that
Delaware corporate law promotes a "Race to the Bottom" due to the
cozy relationship between the judiciary, legislature, and Delaware Bar,
leading to minimal shareholder protections and poor relations between
94
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information, negative externalities, or power inequalities
between suppliers and consumers of laws. 86 In addition,
federalization as a remedy to an unclear problem stifles
innovation and experimentation, replacing jurisdictional
competition with regulatory oversight and unwavering
rules.'87 Most simply, a given legal system would prefer
state laws if the "market" has the ability to produce
efficient laws and will not inflict market failures leading to
overly stringent or lax regulation.'8 In the market for
marijuana laws, one would expect to encounter less need
for consistency, uniformity, and correction of market
failure because jurisdictional "markets" in the drug trade
will presumably be transparent and consumers will have
relatively full information, while states will have
appropriate incentives to optimize laws.' 89
The legalization, decriminalization, and
medicalization of marijuana undoubtedly comprise a story
shareholders and corporate managers). But see Ralph K. Winter, Jr.,
State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation,
6 J. LEG. STUD. 251 (1977) (arguing against Cary's theory of a "Race to
the Bottom" to the extent that corporate managers respond not just to
law, but to market pressures-in particular product markets, corporate
control, and capital markets-and these pressures direct managers to
provide efficient shareholder protections to the extent they produce
profits through the securities exchanges).
186 ERIN A. O'HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 33-36
(2009).
187 Robert B. Ahdieh, From "Federalization" to "Mixed Governance"
in Corporate Law: A Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 BuFF. L. REV.
721, 736-37 (2005) ("State corporate law permits state regulators to
pursue new legal technologies they deem likely to offer competitive
advantage. If they are right, such innovations can be expected to take
hold, both in the state of innovation and among its competitors. If
undesirable, they can promptly be discarded. Even if flawed rules
persist, they do minimum harm. Universally applicable federal rules, by
contrast, stifle experimentation and innovation-the hallmarks of an
efficient market.").
188 See generally id.
189 See Thorton, supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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in its early chapters. As states continue to adopt progressive
marijuana laws, the legal marijuana industry continues to
grow, and the executive branch ignores the strictures of the
CSA, the structure of marijuana policy will begin to
crystallize. Until then, United States citizens are at a
crossroads of conflicting state and federal law and are
waiting to see how the policymaking game will play out.
Interest groups and lobbyists are no strangers to this game,
pitting Big Tobacco, Big Pharma, the Prison Industrial
Complex, and the Religious Right against a progressive
populace and state legislators looking to fill their recession-
ragged coffers while cutting back on drug-induced
violence.
The federal regulatory regime and the politically
motivated and maintained "War on Drugs" costs American
taxpayers billions of dollars a year in a seemingly fruitless
attempt to rid the American populace of the social and
moral hazards of drug use. Yet the social ills of marijuana
use stem almost entirely from its illicitness, 90 inducing
violent organized crime but causing fewer deaths each year
than alcoholl91 or tobacco use;192 marijuana's addiction rate
'9 In fact, commentators on the international organized crime syndicate
have opined, "that as long as drugs that people want to consume are
prohibited, and therefore provided by criminals, driving the trade out of
one bloodstained area will only push it into some other godforsaken
place. But unless and until drugs are legalized, that is the best Central
America can hope to do." See The Drug War Hits Central America,
supra note 45.
191 See By the Numbers: Deaths Caused by Alcohol, SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN (December 1996). Alcohol causes more than 100,000
deaths a year. Id. While cannabis use is not documented according to
indirect death rates, there are no documented direct deaths due to
marijuana use. Id. Facts on Cannabis and Alcohol, SAFERCHOICE.
ORG, (last visited Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.saferchoice.org/
content/view/24/53/ (noting that marijuana is less detrimental than
tobacco in terms of long term use, aggressive behavior and violence,
domestic attacks, sexual assault, and reckless behavior); Visualizing the
Guardian Datablog: "Deadliest Drugs," INFORMATION IS
96
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is also a mere pittance compared to nicotine addiction.' 9 3
The United States system of federalism is premised on
extensive state autonomy, leading to experimentation and
innovation in policymaking, concurrent with the citizenry's
ability to choose the laws they want applied by locating in a
jurisdiction with the bundle of laws they find most
appealing. In accordance with this paradigm, we have
already seen the bulwark of progressive marijuana laws
enacted on the West Coast,194 and almost no innovation in
the Southeast, seemingly in line with population ideologies
in those respective locales.' 95
Cutting the federal government entirely out of
marijuana regulation and enforcement is neither plausible,
nor advisable. The drug trade is too international to limit
federal involvement and states rely on federal enforcement
where distribution and trafficking crosses state lines.
Economies of scale also empower the federal government
to utilize powerful resources in an effort to keep pace with
well-funded drug syndicates. Further, federal legislators
have too much at stake in the drug debate to let it go
BEAUTIFUL.NET, (Nov. 6, 2009), http://www.informationisbeautiful.
net/2009/visualising-the-guardian-datablog/.
192 See U.N. W.H.O., Report on the Global Tobacco Epidemic, 2009:
Implementing Smoke-Free Environments, World Health Organization
(2009), available at whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2009/
9789241563918_eng-full.pdf (noting that tobacco is responsible for
aeproximately five million deaths a year worldwide).
3 See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, U.S. ATT'Y
GEN., The Health Consequences of Smoking: Nicotine Addiction: A
Report of the Surgeon General, (1988), available at http://
profiles.nlm.nih.gov/NN/B/B/Z/D/; Bill Urell, Am I Stupid, Or is This
List of the 18 Most Addictive Drugs All Mixed Up?, ADDICTION
RECOVERY BASICS.COM, (last visited Nov. 2, 2011), http://
addictionrecoverybasics.com/am-i-stupid-or-is-this-list-of-the- 18-most-
addictive-drugs-all-mixed-up/ (noting that marijuana falls thirteenth on
the list of eighteen most addictive substances, while nicotine lies first).
194 See Nat'l Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, supra note 141
and accompanying text.
195 See id.; see also note 143 and accompanying text.
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entirely. As seen in the alcohol regulatory scheme, we can
expect to see Congress utilize its spending power to
incentivize states to act in accordance with federal
objectives.16 That being said, two central arguments from
the "Competitive Alternative" give informed guidance to
Congress, arguing to reign back on forfeiture laws and
simultaneously cut spending on federal media campaigns
against marijuana use.197
Ultimately, it seems the marijuana train has left the
station and has the momentum necessary to establish its
legitimacy in the United States. The million-dollar question
then is how it will be regulated. From the standpoint of
history and logic, state authority is the best vehicle for
public welfare, citizen autonomy, and efficient regulation.
98
196 See 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2006).
See supra Part III.D.2.
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ARTICLE
REDEFINING SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY STATUTE:
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TENNESSEE




In its 2011 session, the Tennessee General
Assembly purported to overrule a landmark decision of the
Tennessee Supreme Court that had clarified the burden of
3production on summary judgment motions. The stage was
set for this legislation by the November 2010 election, in
which Republicans won majorities of twenty to thirteen in
the State Senate and sixty-four to thirty-four (plus one
GOP-leaning independent)4  in the House of
Representatives. In addition, Bill Haslam, the Republican
Mayor of Knoxville, won the election for Governor
*For a transcript of the legislative history of the Bill discussed in this
Article, see the Appendix that begins on Page 206.
1 Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law. I wish to thank
my research assistants, Amanda Morse and Mitchell Panter, Class of
2013, for their outstanding research assistance.
2 Assistant Professor, Lincoln Memorial University - Duncan School of
Law. Thank you to my research assistant, Danielle Goins, for her
timely and diligent work.
3 Hannan v. Alltel Publ'g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008).
4 That independent state representative is Kent Williams (I-
Elizabethton), who served as Speaker of the Tennessee House of
Representatives during the 106th General Assembly from 2009 to
2011.
5 Richard Locker, Republican-Led Tennessee Legislature Gets Ready to
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handily, leaving Republicans "large and in charge" and in
control of the executive branch and both houses of the
legislature in Tennessee for the first time since 1869.
Republicans took control of power in Nashville vowing that
they would govern responsibly,7 despite hard feelings
resulting from years of Democratic control,8 not to mention
the surprise, last-minute denial of the Speaker of the House
position to the Republican leader in the 106th General
Assembly.9 The Republican leadership stated at the outset
6 Andy Sher, Tennessee Republicans 'Large and in Charge' of
Legislature, CHATTANOOGA TIMEs FREE PRESS, Feb. 14, 2011,
available at http://timesfreepress.com/news/2011/feb/14/tennessee-
republicans-large-and-in-charge-of/; see also Tom Humphrey, With
Haslam's Election, GOP Power Greatest Since 1869, KNOXVILLE
NEWS SENTINEL, Nov. 3, 2010, available at http://www.knox
news.com/news/201 0/nov/03/with-haslams-election-gop-power-
greatest-since-186/.
7 Andy Sher, Tennessee's First Female State House Speaker, Beth
Harwell, Says GOP Can Shine, CHATrANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS,
Jan. 4, 2011, available at http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/2011
/jan/04/harwell-says-gop-can-shine/.
8 See, e.g., Jeff Woods, Republican Majority Members Tout Haslam's
Jobs Agenda as Top Priority; Revenge Might be No. 2, NASHVILLE
CITY PAPER, Dec. 26, 2010, available at http://nashvillecitypaper.com/
content/city-news/republican-majority-members-tout-haslams-jobs-
agenda-top-priority-revenge-might-b.
9 The election of Rep. Williams as Speaker was a bizarre turn of events
that illustrates the fiercely partisan environment of the modern
Tennessee legislature. In the 2008 legislative elections, Tennessee
Republicans had bucked the national Democratic trend and secured a
fifty to forty-nine majority in the House, their first in decades. All fifty
of the GOP legislators, including Williams, signed a pledge to back
Rep. Jason Mumpower (R-Bristol) as Speaker. However, on January
13, 2009, the date of the leadership elections, Williams voted for
himself for Speaker and was elected with the votes of all 49 Democrats,
who had previously agreed to the arrangement. See generally Tom
Humphrey, Williams Elected as House Speaker, KNOXVILLE NEWS
SENTINEL, Jan. 14, 2009, available at http://www.knoxnews.
com/news/2009/jan/14/williams-elected-as-house-speaker/; Andy Sher,
Williams Elected Speaker in Upset; Mumpower Loses, CHATTANOOGA
TIMES FREE PRESS, Jan. 13, 2011, available at http://
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that its top priority at the beginning of the legislative
session was "job creation,"10 and this goal translated into
the passage of a slew of legislative proposals friendly to the
business community, many of which had stalled under the
previous Democratic regime." The most notable of these
was a "tort reform" package that limited non-economic
damages to $750,000, and capped punitive damages at two
times the amount of compensatory damages awarded or
$500,000, whichever is greater.12 While this initiative and
others, such as the abolition of collective bargaining for
teachers, received greater public attention, the new
legislative majority also set its sights on overruling certain
Tennessee Supreme Court decisions that the business
community had interpreted as unfriendly to its interests.13
northgeorgia.timesfreepress.com/news/2009/jan/1 3/williams-elected-
speaker-upset-mumpower-loses/. Then-Speaker Williams was
subsequently stripped of his membership in the Republican party.
Shaila Dewan, Tennessee House Member Wins Top Job, but Loses
Party, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2009, at A16, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/02/11/us/iltennessee.html. Rep. Williams now
refers to himself as a member of the "Carter County Republican Party."
See TENNESSEE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, http://www.capitol.tn.gov/
house/members/h4.html, (last visited Jan. 2, 2012).
10 Sher, supra note 7. Speaker-to-be Harwell's top three priorities at the
outset of the 2011 legislative session were: (1) "job creation . . .
looking forward to supporting Gov. Haslam and what he has in store
for really creating an environment that's conducive for job creation in
this state"; (2) "the budget . . . pass[ing] a balanced budget without
raising taxes"; and (3) "keep[ing the state] moving forward on
education reform." Id.
1 See, e.g., Tom Humphrey, Business Interests had Only Each Other to
Fight, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL, June 6, 2011, available at
http://www.knoxnews.com/news/201 1/jun/06/business-interests-only-
had-each-other-to-fight/ ("In many cases, the business lobby found it
could simply sit on the sidelines and cheer for Haslam and the
Legislature's Republican super-majority.").
12 Tennessee Civil Justice Act of 2011, 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts 510.
1 Brandon Gee, Turf Battle between Legislature, Judiciary Lies on
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II. Background
In 2008, the Tennessee Supreme Court explicitly
rejected the federal Celotex summary judgment standard' 4
in Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co.'5 Some members of the
bench and bar reacted with dismay. Critics claimed that the
Tennessee Supreme Court's requirement that the movant
either "negate an essential element of the nonmovant's
claim" or "show that the nonmoving party cannot prove an
essential element of the claim at trial"' 6 made it
unreasonably difficult for defendants to obtain summary
judgment.17 According to the critics of Hannan, only the
Celotex standard, which permits the movant to carry its
initial burden by demonstrating that the nonmovant lacks
evidence of an essential element of its claim at the
summary judgment stage, is effective in weeding out
nonmeritorious claims prior to trial.' 8
Apparently persuaded by the critics' arguments, the
Tennessee General Assembly, on the last day of the 2011
regular session, May 20, 2011, passed Public Chapter No.
498, which purported to overrule Hannan by adopting the
f-battle-between-legislature-judiciary-lies-horizon-Tenn ("Two bills
that easily passed the General Assembly in 2011 go so far as to tell the
courts how to interpret their own procedural rules for resolving
disputes").
14 Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1478 (6th Cir. 1989)
(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)).
270 S.W.3d at 1.
16 Id. at 9.
17 See, e.g., Edward G. Phillips, 'Gossett' Eschews Employers'
Reliance on 'McDonnell Douglas' in Summary Judgment, 47 TENN. B.
J. 24, 25 (Feb. 2011); Andrde Sophia Blumstein, Bye, Bye Byrd?
Summary Judgment After Hannan and Martin: Which Way to Go?, 45
TENN. B. J. 23, 23 (Feb. 2009).
18 See, e.g., Andrde Sophia Blumstein, Bye Bye Hannan? What a
Difference Two Little Words, at Trial, Can Make in the Formulation of
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Celotex standard for summary judgment. The operative
section of the Act creates a new section of the Tennessee
Code Annotated, which reads as follows:
20-16-101. In motions for summary
judgment in any civil action in Tennessee,
the moving party who does not bear the
burden of proof at trial shall prevail on its
motion for summary judgment if it:
(1) Submits affirmative
evidence that negates an
essential element of the
nonmoving party's claim; or
(2) Demonstrates to the court
that the nonmoving party's
evidence is insufficient to
establish an essential element
of the nonmoving party's
claim.' 9
The enacted bill contained findings that expressed the
legislature's purpose to overrule Hannan on the basis of its
conflict with federal law and the unsupported finding that
"this higher Hannan standard results in fewer cases being
resolved by summary judgment in state court, increasing
the litigation costs of litigants in Tennessee state courts and
encouraging forum shopping." 20 The enacted bill also
provided that "[e]xcept as set forth herein, Rule 56 of the
Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure remains unchanged." 21
19 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts 498.
20 Id. at Preamble. One commentator has mistakenly asserted that "[t]he
preamble did not make it into the final version of the law." Blumstein,
supra note 18, at 19 n.14.
21 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts 498.
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III. Celotex in Tennessee: The History behind
Hannan
In 1993, the Tennessee Supreme Court addressed
the Celotex trilogy for the first time in Byrd v. Hall -an
opinion that would later be recognized as Tennessee's
"departure from the federal [summary judgment]
standard." 23 Although the Byrd court set out to "establish a
clearer and more coherent summary judgment
jurisprudence," the court's treatment of Celotex was
ambiguous.24 On the one hand, the court "embrace[d]" the
Celotex trilogy;25 however, the court went on to declare that
in Tennessee "[a] conclusory assertion that the nonmoving
party has no evidence is clearly insufficient." 26 Further, the
court held that a moving party in summary judgment may
meet its burden of production in one of two ways: (1) by
"affirmatively negat[ing] an essential element of the
nonmoving party's claim," or (2) by "conclusively
establish[ing] an affirmative defense that defeats the
nonmoving party's claim." 27 Thus, despite the Tennessee
Supreme Court's self-professed goal of clarity, the Byrd
decision left many doubts about whether a Celotex-type
motion could succeed in Tennessee.28
Any ambiguity that remained about Tennessee's
embrace of the Celotex standard was erased five years later
22 Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn. 1993).
23 Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 7.
24 See Blumstein, supra note 18, at 23 (noting Byrd's ""schizophrenic"
approach to Celotex). See generally Judy M. Cornett, The Legacy of
Byrd v. Hall: Gossiping about Summary Judgment in Tennessee, 69
TENN. L. REV. 175 (2001).
25 Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 214.
26 Id. at 215.
27 Id. at 215 n.5.
28 See generally Blumstein, supra note 18, at 23. Cf Hannan, 270
S.W.3d at 5 (stating that apparently conflicting statements in Byrd
"have led to some confusion among Tennessee courts as to the proof
required for the moving party to meet its burden of production.").
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when the Tennessee Supreme Court issued its decision in
McCarley v. West Quality Food Service.29 In McCarley, the
plaintiff alleged that he became ill after eating Kentucky
Fried Chicken sold by one of the defendant's K.F.C.
franchises. 30 He was diagnosed with food poisoning caused
by campylobacter. During discovery, it was revealed that
the plaintiff had also eaten bacon the morning before
31consuming the allegedly tainted chicken.31 No sample of
either food had been saved. The plaintiffs treating
physician testified that either the chicken or the bacon
could have caused plaintiffs illness, but that the chicken
"was at the top of the list." 32 With the expert testimony in
this state of near-equipoise, the defendant moved for
summary judgment, alleging that the plaintiff could not
"carry his burden of proof to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the chicken caused the food poisoning."33
The trial court granted summary judgment, and the court of
appeals, citing Byrd, affirmed.34 The supreme court
reversed, concluding that, although the defendant's
assertions "may cause doubt as to whether the chicken or
the bacon caused [the plaintiff s] illness . . . [t]his evidence,
however, does not negate the chicken from the list of
possible causes." 35 Because the defendant had not negated
an essential element of the plaintiffs claim, the plaintiffs
burden of production was not triggered, and summary
judgment was improperly granted.
In the ten years between McCarley and Hannan, the
Tennessee Supreme Court continued to insist that a movant
must negate an essential element of the nonmovant's claim
29 McCarley v. West Quality Food Serv., 960 S.W.2d 585 (Tenn.
1998).




341 Id. at 587-88.
35 McCarley, 960 S.W.2d at 588.
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in order to trigger the nonmovant's burden of production.3 6
Despite this consistent line of decisions over a ten-year
period, the Tennessee bench and bar still occasionally cited
Byrd for the proposition that a movant could carry its
burden of production by demonstrating that the nonmovant
could not prove an essential element of its claim-
essentially, by complying with the Celotex standard.37
Finally, the Tennessee Court of Appeals in Hannan
invited the Tennessee Supreme Court to grant permission to
appeal in order to "address (1) the issue of exactly what is
meant by 'negating' an element of a plaintiffs claim, and
(2) whether Tennessee follows the Sixth Circuit's 'put up
or shut up' interpretation of Celotex."3 8
In Hannan, Mr. and Mrs. Hannan owned two
businesses in a small town in East Tennessee: (1) a real
estate company, and (2) a bed and breakfast.39 In 2003, the
plaintiffs contracted with the defendant to advertise their
businesses in the local saffron-colored pages. 40 The
advertisement for the real estate firm, however, was never
published, so the plaintiffs filed an action for lost profits.4'
Interestingly, the plaintiffs' income tax returns actually
revealed an increase in income for 2003.42 Furthermore,
36 See Staples v. CBL & Assoc.,15 S.W.3d 83 (Tenn. 2000); Blair v.
West Town Mall, 130 S.W.3d 761 (Tenn. 2004).
37 See Blumstein, supra note 18, at 15 (asserting that "Byrd was .
widely - but by no means universally - read to have articulated a 'put-
up-or-shut-up' standard just like the Celotex standard."). But see Judy
M. Cornett, Trick or Treat? Summary Judgment in Tennessee After
Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co., 77 TENN. L. REv. 305, 317 n.80
(2010) (demonstrating that in the fifteen-year interval between Byrd
and Hannan, courts rarely misread Byrd as adopting Celotex standard).
38 Hannan v. Alltel Publ'g Co., No. E2006-01353-COA-R3-CV, 2007
WL 208430, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2007), aff'd, 270 S.W.3d 1
(Tenn. 2008).
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neither of the plaintiffs could explain the increase in
income, nor could either quantify the lost profits they
alleged they had suffered.43 Accordingly, Alltel moved for
summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiffs could
not prove that they suffered lost profits -an essential
element of their claim." The trial court granted summary
judgment for Alltel, but the court of appeals reversed.45
Affirming the court of appeals, the Tennessee
Supreme Court unequivocally rejected Celotex and
reaffirmed a modified version of the Byrd standard. 46
Noting that "[d]ecisions within the federal circuits vary, but
most seem either to follow the [Sixth Circuit's] 'put up or
shut up' approach or to require the moving party merely to
point to deficiencies in the nonmoving party's evidence,"
the court reiterated its departure from the federal
standard.47 The court affirmed the Byrd standard,
modifying the second prong to eliminate any reference to
"conclusively establish[ing] an affirmative defense":
In summary, in Tennessee, a moving party
who seeks to shift the burden of production
to the non-moving party who bears the
burden of proof at trial must either: (1)
affirmatively negate an essential element of
the nonmoving party's claim; or (2) show
43 Id. at 4. Indeed, during her deposition, Mrs. Hannan was asked, "Do
you have any way of [quantifying in dollars the amount of loss]?" She
replied, "I have absolutely no way of doing that. And neither does
anyone else." Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 4.
" Id. at 3. The Tennessee Supreme Court clarified that the existence of
lost profits was an essential element of the Hannans' claim, while the
amount of any lost profits was a matter for proof at trial, as long as they
could "lay[] a sufficient foundation to allow the trier of fact to make a
fair and reasonable assessment of damages." Id. at 10.
45 Id. at 4-5.
46 Id. at 6.
471 Id. at 5-6.
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that the nonmoving party cannot prove an
essential element of the claim at trial.48
Justice William C. Koch, Jr. dissented. Consistent with his
assertion that "[t]he Court's decision in this case brushes
aside fifteen years of post- Byrd v. Hall decisions . . .,'49
the dissenting opinion utilized a vocabulary of
metamorphosis. For example, Justice Koch accused the
majority of "dramatically changing the moving party's
burden of production."50 He declared that movants "will no
longer be able to shift the burden of production" as easily
as they could pre-Hannan.51 He questioned the "change in
direction" supposedly signaled by Hannan.52 Given his
assertion that Hannan changed Tennessee law, Justice
Koch looked to the future: "What practical effect will this
decision have on litigation in Tennessee's courts? The
answer is that its effects will be significant and far-
reaching."53 Finally, Justice Koch made a prediction that
48 Thus, the difference between the Tennessee standard and the federal
Celotex standard is essentially one of timing. The federal standard
permits summary judgment if the non-movant cannot prove an essential
element of its case at the summary judgment stage. The Tennessee
standard permits summary judgment only if the non-movant cannot
prove an essential element of its case at trial. See generally Blumstein,
supra note 18, at 14 (noting importance of two words "at trial");
Cornett, supra note 37, at 334 (noting that in Hannan "the Tennessee
Supreme Court rejected the federal approach to summary judgment as a
way of testing the sufficiency of the nonmovant's evidence pre-trial.").
49 Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 17 (Koch, J., dissenting). Justice Koch's
assertion was refuted by the majority, who pointed out that the
interpretation of Rule 56 applied in Hannan is identical to that adopted
in McCarley v. West Quality Food Services, 960 S.W.2d 585 (Tenn.
1998).
5o Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 11 (emphasis added). Accord id. at 17 ("Such
a dramatic change in established summary judgment practice prompts
several questions.")
5i Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
52 Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
5 Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
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was echoed in later criticism of Hannan and in Public
Chapter No. 498 itself: "The Court's decision will
undermine, rather than enhance, the utility of summary
judgment proceedings as opportunities to weed out
frivolous lawsuits and to avoid the time and expense of
unnecessary trials." 54
Taking their cue from Justice Koch's dissent, some
members of the Tennessee bar, especially the defense bar,
expressed alarm at the Hannan decision.5 5 Indeed, one
prominent Tennessee law firm asserted that "Hannan had
placed such a heavier burden [sic] on parties seeking a
summary judgment that summary judgment was, in effect,
relegated to the spectator seats and no longer a viable
alternative to trial. 5 6 Although the court in Hannan merely
reaffirmed and clarified its fifteen-year-old approach to
summary judgment,5 7 the defense bar, echoing the Hannan
dissent, insisted on viewing Hannan as something new and
different.5 8 Consternation at the decision was undoubtedly
heightened by the bad facts of Hannan, which presented a
worst case scenario in which the plaintiffs admitted that
they lacked proof of the amount of their lost profits -
perceived as an essential element of their claim at the
summary judgment stage. Under Hannan, such plaintiffs
can escape summary judgment and proceed to the trial
54 Id. at 12.
5 See, e.g., Blumstein, supra note 18, at 14; Cornett, supra note 37, at
330 n.169, 334 n.196 (citing reactions from the bench and bar).
56 Press Release, Miller & Martin PLLC, Tennessee General Assembly
Changes Standard for Summary Judgment (May 24, 2011) (on file with
author). Although this assertion found its way into the preamble of
Public Chapter No. 498, there has never been any empirical study
supporting a finding that fewer summary judgments were granted after
Hannan than before it, or that summary judgment was granted less
often in Tennessee than in federal court.
5 See Cornett, supra note 37, at 332.
58 E.g., David E. Long, "I Understand TRCP 56": The Evolving
Tennessee Summary Judgment Standard, DICTA (Nov. 2010) at 14.
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stage, thereby inducing defendants to settle potentially
nonmeritorious cases.59
Almost two years elapsed between the Hannan
decision and the introduction of the bill that became Public
Chapter No. 498. In the interval came another controversial
court decision deemed unfriendly to business, Gossett v.
Tractor Supply Co.,60 a common-law retaliatory discharge
case in which the Tennessee Supreme Court jettisoned the
McDonnell Douglas61 framework in favor of the general
summary judgment burden-shifting analysis. The Court
noted two main problems with applying the McDonnell
Douglas framework at the summary judgment stage. First,
59 The Hannan case ended in a confidential settlement. See generally
Cornett, supra note 37, at 337 nn.219-20.
6 Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., 320 S.W.3d 777 (Tenn. 2010).
61 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). As
described in Gossett, the McDonnell Douglas framework is as
follows:
Pursuant to McDonnell Douglas, if an employee
proves a prima facie case of discrimination or
retaliation, the employee creates a rebuttable
presumption that the employer unlawfully
discriminated or retaliated against him or her. The
burden of production shifts to the employer to
articulate a legitimate and nondiscriminatory or
nonretaliatory reason for the action. If the employer
satisfies its burden, the presumption of discrimination
or retaliation "drops from the case," which sets the
stage for the factfinder to decide whether the adverse
employment action was discriminatory or retaliatory.
The employee, however, "must ... have an
opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the
[employer] were not its true reasons, but were a
pretext for discrimination." Tennessee courts have
applied this evidentiary framework to statutory
employment discrimination and retaliation claims.
Gossett, 320 S.W.3d at 780-81 (citations omitted).
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"evidence of a legitimate reason for discharge does not
necessarily show that there is no genuine issue of material
fact" because the articulated reason "is not always mutuall
exclusive of a discriminatory or retaliatory motive ..... "
Thus, the Court implied, the mere articulation of a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason should not necessarily
shift the burden of production to the plaintiff. Second,
under the McDonnell Douglas framework, once the
defendant articulates its legitimate reason, the
"presumption of discrimination or retaliation" established
by the plaintiff s prima facie case "'drops from the case."' 63
This aspect of the McDonnell Douglas framework means
that "[i]n addressing the issue of pretext, a court may fail to
consider the facts alleged by the employee to show a prima
facie case."6 Indeed, the Court found an example of this
defect in its earlier decision, Allen v. McPhee, which the
Court implicitly overruled in Gossett.66
62 Id. at 782. The common-law tort of retaliatory discharge requires
only that the employee's protected action or inaction be a "substantial
factor" in the employer's decision. Id. at 781.
63 Id. at 780.
6 Id. at 783.
65 Allen v. McPhee, 240 S.W.3d 803 (Tenn. 2007), cited in Gossett,
320 S.W.3d at 783-84.
66 Gossett, 320 S.W.3d at 784. Regarding Allen, the Court stated,
"Without the McDonnell Douglas framework, our summary judgment
analysis in Allen would have reached a different outcome. . . . Our
reaffirmation of longstanding Tennessee law on summary judgment ...
convinces us that our application of the McDonnell Douglas framework
in Allen skewed our summary judgment analysis in favor of the
employer." Id. at 784. Although the Court did not explicitly overrule
Allen, most commentators have read Gossett as doing so. Edward G.
Phillips, The Law at Work: "Gossett" Eschews Employers' Reliance on
"McDonnell Douglas" in Summary Judgment, 47 TENN. B.J. 24, 24
(Feb. 2011) ("[T]he upshot of the Gossett majority's criticism of Allen
is that if a plaintiff can establish temporal proximity between the
protected activity and the termination, without more, the plaintiff
prevails at summary judgment."); see also West v. Genuine Parts Co.,
112
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Like Hannan, Gossett caused consternation among
members of the defense bar. The following excerpt is
representative:
In a surprise split decision, the
Tennessee Supreme Court potentially has
made life more expensive for companies
sued by current or former employees for
discrimination.
The 3-2 decision in Gossett v.
Tractor Supply Inc. is a sharp departure
from a decades-long precedent that puts the
burden on employees to prove their firing
was discrimination or retaliation (as opposed
to legitimate reasons) before a case can go to
trial. The Gossett decision forces employers
to do the heavy lifting and prove a worker's
allegation is false.
"The initial reaction from some folks
in our community is this is egregious, Jim
Brown, Tennessee director for the National
Federation of Independent Business, told the
Insurance Journal. "Big businesses will
likely settle, but many small businesses will
likely go out of business. The consequences
of this will be significant." 67
Even the Associated Press report on Gossett misstated its
holding and overstated its implications. According to the
Associated Press, Gossett held "that employers must prove
that workers' claims of discrimination or retaliation are
2011 WL 4356361, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 16, 2011) (observing that
Gossett "abrogated" Allen).
67 Courtney Rubin, Tennessee Ruling Makes Discrimination Cases
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false or else face a trial."68 Consequently, Gossett "made it
easier for workers to sue their employers." 69 The perceived
extension of Hannan into the employment discrimination
arena, combined with Republican domination of the
General Assembly, set the stage for Public Chapter No.
498.
IV. The Legislative History
In February of 2011, legislation was introduced in
both the House and Senate to overrule Hannan and adopt a
standard for courts to apply at the summary judgment stage
of litigation that purported to more closely match the
federal standard. After House Bill 1358 and Senate Bill
1114 were introduced in their respective chambers in mid-
February, they were referred to their respective Judiciary
Committees. The House version of the summary judgment
legislation, House Bill 1358, was introduced by Rep. Vance
Dennis on February 16, 2011.70 Rep. Dennis is a thirty-
five-year-old Republican from Savannah, in Hardin County
in West Tennessee.7 1 He is a University of Tennessee
College of Law graduate who was first elected to the House
of Representatives in 2008.72 The Senate companion
68 Court Sides with Fired Employees, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL,




69 Id. Accord Pamela Reeves, Certain Firings Made More Difficult,
KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL, October 17, 2010, at C2 ("it will be much
more difficult for employers to get cases dismissed on motions for
summary judgment. . .. "); Phillips, supra note 17, at 25 ("Gossett
largely eviscerates a Tennessee employer's ability to obtain summary
judgment in employment discrimination and retaliation [cases] ....
70 H.B. 1358, 107th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2011).
71 Tennessee General Assembly, http://www.capitol.tn.gov/house/
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legislation, Senate Bill 1114, was introduced by Sen. Brian
Kelsey.73 Sen. Kelsey is a thirty-three-year-old Georgetown
University Law Center graduate, also a Republican, who
has served in both the House and Senate and hails from
Germantown, an affluent Memphis suburb. 74 Rep. Dennis
and Sen. Kelsey sponsored other successful business-
friendly pieces of legislation in 2011, including the tort
reform bill75 and the legislation to overrule Gossett.76
A. The House
The summary judgment legislation sat dormant for
months in both chambers, but moved first in the House
when the Judiciary Subcommittee considered it on April
12, 2011. When asked by Rep. Janis Baird Sontony (D-
Nashville) to explain the legislation, Rep. Dennis stated
7 S.B. 1114, 107th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2011).
74 Tennessee General Assembly, http://www.capitol.tn.gov/senate/
members/S31.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2012).
7 The version of the Civil Justice Act that Rep. Dennis introduced in
the House varied slightly from the version that Gov. Haslam signed
into law in June 2011. Opponents of the bill were successful in adding
an amendment in the Judiciary Committee to remove the damage cap
awards when the tort upon which the defendant is sued results in a
felony conviction of the defendant. Richard Locker, Tennessee House
Panel OKs Limits on Liability: Haslam Says Curbs will Improve Tenn.
Business Prospects, THE COM. APPEAL, Apr. 20, 2011, available at
http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/201 1/apr/20/house-panel-oks-
limits-on-liability/?partner-RSS. Although Rep. Dennis initially
resisted the amendment, he later vowed to restore the provision
excluding felons from the cap during a future legislative session. Andy
Sher, Lawsuit Caps Legislation Goes to Tennessee Governor,
CHATrANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, May 20, 2011, available at http://
www.timesfreepress.com/news/201 1/may/20/lawsuit-caps-legislation-
goes-tennessee-govemor/ ("Rep. Vance Dennis, R-Savannah, the
House bill's sponsor, said while he disagrees with the Senate version, it
was important to get the bill to Haslam. He said senators have agreed to
work him on separate legislation to restore the House version, although
that will likely to occur next year.").
7 H.B. 1641, 107th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2011).
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that he was "not an expert on it but" would do the best he
could to explain it.77 His explanation as to why it is
necessary to overrule Hannan is somewhat difficult to
understand, but appears to rely upon two assertions that he
and other supporters of the bill repeated throughout the
legislative process: (1) Hannan fundamentally changed the
summary judgment practice in Tennessee from the standard
that existed prior to that case; and (2) the standard in
Tennessee prior to Hannan was the same as the federal
Celotex standard, and it is preferable for Tennessee to
conform to the federal standard.7 8 As discussed,79 the first
of these assertions was made by Justice Koch in his
Hannan dissent and formed the basis for much of the hand-
wringing over Hannan among the business community and
defense bar from late 2008 until 2011. The premise that
Hannan changed, rather than simply clarified, the burden
shifting test on a summary judgment motion is at least
arguable, although likely inaccurate. The second rationale
that Rep. Dennis provides for the legislation - that the
standard for summary judgment in Tennessee that existed
prior to Hannan, under Byrd v. Hall, was the same as the
federal standard - is clearly incorrect. While the standard
n Statement of Rep. Dennis, House Judiciary Subcommittee, Apr. 12,
2011, available at http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?
viewid=186&clipid=41700. Rep. Dennis, who as the sponsor
presumably drafted the legislation, went on to state that he would prefer
"to get somebody that is more fluent on summary judgment practice
and civil practice to explain [the bill] much better than [he] could." Id.
78 "Basically, the gist of [the legislation] is, I think last year or the year
before the Supreme Court made a decision that changed the way the
standard they had historically applied the summary judgment decisions.
And they did it in such a way that it makes it almost impossible for the
court to award summary judgment. . . . [The bill] shifts the standard
from what the court adopted, it shifts it back to what it was prior to that
decision and what it had been in Tennessee for the last, I don't know,
twenty to thirty years, and it mirrors the federal standard for decisions
on summary judgment." Id.
7 Supra, section III.
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the Tennessee Supreme Court adopted in Byrd may not
have been completely transparent, there is no doubt that the
Court declined to adopt the Celotex standard. At any rate,
Rep. Dennis agreed to "roll" - that is, hold over - the bill
until a future meeting of the Judiciary Subcommittee.so
The Subcommittee next considered the bill on April
27, 2011. At this hearing, the rationale for the bill was
challenged by Rep. Karen Camper (D-Memphis), a non-
lawyer whose understandable lack of familiarity with the
highly technical summary judgment process provided Rep.
Dennis with an opportunity to educate the Subcommittee as
to why the bill was necessary. Although Rep. Dennis's
explanation of the summary judgment process to the
Subcommittee was somewhat more cogent than it had been
a couple of weeks earlier, the justification for the bill
remained essentially unchanged: it was necessary to
overrule Hannan because that case changed summary
judgment practice in Tennessee for the worse and because
it would be preferable to return to Celotex, which was the
standard in Tennessee for years under Byrd v. Hall.82 At
80 Statement of Rep. Jim Coley, House Judiciary Subcommittee, Apr.
12, 2011, available at http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?
viewid=1 86&clip-id=4170.
81 "[T]here is a particular Tennessee Supreme Court case called Hannan
versus Alltel Publishing where the court kind of changed how they look
at and apply Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil Procedure dealing with
summary judgments and made a really, at least in my opinion, made a
wrong incorrect decision . . . they established a standard that makes it
almost impossible for a court to grant summary judgment . . . . So, it
basically goes back to what the standard was in Tennessee for several
years prior to 2008 when the Supreme Court changed that." Statement
of Rep. Dennis, House Judiciary Subcommittee, Apr. 27, 2011,
available at http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?viewid=186&
clip-id=4170.
82 "[T]his would go back to the standard that was in place for a number
of years before, under the Byrd case essentially which is a several year
old Tennessee case. This would codify the standard under the Byrd
case and effectively reverse the standard that the Supreme Court put in
place under the Hannan case." Id.
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this hearing, Rep. Dennis came prepared with "a more
skilled quest ... that might can explain [the bill] a little
better" - namely, Benjamin Sanders from Farmers Bureau
Insurance of Tennessee ("Farmers"). The Subcommittee
went out of session and Rep. Dennis called upon Mr.
Sanders to address the Subcommittee directly. 84
Mr. Sanders began his statement to the
Subcommittee with the caveat that, although the summary
judgment bill was not Farmers' bill,8 5 the organization had
83 Id.
" This practice of having lobbyists address the members of the
legislature directly on a pending bill was described by then-Tennessee
Governor Phil Bredesen during a 2007 interview with the Associated
Press. The Governor observed that "[b]ecause lawmakers spend only
part of the year in session and have a limited support staff, they depend
on lobbyists for help developing - and sometimes debating and killing -
complex legislation." Beth Rucker, Ethics Reforms Didn't Take Away
Lobbyists' Power, Bredesen Says, MEMPHIS DALY NEWS, July 31,
2007, available at http://www.memphisdailynews.comleditorial
Article.aspx?id=33447. In this role, "[1]obbyists are often called on
during legislative committee meetings to explain the merits of a bill or
answer lawmakers' questions." Id.
85 Despite this caveat, Rep. Dennis himself privately referred to the bill
as "Farmers' bill" and referred questions about the bill to lobbyists for
Farmers' Insurance. Telephone interview with John Day, Brentwood,
Tennessee (Jan. 23, 2012). In a "State Capital Bulletin" dated May 23,
2011, the Property Casualty Insurers Association of America took
credit for the Hannan legislation: "[I]n the wee hours of the last day of
the legislative session, PCI was successful in amending the summary
judgment law back to the pre-Hannon [sic] decision. This was another
major win for PCI in Tennessee!" Property Casualty Insurers
Association of America, State Capital Bulletin (May 23, 2011). The
Bulletin went on to explain, "The purpose of the bill was to addresses
[sic] the Supreme Court's 2008 decision in Hannan v. AlItel Pub where
the Tennessee Supreme Court decision which makes it almost
impossible for a court to grant summary judgment by requiring a party
to essentially prove a negative." Id. (syntax as in original). On its
website, PCI boasts that it has "1000+ members - the broadest cross
section of insurance companies of any national trade group." Property
Casualty Insurers Association of America, http://www.pciaa.net/web/
sitehome.nsf/main (last visited Jan. 2, 2012). Under the tab "Member
118
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"adopted it because it's just such a good idea."86 Mr.
Sanders then explained the need for the legislation in more
detailed, but similar, terms to those that Rep. Dennis had
used:
Summary judgment is a judicial tool that
determines whether a case should go to trial
or not. In other words, if Representative
Dennis sues me than I can challenge under
our old standard of summary judgment... I
can move for summary judgment and
challenge the sufficiency of evidence. And
essentially saying if you don't have enough
evidence to go to trial we need to stop it
right here. Under the old standard, the court
could grant that. They could say, if he
doesn't prove evidence now we're not going
through the time and expense of going to
trial. Under the standard that they adopted in
2008 they changed that. Instead of granting
summary judgment by me challenging his
evidence, they put the burden on the
defendant and said we now have to prove
that he can't prove his case. So, in other
words, if I move for summary judgment
now, under the new standard, all
Representative Dennis has to say is I'll
prove it at trial and doesn't have to show at
that point that he has any evidence. So what
Benefits," PCI makes the following pitch: "The value of joining PCI is
clear from your first day of membership. It starts with having the most
respected, persuasive voice on Capitol Hill and in 50 statehouses
representing you and our industry." Id.
86 Statement of Benjamin Sanders, Farmers' Bureau Insurance of
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we are seeing is a lot cases that have no
disputed facts that are going to trial and that
probably shouldn't go to trial.
This description by Mr. Sanders adds a new justification for
the legislation: the claim that Hannan has led to an increase
in the number of cases that have no disputed issue of
material fact but nevertheless survive summary judgment
and proceed to trial. Mr. Sanders provided no empirical or
even anecdotal proof in support of this assertion, nor did
the Subcommittee hold a hearing to take such evidence.88
Mr. Sanders provided yet another reason for the bill in
response to Rep. Camper's question as to whether the
Tennessee Supreme Court was simply acting within its
rights to interpret the Rules of Civil Procedure when it
decided Hannan. While he conceded to Rep. Camper "that
the Supreme Court certainly had the authority to make a
different interpretation of [Tennessee Rule of Civil
Procedure 56] . . . this bill says it is the public policy of
Tennessee that if you don't have enough evidence to go to
trial for your case that you shouldn't move past the
summary judgment stage." 89 This justification addresses an
important separation of powers concern, because the
legislature generally has the power to articulate public
87 id.
88 The Fiscal Note prepared by the General Assembly's Fiscal Review
Committee on March 1, 2011, estimated the fiscal impact of HB
1358/SB 1114 to be "Not Significant," and assumed that "[c]odifying a
standard for granting summary judgment will have no significant
impact on the case load of trial or appellate courts."
http://www.capitol.tn.gov/Bills/107/Fiscal/HB1358.pdf. In fact,
Brentwood trial lawyer John Day has suggested the new legislation
could "cost millions of dollars in attorneys' time to try to figure out
what this law means." Gee, supra note 13.
89 Statement of Benjamin Sanders, Farmers' Bureau Insurance of
Tennessee, to House Judiciary Subcommittee, Apr. 27, 2011, available
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policy, whereas reversing the judicial branch's
interpretation of a procedural rule is more questionable.
Unlike Mr. Sanders' earlier rationale regarding the
increased number of cases surviving summary judgment,
however, this legislative purpose was not included in the
legislation.
After Mr. Sanders finished speaking, Rep. Sontany
(D-Nashville) called upon another outside speaker, Doug
Janney of the Tennessee Employment Lawyers'
Association, to speak against the bill.90 Mr. Janney
remarked on what he viewed to be weaknesses in the bill,
focusing in particular on the provision that the party who
does not bear the burden of proof at trial "shall prevail" if it
either affirmatively negates an essential element of the non-
moving party's claim or shows that there is insufficient
evidence to prove an element of the non-moving party's
claim.91 He then engaged in an extended colloquy with
Rep. Dennis on the subject, with Rep. Dennis stating that it
9 Statement of Rep. Sontany, House Judiciary Subcommittee, Apr. 27,
2011, available at http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view-id=
186&clip-id=41700. According to their website, the Tennessee
Employment Lawyers Association is an "authorized affiliate of the
National Employment Lawyers Association, the largest group of
plaintiff employment lawyers in the country. We are a group of
attorneys dedicated to eradicating employment discrimination in all its
forms from the workplace, and are constantly seeking to influence the
law to better protect workers' rights." The Tennessee Employment
Lawyers Association, https://www.tennela.org/index.php (last visited
Jan. 3, 2012). Unlike Benjamin Sanders, Doug Janney is not a
registered lobbyist.
91 "If [the moving party] submits an affidavit that saying well the
nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient to the courts satisfaction,
than the nonmoving party may not get any opportunity to respond and
have the lawsuit dismissed. And that's inconsistent with summary
judgment practice in federal and in state courts and in the way it's
always been done. You have to give the nonmoving party opportunity
to respond." Statement of Doug Janney to the House Judiciary
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was not the intent of the bill to permit a court to grant
summary judgment without allowing the non-moving party
the opportunity to be heard,92 and Mr. Janney responding
that "it may not be the intent but that's the effect it could
have." 93 Rep. Dennis reminded Mr. Janney that he had
asked him for language to insert into the statute a few
weeks earlier, but had not received any. 94 The back-and-
forth between the two men continued with Mr. Janney
expressing concern that the bill would codify a separate
standard for plaintiffs who move for summary judgment
than for defendants who do so. Finally, Rep. Eric Watson
(R-Cleveland) asked Rep. Dennis if, prior to the bill's
discussion by the full Judiciary Committee, he would meet
with representatives of the trial lawyers' lobby to "just
straighten some of this out" and "[m]aybe . . . write
something different." 95 Rep. Dennis indicated that he was
willing to do so, but that he had already made changes to
the legislation suggested by John Day of the Tennessee
Association for Justice, an organization representing
Tennessee's trial lawyers.96 With this understanding, the
bill was passed through to full committee.
92 Statement of Rep. Dennis, House Judiciary Subcommittee, Apr. 27,
2011, available at http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view-id=
186&clipjid=4170.
9 Statement of Mr. Janney, House Judiciary Subcommittee, Apr. 27,
2011, available at http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?viewid=
186&clip-id=4170.
94 Statement of Rep. Dennis, House Judiciary Subcommittee, Apr. 27,
2011, available at http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?viewid=
186&clip-id-4170.
95 Statement of Rep. Watson, House Judiciary Subcommittee, Apr. 27,
2011, available at http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?viewid=
186&clipjid=4170.
96 Statement of Rep. Dennis, House Judiciary Subcommittee, Apr. 27,
2011, available at http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?viewid=
186&clip-id=41700. But see Telephone interview with John Day,
supra note 85 (noting that he never suggested specific changes to the
language of the bill but instead questioned the lobbyists for Farmers'
Insurance about the purposes of the bill and merely suggested that those
122
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The full House Judiciary Committee considered HB
1358 on May 3, 2011. Rep. Dennis stressed that the bill
"would codify the court's previous status prior to a
Supreme Court decision in 2008 and take us back to the
way the law was on summary judgment before 2008."" In
fact, he repeated several times in response to questioning
from Rep. Camper that the purpose of the bill was to move
the summary judgment standard "back to what the state
standard was prior to 2008 and what the federal standard
has always been . . . the plaintiff has got to 'put up or shut
up. Following up on the charge he was given at the end
of the Subcommittee's meeting, Rep. Dennis stated that he
had "worked with the trial bar, the Trial Lawyers'
Association, in drafting this language," and it was his
"understanding they don't have any intent to oppose this
bill. Although there was an attorney here last week who
had some issues but he was not representing the Trial Bar
purposes be set forth more clearly). According to its website, the
Tennessee Association for Justice "works to protect the civil justice
system and advocates for accountability and the rights of all citizens."
http://www.tnaj.org/. In the brochure for its 2010 Annual Convention,




97 Statement of Rep. Dennis, House Judiciary Committee, May 3, 2011,
available at http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view-id=
186&clip-id=419.
98 Id. Rep. Dennis went so far as to provide an example of a
hypothetical lawsuit in an effort to explain the meaning of summary
judgment and the potential effects of the legislation to Rep. Camper.
Significantly, throughout this hypothetical, Rep. Dennis implied that
the bill would change the burdens of proof, not the burdens of
production, at the summary judgment stage. The implications of this
hypothetical could be misleading in that Hannan dealt only with the
parties' burden of production and the bill was represented as merely
changing the result in Hannan.
123
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Association." 99 With regard to his views on the Hannan
decision, Rep. Dennis stated:
The court got it wrong. The court changed
its standard. The court changed its standard
that it had always applied. The court
changed the standard away from what the
federal courts applied. And we're saying
yes, we do it all the time, that if the court
makes a decision wrong, incorrectly, if the
people think it was done incorrectly, we
change the law to rein that in unless it's a
constitutional issue which has constitutional
protections that are greater than normal. But
yes, the court adopted a standard that was
too far to one side. If we codify this, we will
be bring that standard back in line with what
it was prior to 2008 and what the federal
standard is now.100
During the Judiciary Committee meeting, Rep.
Mike Stewart (D-Nashville) asked Rep. Dennis whether the
legislation might violate separation of powers principles.
He was the only member of either the House or the Senate
to voice this concern that the legislation might violate
separation of powers. Specifically, Rep. Stewart said:
9 Id. Rep. Dennis was apparently referring to Doug Janney of the
Tennessee Employment Lawyers Association. See also Telephone
Interview with John Day, supra note 85 (indicating that the Tennessee
Association for Justice did not actively oppose the bill but also did not
support the bill or express approval of it).
100 Id. When asked by Rep. Mike Stewart (D-Nashville) whether this
bill represented his personal feelings, Rep. Dennis responded that
"there's a lot of concern within the business community that we've
gotten to the point that cases with no merit are getting to juries because
of Hannan - but it is my personal view that we should be using the
Celotex standard, and the Byrd standard, which adopted Celotex."
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I guess my concern is on a rules case, do we
really want to ... you know ... it's different
from creating an environmental law or a law
where a person can carry a gun. That's our
job, we can make that decision, okay. But
I'm worried that this seems like a bad
precedent because the courts ultimately
create these rules. We have a hand in it, but
aren't we really encroaching upon an
independent branch of government? You
know, the reason I say that is if you think
back, you know, where [Franklin]
Roosevelt, a very popular president, ran into
trouble with his own Democrats is when he
tried to pack the Supreme Court and the
Democratic senate said no because they
respected, even though they had respect for
the president, they respected even more this
separate branch of government. Seems to me
what we're doing here . . . I mean if every
time the Supreme Court has said something
about a rule we don't like, if we're going to
start getting in the business of rewriting the
rules every time a case is lost, it seems like
we're stepping into their house and I think
that is not . . . do you really think that's
smart when it comes to rules? I mean rules
about how a court works as opposed to the
underlying policies that the eople sent us
up here to do, to implement.10
101 Statement by Rep. Stewart, House Judiciary Committee, May 3,
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Rep. Dennis responded that he did not believe the
bill raised constitutional concerns, because the bill neither
changed the language of Rule 56 nor was in direct
contravention to it; rather, the legislation would simply be
establishing a burden of proof, something the General
Assembly had done in many other contexts, both civil and
criminal. 102 To Rep. Dennis, the constitutionality of the
legislation seems to turn on whether the legislature actually
changed the language of the rule itself, although he added
the caveat that if the Supreme Court disagreed, it was their
prerogative to find the bill unconstitutional sometime in the
future. 103 Rep. Stewart responded that he would be voting
against the bill because although the legislation did not
literally change the words of Rule 56, it changed their
meaning, which, to a litigant, was the same thing.104 Rep.
Stewart did vote against the bill, but it passed easily out of
the Judiciary Committee, and then passed the full House,
after no discussion, by an eighty-five to four vote on May
20. 1os
102 Statement of Rep. Dennis, House Judiciary Committee, May 3,
2011, available at http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?viewid=
186&clipjid=419.
103 Id.
i04 Statement by Rep. Stewart, House Judiciary Committee, May 3,
2011, available at http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?viewid=
186&clip-id=419. Rep. Stewart added that "[t]he Tennessee Supreme
Court. . . is a pretty pro-business court and I think we should leave it to
the courts to decide what the rules mean." Id.
105 Although there was no discussion on the House floor about HB
1358, there was relevant discussion during the House's consideration of
HB 1641, companion legislation also sponsored by Rep. Dennis that
overruled the Supreme Court's 2010 Gossett decision. During this
debate, Rep. Stewart stated: "I don't think this body should routinely
overturn decisions by our high court whether or not it's to an advantage
of one particular group or another just because I think separation of
powers suggest that we should be very deferential to them." Statement
of Rep. Stewart, House Floor, May 20, 2011, available at
http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view-id=186&clip-id=438.
Rep. Dennis reiterated, "the intent of the legislation is to take us back to
126
126
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B. The Senate
The legislation's trip through the Senate was even
less eventful than its companion bill's journey through the
House. Only one question was raised when Senate Bill
1114 was brought before the Judiciary Committee on May
17, 106 and it quickly passed out of committee by a six-to-
two vote. Unlike in the House, however, there was some
debate over the bill on the floor of the Senate. Sen. Tim
Barnes (D-Adams), who had raised the lone question in the
Judiciary Committee, stated that the American Association
for Retired Persons ("AARP") was opposing the bill
because it "would make it all but impossible for victims of
employment discrimination or of any other employment
law violation to be able to prove their case and get their
rightful day in court."' 0 7 Sen. Barnes further stated that he
would be voting against the bill because he did not agree
with jettisoning the Tennessee summary judgment standard
the standard that was applied before that case and the standard that is
applied in our federal courts." Statement of Rep. Dennis, House Floor,
May 20, 2011, available at http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?
viewid=186&clip-id=438. Rep. Dennis also opined, in response to
questioning from Rep. Brenda Gilmore (D-Nashville), that the bill
"clarifies" rather than "reverses" the Supreme Court's opinion in
Gossett and makes it no harder for an employee to receive restitution
through an employment discrimination suit. Id.
" The question from Sen. Tim Barnes (D-Adams) was whether the
proposed legislation applies equally to defendants and plaintiffs. See
Statement of Sen. Barnes, Senate Judiciary Committee, May 17, 2011.
Sen. Kelsey clarified that the bill refers not to defendants and plaintiffs,
but "speaks in terms of the party that . . . bears the burden of proof at
trial." Statement of Sen. Kelsey, Senate Judiciary Committee, May 17,
2011, available at http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view-id=
186&clip-id=428.





8.1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 128
in favor of the federal standard."108 Another member, Sen.
Jim Kyle (D-Memphis), expressed concern that the General
Assembly was "blindly overturn[ing] the Supreme Court
decision" in Hannan.'0
Sen. Lowe Finney (D-Jackson) raised specific
concerns that the bill was not sent to the Rules Commission
prior to consideration by the General Assembly.o10 He
asked Sen. Kelsey if he would consider sending the
proposal to the Rules Commission and allowing them to
consider it, as it is generally standard for the courts to
promulgate their own rules of procedure.' Sen. Kelsey
108 Specifically, Sen. Barnes stated that "[s]ummary judgment is
something that is developed in Tennessee with Tennessee body of law,
the law that's unique to Tennessee, and I think it a wrong direction to
go to abrogate Tennessee law and try to impose legislatively a body of
law that is applied in federal courts." Id.
109 Statement by Sen. Kyle, Senate Floor, May 20, 2011, available at
http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view-id=
186&clip-id=43288.
110 Under a statutory procedure in Tennessee, the Supreme Court's
Advisory Commission drafts and vets amendments to the Tennessee
Rules of Civil or Criminal Procedure or Rules of Evidence. The
Supreme Court sends them in a package to the General Assembly,
which (unlike the process for the Federal Rules) must approve them by
joint resolution before they have the force of law. See TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-3-401 to -403 (2011). Ironically, during the pendency of
the Hannan legislation, the General Assembly approved amendments to
the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure promulgated by the Tennessee
Supreme Court. H.R. 0034 (signed by House Speaker May 2, 2011);
S.R. 0012 (signed by Speaker of Senate April 6, 2011).
1n Statement of Sen. Finney, Senate Floor, May 20, 2011, available at
http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view-id=186&clip-id=4328
8. Sen. Finney went on to express concern that the Senate had not fully
deliberated over the bill, and stated a preference that "when we start
telling the courts how to expedite dockets, how to get cases moving
along, that we let those rules, that we let those courts decide how to do
it rather than doing it by statute because it's very specialized." Id.
Nashville plaintiff's attorney Mark Chalos recently opined that "[t]he
Tennessee Constitution and Tennessee law is clear that that it is
exclusively in the courts' purview to make rules for resolving disputes.
128
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responded that the bill had been on the Rules Commission
agenda,1 2 and that the Tennessee Bar Association or any
other interested party had ample opportunity to take the
legislation before the Rules Committee after it was
introduced in February, but had not done so. 113 He also
believed that, at any rate, it was unnecessary for the Rules
Committee to consider the legislation because the bill did
not change Rule 56, but rather overruled the Court's
interpretation of it. 114 After this brief debate, the bill passed
the Senate by a nineteen-to-nine vote.
There is a concern that this legislature is ignoring the constitutional
limits on its powers." Gee, supra note 13.
112 In fact, the bill was never on the Commission's agenda and was
never considered by the Commission. See Agenda, Advisory
Commission to the Supreme Court on Rules of Practice and Procedure
(Feb. 18, 2011); Minutes, Advisory Commission to the Supreme Court
on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Feb. 18, 2011); Agenda, Advisory
Commission to the Supreme Court on Rules of Practice and Procedure
(May 13, 2011); Minutes, Advisory Commission to the Supreme Court
on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 13, 2011) (on file with
authors).
113 Statement of Sen. Kelsey, Senate Floor, May 20, 2011, available at
http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?viewid=1 86&clipid=
4328. Sen. Finney responded that he served on the Commission and
had the agenda, and the issue was never raised. Statement of Sen.
Finney, Senate Floor, May 20, 2011, available at http://tnga.
granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view id=186&clip-id=43288.
114 "I think the bigger issue is that the rule didn't change. It's been the
rule, it's been there for a number of years. It's the same rule that was in
place before the 2008 decision. It's the same rule in place after the
2008 decision. And it will be the same rule that will be in place after
the passage of this bill. So we're really not looking to change the rule.
We're simply looking to change the law on the burdens of production
and how that is interpreted." Statement of Sen. Kelsey, Senate Floor,
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V. The "Stealth" Bill
The bills that became Public Chapter No. 498,
House Bill 1358 and Senate Bill 1114, were both
introduced on February 16, 2011. The bills were passed by
their respective chambers on May 20, 2011.1s The Senate
then substituted House Bill 1358 for Senate Bill 1114, and
the final bill, House Bill 1358, was signed by the Speaker
of the House on May 24, 2011 and by the Speaker Pro
Tempore of the Senate on May 25, 2011. The legislation
was signed as enacted by Governor Haslam on June 16,
2011.
Between February 16, 2011 and June 16, 2011,
there is not a single mention of either the House or Senate
bill, or the Act as passed, in the media, either legal or
popular. Much media attention was given to the tort reform
legislation that was ultimately passed, but even in this
coverage, the bills attempting to overrule Hannan were not
mentioned.1 6 The "stealth" nature of the Hannan bills may
explain why they were part of the flood of bills-154 in all-
that were passed during the final three days of the
legislative session. 17 Because of the end-of-session rush,
"some [bills] are going to need to be redone in the next
session because they contained mistakes.""1 8
The combination of stealth and rush to passage may
explain the most glaring error in Public Chapter No. 498:
its purported directive that a movant "shall prevail" upon
115 Supra Part IV.
116 This lack of linkage between the tort reform legislation and the
Hannan legislation appears to negate the suggestion made by one
commentator that Public Chapter 498 could be seen as part of the tort
reform package. See Blumstein, supra note 18, at 17.
117 See Lucas L. Johnson II, Tennessee General Assembly Passed 154
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making the specified showing. If read literally, this
language totally changes the current standard for summary
judgment stated in Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure
56.04:
Subject to the moving party's compliance
with Rule 56.03, the judgment sought shall
be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law. 19
Under Public Chapter No. 498, to prevail on a motion for
summary judgment, the movant need no longer prove that
there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law."l 20 Instead, all the movant must do is either
"[s]ubmit[] affirmative evidence that negates an essential
element of the nonmoving party's claim; or . . .
[d]emonstrate[] to the court that the nonmoving party's
evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of
the nonmoving party's claim.121
VI. Context and Implications
A. Context
This legislation can be viewed through a few
different lenses. Perhaps the sponsors had a personal belief,
or believed that their constituents would feel, that Hannan
131
" TENN. R. Cv. P. 56.04 (2011).
120 id.
121' 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts 498.
131
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was wrongly decided and that it was necessary for the
legislature to step in and require courts adjudicating
summary judgment motions in Tennessee to apply the
Celotex standard. This seems unlikely given the inability of
Rep. Dennis, in particular, to elucidate the precise meaning
and effect of the bill, and his decision to call on Mr.
Sanders from Farmers to describe it to the Judiciary
Committee for him. Another explanation is that the
Republican majorities were determined to pass a business-
friendly agenda during the 2011 session after years in the
political wilderness, and that overturning Hannan was
simply something that their business constituencies wanted
and they had the votes to accomplish. This is a more
reasonable possibility. A third prism looks at the issue more
broadly and tries to place it in context of the ongoing power
struggle between the conservative legislature and the
judicial branch, which the legislature arguably views as the
last check on its complete control of state government. 122
Some of the most significant issues causing this rift
between the legislature and judiciary in Tennessee are: (1)
the method by which Attorney General is selected; (2) the
make-up of the Court of Judiciary; and (3) the Tennessee
Plan, which determines the method of selection of appellate
judges in Tennessee.' 23 Any of these could form the basis
for its own article, but a brief survey of the issues helps to
place the summary judgment legislation in context.
122 Indeed, the attempts of legislatures to extend their power at the
expense of the judiciary have become an epidemic nationwide. See
generally John Gilbeaut, Co-Equal Opportunity: Legislators are Out to
Take Over Their State Judiciary Systems, ABA JOURNAL (Jan. 2012),
at 45.
123 For a detailed analysis of the current dynamic in Tennessee
regarding the threat of contested judicial elections - and how Public
Chapter No. 498 contributes to that dynamic - see Judy M. Cornett &
Matthew R. Lyon, Contested Elections as Secret Weapon: Legislative
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i. Appointment of the Attorney General
Tennessee's method of selecting its Attorney
General is unique among the fifty states. Rather than
selecting the office through popular election, or even
through appointment by the Governor, the Attorney
General is appointed by the Tennessee Supreme Court for a
term of eight years.124 Some have referred to the Attorney
General, both positivelyl 25 and derogatively,' 26 as the
"fourth branch of government" in Tennessee. Over the past
several years, there have been several attempts, primarily
among conservatives, to amend the Constitution to allow
for popular election of the Attorney General. 127 This
movement gained steam when Tennessee's current
Attorney General, Robert Cooper, declined to join with a
group of other state attorneys general who were challenging
the constitutionality of the federal Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act that passed in 2009.128 Popular
124 TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 5.
125 See generally Paul Summers, Attorney General Impartiality is an




126 See Andrea Zelinski, Multiple Proposals Filed to Reform How TN
Picks a Chief Attorney, THE TENNESSEE REP., Jan. 31, 2011, available
at http://www.tnreport.com/201 1/01/multiple-proposals-filed-for-
reforming-how-tn-picks-a-chief-attorney/ (statement by Rep. Joe Carr
(R-Lascassas)).
127 See, e.g., Bonna de la Cruz, 104th General Assembly, THE
TENNESSEAN, January 17, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 26776267;
Proposal Would Add S Office to Statewide Elections, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Apr. 3, 2007, available at http://www.wate.
com/story/6324679/proposal-would-add-5-offices-to-statewide-
elections?clienttype=printable&redirected=true; Tennessee Senate
Delays Vote on Plan to Elect Attorney General, THE TENNESSEAN, Apr.
20, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 8142261.
128 See, e.g., Mark Todd Engler, Guy to Pressure AG Cooper on
ObamaCare?, THE TENNESSEE REP., Jan. 22, 2011, available at
133
133
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election of the Attorney General has become a major
priority of the Tennessee Tea Party, and Sen. Brian Kelsey,
the sponsor of the summary judgment legislation, has been
one of the lead proponents.129 Due to the difficulty of
amending the state constitution, an alternative proposal has
been made to create a Solicitor General's office that will
take on many of the functions that the critics of the
Attorney General wish his office would embrace.130
ii. Court of the Judiciary
Established by statute,131 the Court of the Judiciary
investigates allegations of misconduct by Tennessee judges
and imposes discipline. Currently, the Court is made up of
sixteen members: ten judges appointed by the Tennessee
Supreme Court, three members appointed by the Tennessee
Bar Association, and one member each appointed by the
Governor, the House Speaker, and the Senate Speaker Pro
Tempore.132 Recently, the Court of the Judiciary has been
criticized by Republicans for failing to effectively police
the judiciary, with critics pointing to the fact that few
complaints result in discipline, and much of the discipline
http://www.tnreport.com/201 1/01/guv-to-pressure-ag-cooper-to-fight-
obamacare/; Greg Johnson, AG Cooper Should Fight Health Care Law
or Resign, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL, Dec. 17, 2010, available at
http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2010/dec/17/ag-cooper-should-fight-
health-care-law-or-resign/.
129 Andrea Zelinski, Tea Party Wants People's Choice for Top State
Litigator, THE TENNESSEE REP., Jan. 13, 2011, available at
http://www.tnreport.com/201 1/01/tea-party-wants-peoples-choice-for-
to -state-litigator/.
See, e.g., H.B. 1073, 107th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2011);
Chas Sisk, Lawmakers Target AG Office, THE TENNESSEAN, Mar. 26,
2011, available at 2011 WLNR 5909301.
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is issued in the form of private reprimands. 133 In response,
a Republican legislator introduced a bill this past session to
shrink membership on the Court of the Judiciary to twelve,
all of them appointed by either the House Speaker or the
Senate Pro Tempore. 134 Although the legislation failed in
the 2011 session, it is an additional example of the tension
between the legislative and judicial branches, and
represents "a fairly straightforward assault on the
independence of the judicial branch."'135 Most recently, an
ad hoc committee of legislators appointed by the House
Speaker and Lieutenant Governor held hearings on the
133 Tom Humphrey, Tennessee Leaders Struggle Over Who Judges the
Judges, KNOXViLLE NEWS SENTINEL, Aug. 28, 2011, available at
http://www.knoxnews.com/news/201 1/aug/28/tennessee-leaders-
struggle-over-who-judges-the/; see also Press Release, Tennessee
Senate Republican Caucus, Senator Mae Beavers: Judges Judging




135 Id. An even more straightforward assault on the judiciary was made
by Senator Mae Beavers on January 13, 2012, when she introduced
S.B. 2348, which would have abolished the Tennessee Supreme
Court's power of judicial review of legislation. S.B. 2348, 107m Gen.
Assembly, 2d Sess. (2012) ("The supreme court shall have no
jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of a statute which has
been properly enacted by the general assembly and become law in
accordance with Article II, § 18 and Article III, § 18 of the Tennessee
constitution."). See generally Bill Raftery, Tennessee Bill Would End
Judicial Review of All Statutes, GAVEL TO GAVEL (Jan. 13, 2012)
available at http://gaveltogavel.us/site/2012/01/13/tennessee-bill-
would-end-judicial-review-of-all-statutes (noting that bill attempts to
strip judicial review by statute rather than by constitutional amendment
as is being attempted in New Hampshire). Sen. Beavers later withdrew
her bill under pressure from legislators in both parties. Erik Schelzig,
Sen. Mae Beavers Withdraws Bill to Ban Judicial Review, THE
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Court of the Judiciary, with one lawmaker suggesting that
the legislature do away with the body entirely and have the
members of the judiciary investigated exclusively by
members of the legislature. 36
iii. Tennessee Plan
Probably the greatest source of tension between the
legislature and the judiciary in Tennessee is the constant
threat of revising the method of selecting appellate judges
in Tennessee, known as the Tennessee Plan. The
Tennessee Constitution provides that "[t]he Judges of the
Supreme Court shall be elected by the qualified voters of
the State."1 38 In 1993, the legislature enacted the Tennessee
Plan, under which vacancies on appellate courts in
Tennessee are filled by gubernatorial appointment, with
that appointee being called up for a retention vote at the
next biennial election. 139 A number of different proposals
have circulated to change the Tennessee Plan, including
popular election and, most recently, adoption of a system
similar to the federal model (appointment by the Governor
with confirmation by the Senate).140 Most recently,
136 Brandon Gee, Lawmakers Grill Courts' Disciplinary Body, THE
TENNESSEAN, Sept. 21, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 18857433
(statement of Sen. Mike Bell (R-Riceville)). The testimony taken by
legislators at the hearing included John Jay Hooker, a long-time,
outspoken critic of the Tennessee Plan and the Court of the Judiciary,
and individuals "telling tales of judicial misconduct, including that of a
judge who ordered a Hispanic woman to learn English and use birth
control or he would take away her kids." Legislature Aims Scrutiny at
Court of the Judiciary, TENN. ATTORNEYS MEMO, Oct. 3, 2011, at 1.
137 See Cornett & Lyon, supra note 123.
'3 8 TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
13 9 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-115 (2011).
'4 Sen. Kelsey plans to propose this option in the 2012 legislative
session. Brandon Gee, New Way to Pick TN Judges Proposed, THE
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Governor Bill Haslam, House Speaker Beth Harwell, and
Senate Speaker and Lieutenant Governor Ron Ramsey have
joined in supporting a constitutional amendment that would
explicitly authorize the Tennessee Plan. 141 Because the
Tennessee Plan expires in 2012, judicial selection is
expected to be a major focus of the 2012 legislative
session.142
B. Implications
This fascinating attempt to legislatively overrule the
Tennessee Supreme Court's interpretation of Tennessee
Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (or, alternatively, to
legislatively amend Rule 56) raises many questions -
among them, whether the Act violates the separation of
powers provision of the Tennessee Constitution.143 Our
examination of the legislative history reveals a number of
concerns. First, the legislative history provides no support
for any of the legislative findings in the Act. The General
Assembly held no hearings on the legislation. No data was
presented to demonstrate the validity of the assertions that
Hannan had made summary judgment more difficult to
TN-judges-proposed. Proponents of popular elections have suggested
that they might be able to support the plan, id.; however the judiciary
has reacted skeptically, at least initially. Brandon Gee, Nomination
Plan Draws Skepticism Among TN Judges, THE TENNESSEAN, Oct. 21,
2011, at 4B, available at 2011 WLNR 21625761.
141 Chas Sisk & Brandon Gee, Gov. Bill Haslam Wants TN
Constitutional Amendment on Merit Selection of Judges, THE
TENNESSEAN (Jan. 26, 2012) available at http://www.tennessean.com/
article/20120126/NEWSO201/301250149/Gov-Bill-Haslam-wants-TN-
constitutional-amendment-merit-selection-judges. Gov. Haslam stated
that "the amendment is needed to settle once and for all the long
dispute over how Tennessee's judges are named and elected." Id.
142 Brandon Gee, Nomination Plan Draws Skepticism Among TN
Judges, THE TENNESSEAN, Oct. 21, 2011, at 4B, available at 2011
WLNR 21625761.
143 See Cornett & Lyon, supra note 123.
137
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obtain and, concomitantly, that the courts were being
overburdened by trials of nonmeritorious cases. Instead, the
reiteration of this unsupported assertion simply echoed the
doom-saying by the defense bar in the wake of Hannan.1"
Principled lawmaking - especially lawmaking that purports
to overrule a decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court on a
procedural matter - should be based on more than mere
speculation and doom-saying.
Second, the bills' sponsors provided inaccurate
descriptions of the Tennessee law of summary judgment
both pre- and post-Hannan. The bills' sponsors, both
lawyers, consistently represented to the other legislators,
some of them laypersons, that the bill would return
Tennessee law to its pre-Hannan state, which was identical
to the federal Celotex standard. As shown above, the
assertion that Tennessee summary judgment law was ever
identical to the federal standard is simply wrong. The
erroneous representations about the effect of the bills
served to mislead other legislators, who undoubtedly had
even less of a grasp of the fine points of Tennessee's
summary judgment law than did the lawyer-sponsors.
Exacerbating the sponsors' inability to accurately
depict either the state of Tennessee summary judgment law
or the effect of the proposed legislation is the fact that third
parties had to be called upon to explain the bill. In the
House, Benjamin Sanders, a registered lobbyist for
Tennessee Farmers Insurance Company, who was
apparently standing by, was called upon to "clarify" the
bill, but he also inaccurately described the pre-Hannan
law. 145 Also apparently standing by was Doug Janney,
144 See Phillips, supra n. 17, Blumstein, supra n. 18.
145 Statement of Mr. Sanders, House Judiciary Subcommittee, Apr. 27,
2011, available at http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?viewid=
186&clip-id=41700. ("[U]nder our old standard of summary judgment
I can move for summary judgment and challenge the sufficiency of
evidence. And essentially saying if you don't have enough evidence to
138
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President of the Tennessee Employment Lawyers
Association, 146 who accurately pointed out the error
discussed above by noting that the bill "give[s] the
defendant the opportunity to prevail on the motion of
summary judgment without ever giving the plaintiff the
opportunity to respond in some circumstances." 47 While
the legislative history does not reveal the precise role
played by lobbyists in drafting the bill and briefing its
sponsors, the need for third parties to participate in
explaining the bill demonstrates how poorly understood the
bill actually was.
Third, the General Assembly failed to utilize
procedures designed to ensure careful consideration of such
changes to court practice and procedure by not submitting
the bills to the Tennessee Supreme Court Advisory
Commission on the Rules of Practice and Procedure (the
"Rules Commission"), as has been customary. In the Senate
debate, Senator Lowe Finney, a member of the Rules
Commission,148 stated, "I think [Senate bill 1114] would be
appropriate for the Rules Commission to look at." When
Senator Kelsey asserted "the Rules Commission already
had a chance to take a look at it last week," Senator Finney
responded, "I have the agenda from the Rules Committee
and it wasn't on the agenda of the Rules Commission
Committee [sic]." Senator Kelsey then replied, "Well the
Tennessee Bar Association had the ability to take it to the
go to trial we need to stop it right here. Under the old standard, the
court could grant that.")
146 See supra, note 90.
147 Statement of Mr. Janney, House Judiciary Subcommittee, Apr. 27,
2011, available at http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view-id=
186&clip-id=41700.
148 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-3-601 (2011) (establishing the Advisory
Commission on the Rules of Practice and Procedure); http://www.
tncourts.gov/boards-commissions/boards-commissions/advisory-
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rules committee and at least somebody on there was aware
of this particular bill and this particular issue." Although it
is unclear why someone from the Tennessee Bar
Association would have known about the bill given the
complete lack of publicity it received, what is obvious from
this colloquy is that the bill's sponsors did not present the
bill to the Rules Commission.149 The General Assembly
thereby lost the opportunity to receive a variety of
perspectives and expert advice about the state of Tennessee
summary judgment law and the potential effect of the bill.
VII. Conclusion
Taken together, these concerns reflect an overall
lack of public attention and significant debate among
legislators. The old canard that "you wouldn't want to
know how the sausage is made" seems to apply here. A
citizen or a court looking to the legislative history to
discover the logic and policy underlying Public Chapter
No. 498 would be frustrated, at best. The oft-repeated
mantra that the bill returns Tennessee law to an edenic state
that existed prior to Hannan is simply wrong; the reports of
decreased grants of summary judgments and increased
numbers of trials post-Hannan is unsupported; and, in
addition to constitutional concerns, the legislature's failure
to follow customary procedures to secure expert advice and
to demonstrate respect for a coordinate branch of
government casts doubt on the wisdom, as well as the
validity, of the legislation.
149 The Commission met twice while the bill was pending. In neither
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COMMENT
TENNESSEE TUSSLE: THE STRUGGLE OVER TENNESSEE'S




One representative referred to Tennessee's teacher
collective bargaining bill as "...the tail wagging the dog."2
Another said it signified a fight against "socialistic
bargaining."3 A lobbyist for the Tennessee Education
Association (TEA) said it "...turn[ed] back the clock 35
years."4 The bill's sponsor declared that the legislation
would reverse the state teachers' union's "strangle [on] the
hope of education reform."5 Without a doubt, the
Tennessee 10 7th General Assembly's most contentious
debate brought out hostile language from both sides. The
final result, the Professional Educators Collaborative
'William Gibbons is a second-year law student the University of
Tennessee College of Law.
2 Andrea Zelinski, Amid Political Uncertainty, Collective Bargaining
Bill Headed to House Floor, TNREPORT (May 12, 2011),
http://www.tnreport.com/2011/05/amid-political-uncertainty-collective-
bargaining-bill-headed-to-house-floor/ (statement of Rep. Gary Odom).
3 Richard Locker, Teacher Bargaining Hinges on GOP, COMMERCIAL
APPEAL, May 20, 2011, at B1 (statement of Rep. Glen Casada)
(hereinafter "Locker, "Bargaining Hinges").
4 Andrea Zelinski, House Collective Bargaining Bill Clears Education
Committee, TNREPORT (March 23, 2011), http://www.
tnreport.com/2011/03/house-collective-bargaining-bill-clears-
education-committee/ (statement of TEA lobbyist Jerry Winters).
s Ramsey Proud of Senate's Teacher Collective Bargaining Repeal
Vote, TNREPORT (May 2, 2011), http://www.tnreport.com/2011/
05/ramsey-proud-of-senates-teacher-collective-bargaining-repeal-vote/
(statement of Sen. Jack Johnson).
142
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Conferencing Act of 2011 (PECCA), formalized collective
bargaining's replacement with "collaborative
conferencing," in which education employees and
administrators discuss proposals through "interest-based
collaborative problem-solving." 6
Opponents questioned the motives of the bill's
sponsors, viewing it as an attack on teachers and the
unions' previous political stances.7 Regardless of the truth
of such convictions, detractors chafed while supporters
hailed victory.8 This comment will explore the different
versions of PECCA, how it became new law in Tennessee,
and its possible impact on education in the state. It will also
seek to demonstrate that although the bill's passage
revealed the sometimes unpleasant nature of making law,
PECCA could bring a potentially meaningful and positive
policy change on Tennessee's education system.
II. Tennessee Collective Bargaining before
PECCA
Tennessee teachers first won the right to bargain
collectively in 1978 with the passage of the Education
Professional Negotiations Act (EPNA).9 The legislation
was part of a growing national trend favoring workers'
rights.' 0 The baby-boomer generation had increased student
enrollment, which spawned higher demand for teachers and
increased their "babysitting" duties, such as monitoring
6 Professional Educators Collaborative Conferencing Act of 2011,
TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-602(2) (2011).
7 Teachers Lose PAC Deduction, Will Now Bargain "Collaboratively,"
TENN. J., May 27, 2011 (hereinafter "Teachers Lose").
8 id.
9 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-5-601 to -613 (1978) (repealed 2011); see
Teachers Lose, supra note 7.
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lunchrooms." With greater responsibility, teachers wanted
more in return. 12 Supported by then-Governor Ray Blanton,
a Democrat, the EPNA granted professional employees'
organizations exclusive negotiating authority with local
school boards. 13 Blanton praised the bill as "elevating
government employees from being second-class citizens,"
and the TEA cheered at his surprise appearance at its
convention. 14 Teacher associations in 92 of 136 school
districts used the law to bargain collectively.15
As the 1978 law stated, the purpose was "...to
protect the rights of individual employees in their relations
with boards of education, and to protect the rights of the
boards of education and the public in connection with
employer-employee disputes affecting education."' 6 To
find that balance, the bill put forth a two-step system of
elections leading to recognition of an "organization," which
would then negotiate exclusively with local school
boards. 17 To be able to negotiate, the bill's first step called
for thirty percent or more of professional employees to
agree to request an election that would decide whether to
bargain.18 After securing the thirty percent vote, the second
step required a majority of those eligible to vote
affirmatively to secure representation by the organization. 19
11 Capitol Hill Conversation: History of Teachers' Collective
Bargaining, NASHVILLE PUBLIC RADIO (Feb. 28, 2011), http://
wpln.org/?p= 24 55 3 .
12 id.
13 That Was Then, This Is Now, TNREPORT (May 16, 2011), http:/
www.tnreport.com/2011/05/that-was-then-this-is-now/.
14 House Collective Bargaining Bill Clears Education Committee,
supra note 4.
15 Teachers Lose, supra note 7.
16 TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-601(b)(3) (2009) (repealed 2011).
1 See id. § 49-5-605 (b)(8).
1 See id. § 49-5-605(a).
1 See id. § 49-5-605(b)(4).
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Once it gained a majority, an organization 2procured
exclusive bargaining rights for the next two years.
Mandatory negotiation topics included salaries,
grievance procedures, insurance, fringe benefits, working
conditions, leave, student discipline, and payroll
deductions.21 When disagreements arose, the law provided
for mediation and conciliation that would extend
indeterminately if the parties reached no resolution.22 With
ninety-two school districts engaging in collective
bargaining, the issue of overturning the practice did not
reach serious levels, even during the 2010 election
season.23 Thus, when the legislature introduced PECCA,
one had to wonder what brought about its unanticipated
emergence.
III. Triggers of Change
Local school boards, organized through the
Tennessee School Boards Association, opposed collective
bargaining and officially favored its repeal beginning in
241982. The Association's attempts to turn back the law,
though, typically rose to no more than token efforts. 25
However, once Republicans across Tennessee triumphed in
the 2010 elections, claiming significant majorities in both
the Senate and the House, the Association saw opportunity
in the altered political climate.26 Perhaps adding to the
Association's sense of opportunity was Tennessee's
passage of several reforms as it sought funds in the federal
20 See id. § 49-5-605(b)(8).
21 See id. § 49-5-611(a).
22 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-613.
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Race to the Top competition.27 Further, Tennessee's State
Collaborative on Reforming Education (SCORE), under
former Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, brought various
educational reform ideas into the public sphere.28 Some of
SCORE's proposals, such as tenure reform, have become
policy in the state.29 Taken together, education policy had
entered the public dialogue, and perhaps the Association
saw a climate of change taking hold in Tennessee. Indeed,
when the Boards Association presented the idea to Senate
Republicans, it caught their interest, setting the wheels in
motion towards its eventual adoption. 30
IV. Evolution of Collective Bargaining's Repeal
A. The Original Bill and its First Major Amendment
Introduced on January 18, 2011, in the House and
January 24, 2011, in the Senate, the initial PECCA bill
proposed the complete repeal of the 1978 EPNA, outlawing
negotiation between professional employees' organizations
or teachers' unions and local school boards. 3' While the
changes would not have taken effect immediately, once the
27 See J.E. STONE, EDUCATION CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, POLICY
HIGHLIGHTS FROM TENNESSEE'S RACE TO THE TOP APPLICATION 2
(2010).
28 See TENN. SCORE, A ROADMAP TO SUCCESS 14 (2010), available at
http://www.tnscore.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/SCORE-
Roadmap-to-Success.pdf.
29 See TENN. SCORE, TENURE REFORM (SB 1528/HB 2010) TALKING
POINTS (2011), available at http://www.tnscore.org/wp-content/
3jloads/2011/03/TENURE-TALKING-POINTS.pdf.
Teachers Lose, supra note 7.
31 S.B. 113, 107th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2(a) (Tenn. 2011). See
BILL INFORMATION, S.B. 113, 107th Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2011),
http://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/BilllnfolDefault.aspx?BillNumber-SBO
113; see also Eric Schelzig, TN Teachers Collective Bargaining
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active collective bargaining contracts ran their course,
school boards would have had full policymaking authority,
with no obligation to discuss ideas with employees'
organizations. 32
Some viewed the first draft as going too far, and
thus the Senate worked to revise it.33 The amendment,
Senate Amendment No. 5, rewrote the original bill and
once again called for the repeal of the EPNA while setting
forth a system of "collaboration" between professional
employees or their representatives and local boards. 34 it
also required local boards to develop manuals with
procedures for creating employment policies. 35 Local
boards were to receive "input" from professional
employees and the general public in creating local
manuals. 36 Further, the amendment required the Tennessee
Organization of School Superintendents (TOSS), in
conjunction with employee representative organizations
and the Boards Association, to develop a separate training
system manual for collaborative problem solving.37 For use
by local boards, this training manual would include
procedures on discussing terms and conditions of
contracts.3 8 Employees could submit written input to local
boards during a 45-day period following their local
manual's release.3 9 The board, however, possessed final
authority under the amendment for the specification of
terms and conditions.40
32 S.B. 113, supra note 31, § 2(b).
33 Teachers Lose, supra note 7; Joe White, New Collective Bargaining
Proposal Gives Management Job of Crafting Teacher Provisions,
NASHVILLE PUBLIC RADIO (Apr. 28, 2011), http://wpln.org/?p=26447.
34 S. Amend. No. 5 to S.B. 113, 107th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §§ 1,
49-5-603 (Tenn. 2011).
1 Id. § 49-5-610.
36 Id. § 49-5-610(a)(2).
17 Id. § 49-5-601(c).
Id. § 49-6-608(a).
39 Id. § 49-6-610(c)(3)(a).
40 S. Amend. No. 5 to S.B. 113 § 49-6-608(a).
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The amendment required local boards to collaborate
with professional employees or their representatives with
regard to salaries or wages, grievance procedures,
insurance, working conditions, leave, payroll deductions,
and fringe benefits. 4 1 As mentioned, though, the boards
were to retain final authority on all of these topic areas.42
Further, the amendment prohibited collaboration on
differentiated pay and incentive programs, expenditures of
grants from such entities as the federal government and
private foundations, evaluation standards, staffing decisions
related to "innovative" programs, and personnel decisions
concerning assignment of employees. 4 3 The amended
version of the bill passed in the Senate on May 2, 2011,
along a largely party-line vote of eighteen to fourteen.44
B. Survival in the House and the House's Revisions
With the amended bill having passed in the Senate,
the remaining hurdles to its enactment resided in the House.
Those hurdles proved to be more difficult than expected,
however. The House initially voted to refer the Senate's bill
to its Education Committee, which, given the short time
remaining in the session, seemed to indicate the House was
tabling the bill.45 The Education Committee, however,
46voted affirmatively on the bill. Then, in a legislative
oddity, Republican Speaker of the House Beth Harwell
41 Id. § 49-6-608(a)(1)-(7).
42 Id. § 49-6-608(a).
43 Id. § 49-6-608(b)(1)-(5).
" Tom Humphrey, Senate Votes to Abolish Bargaining for Teachers,
KNox NEWS (May 3, 2011), http://www.knoxnews.com/news/
201 1/may/03/senate-votes-to-abolish-bargaining-for-teachers/?print=1.
45 Richard Locker, Collective Bargaining Bill Hits Snag, COMMERCIAL
APPEAL, May 4, 2011, at B2.
46 Andrea Zelinski, House Reverts to Scaled Back Collective
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kept the bill alive in the Finance, Ways, and Means
Committee by breaking a tie vote, using her right as
speaker to vote in any committee.47
With new life for the legislation, some members of
the House sought to advance their own amendment, which
was less comprehensive than the Senate's draft.48 The
amendment was also a rewrite of the original bill, but its
distinction from the Senate Amendment meant the two
bodies would have to develop a final version of the bill
once the House made its changes.49 Most fundamentally
different was that the House version did not completely
repeal the EPNA.50 The amendment required local boards
to negotiate with recognized professional employees'
organizations only on conditions of employment for which
performance requires the employee to have a license-
essentially base salaries and benefits, among other issues.
Like the Senate version, however, the House proposal
specified that issues such as differentiated pay and
incentives, expenditure of governmental and private grants,
evaluation standards, salary and staffing issues relating to
innovative educational programs, and personnel decisions
regarding assignment would be off limits in negotiation. 52
47 Tom Humphrey, Harwell Casts Vote to Save Collective Bargaining
Bill from Defeat, HUMPHREY ON THE HILL (May 11, 2011, 6:39 PM),
http://blogs.knoxnews.com/humphrey/2011/05/harwell-casts-vote-to-
save-col.html
48 Richard Locker, Tennessee House Amends Bill to Limit Collective
Bargaining by Teachers, COMMERCIAL APPEAL, May 16, 2011,
http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2011/may/16/tennessee-
house-amends-bill-limit-collective-barga/ (hereinafter "Locker, House
Amends"); see also Joe White, Collective Bargaining Vote Delayed,
Another Union Bill Marches Forward, NASHVILLE PUBLIC RADIO (May
16, 2011), http://wpln.org/?26949.
49 Locker, House Amends, supra note 48.
5o Id.
5' H. Amend. No. 1 to H.B. 130, 107th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 12
(Tenn. 2011); see also Locker, House Amends, supra note 48.
52 H. Amend. No. I to H.B. 130, supra note 51, § 4(c)(1)-(5).
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After extensive debate on the House floor and several
proposed amendments containing "opt-out" provisions for
local systems, the House amendment passed fifty-nine to
thirty-nine, necessitating synchronization between the two
bodies. 53
C. Reaching a Compromise
The Senate, led by Senator Jack Johnson and
Lieutenant Governor Ron Ramsey, both Republicans,
refused to concur with the amended House bill, which they
perceived as too weak.54 To avoid a stalemate, the two
bodies formed a conference committee charged with
forming a compromise version of the bill.s After
deliberating, the compromise banned collective bargaining,
but kept much of the framework for its replacement,
"collaborative conferencing," the same as under EPNA.56
The new bill retained the EPNA's two-step voting structure
for recognition of teacher organizations, although it
lowered the percentage vote necessary to recognize an
organization's request to conference from thirty percent to
fifteen percent. In one significant departure from previous
law, the conference committee took away the exclusive
negotiating rights of a professional group, meaning
multiple organizations could approach local boards. 5 Like
the original statute, the compromise allowed conferencing
only on salaries and wages, grievance procedures, working
conditions, leave, payroll deductions of dues, and insurance
53 Tom Humphrey, House Passes Collective Bargaining Bill, 59-39,
HUMPHREY ON THE HLL (May 19, 2011, 5:01 PM), http://blogs.
knoxnews.com/humphrey/2011/05/house-passes-collective-bargai.html.
54 Teachers Lose, supra note 7.
s5 Locker, Bargaining Hinges, supra note 3.
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-602(2).
See id § 49-5-605(b)(1)-(6).
58 See id § 49-5-605(c).
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and benefits, including retirement and pension. 59 Collective
bargaining had mandated talks on each of these, as well as
student discipline measures, meaning the new legislation
kept the major topics of negotiation largely the same, but
only suggested them while limiting the scope of talks
beyond those topics. 60
Collaborative conferencing also called for
collaboration to take place between even teams of seven to
eleven representatives each between the local school
system and teacher organizations, a change from EPNA's
variation of team sizes based on school district size.61
Finally, a memorandum of understanding following
collaboration would memorialize agreements the two sides
could make, although the local school boards would
possess ultimate power to decide unresolved matters.62 The
compromise passed both legislative bodies along largely
party-line votes, and Governor Bill Haslam signed the bill
into law on June 1, 2011.63
V. Criticism of the Bill
The bill received aggressive legislative commentary
inside and outside of the legislature. Following the House's
approval of the compromise, TEA members shouted
"Shame on you" and "2012"-the year of the next set of
' See id. § 49-5-608(a).
6 Senator Dolores Gresham, Comparison of the Educational
Professional Negotiations Act of 1978 and the Professional Educators
Collaborative Conferencing Act of 2011, available at http:/
senatordoloresgresham.com/pdf/CollBarg%20vs%
20CollabConferencing.pdf.
61 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-605(b)(4); see also Gresham, supra
note 60.
62 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-609(a)-(d).
63 See TENN. CODE ANN.; Richard Locker, Teacher Rights to Negotiate
Repealed, COMMERCIAL APPEAL, May 21, 2011, at Al.
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elections in Tennessee.6 Democrats in opposition to the
bill suggested that the primary reason for the bill's passage
was revenge for the TEA's historical support of Democratic
candidates. 6 5 "I have to say that it's not easy to give the
benefit of the doubt any more. In fact, this process seems
more and more to be a political vendetta," said Senator
Andy Berke, a Democrat. 6
Republicans, however, denied that accusation, and
some indicated that the TEA's reduced influence would in
fact remove politics from education policy.67 "We are not
trying to punish the teachers, absolutely not. For too long,
we have allowed the TEA to make education a political
battleground in this state. We need to make education about
education," said Representative Jim Gotto." 68  Other
Republicans hailed the bill's passage as a major education
breakthrough.69 "For years upon years, one union has
thwarted the progress of education in Tennessee," said
Lieutenant Governor Ramsey. "The barrier that has
prevented us from putting the best ossible teacher in every
classroom will soon be removed.",7 p
Outside the legislature, education association
advocates have taken issue with the bill, mostly regarding
64 Lawmakers Vote to Repeal 1970s Era Collective Bargaining Law,




67 Jeff Woods, State House Ok's Compromise Version of Proposal to





69 Tim Ghianni, Tennessee Limits Collective Bargaining Rights for
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its fairness but also concerning its legality. Tennessee
courts have recognized public employees' right to join
unions, but state and federal courts have not found a
constitutional right to bargain collectively under Tennessee
law.7 1
Still, challenges in Tennessee have emerged,
focusing on PECCA's constitutionality in other respects.72
Three challenges have commenced in Blount, Dickson, and
Sumner Counties in which local education associations
have sued local boards, with the TEA general counsel
serving in each.73 While there are some differences in what
the suits allege, they each proffer two fundamental
arguments regarding PECCA's constitutionality-that it
retrospectively removes powers education associations
once possessed and that PECCA's content extends beyond
its caption.74
The education associations' first argument was that
PECCA "retrospectively impairs" the rights of teachers'
71 Catherine E. Shuck, Bargaining Power: Understanding the Rights of
Public Sector Workers in Tennessee, TENN. BAR J. 12-14 (2011).
72 Tom Humphrey, Dickson Teachers' Lawsuit Contends Anti-
Collective Bargaining Law Violates State Constitution, HUMPHREY ON
THE HILL (July 21, 2011, 2:37 PM), http://blogs.knoxnews.com/
humphrey/2011/07/dickson-teachers-lawsuit-conte.html.
7 Tennessee Education Association, Locals Allege Violation of First
Amendment Rights, TEACH, Jan. 2012, at 3 (hereinafter "TEA, Locals
Allege").
74 See Tennessee Memorandum of Law in Defense of the
Constitutionality of 2011 Tenn. Pub. Ch. No. 378 at 2,4, Blount Cnty.
Educ. Ass'n v. Blount Cnty. Bd. Of Educ., No. 2010-140 (Ch. Ct. of
Blount Cnty. filed Oct. 28, 2011) (hereinafter "Blount Memo");
Tennessee Memorandum of Law in Defense of the Constitutionality of
2011 Tenn. Pub. Ch. No. 378 at 2,4, Dickson Cnty. Educ. Ass'n v.
Dickson Cnty. Bd. Of Educ., No. 2011-CV-288 (Ch. Ct. Dickson Cnty.
July 13, 2011) (hereinafter "Dickson Memo"); Tennessee
Memorandum of Law in Defense of the Constitutionality of 2011 Tenn.
Pub. Ch. No. 378 at 2,7, Sumner Cnty. Educ. Ass'n v. Sumner Cnty.
Bd. of Educ., No. 2011 C-26 (Ch. Ct. Sumner Cnty. June 30, 2011)
(hereinafter "Sumner Memo") (all on file with author).
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unions formed under the EPNA in violation of Article I,
Section 20 of the Tennessee Constitution,75 which states
that "no retrospective law, or law impairing the obligations
of contracts, shall be made."76 Under Tennessee law,
"retrospective statutes" are those that "operate forward but
look backward" in attaching new consequences or legal
significance in the future to past acts or facts that existed
before the statute went into effect.77 In response, the State
Attorney General's office has intervened by submitting
memoranda in each case, arguing in favor of its
constitutionality.78  The memoranda maintained that
PECCA is a prospective statute that does not apply to
already existing contracts. 79 Instead, they point out that
PECCA suspends bargaining between unions and school
boards so that the two sides can develop new discussion
procedures.80 In other words, the suspension of negotiations
was merely procedural, not substantive.8 The office points
out that, under the logic of the plaintiffs challenge,
amending any state law could face the same constitutional
difficulty. 82 Further, the Attorney General's office argues
that no violation of Article I, Section 20 occurred because
PECCA did not strip teachers of any "vested" rights even if
7 5Blount Memo, supra note 74, at 2; Dickson Memo, supra note 74, at
2; Sumner Memo, supra note 74, at 7.7 6 Tenn. Const. art. I, § 20.
7 7Blount Memo, supra note 74, at 5; Dickson Memo, supra note 74, at
5; Sumner Memo, supra note 74, at 3.
7 See, e.g., Blount Memo, supra note 74.
79 Blount Memo, supra note 74, at 4; Dickson Memo, supra note 74, at
4; Sumner Memo, supra note 74, at 2.
so Blount Memo, supra note 74, at 6-7; Dickson Memo, supra note 74,
at 6; Sumner Memo, supra note 74, at 4.
8 Blount Memo, supra note 74, at 7; Dickson Memo, supra note 74, at
7; Sumner Memo, supra note 74, at 5.
82 Blount Memo, supra note 74, at 5; Dickson Memo, supra note 74, at
5; Sumner Memo, supra note 74, at 3.
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the law was in fact retrospective. 8 3 Citing case law, the
memoranda state that the Tennessee Constitution only
prohibits retrospective laws that take away vested rights
under existing law. 84  They argue that because teachers
retained their right to form a union and to engage in
negotiations, they kept their vested rights.85
Second, the teachers' unions argue that PECCA
extended beyond its caption, a violation of Article II,
Section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution.86 That section
states that bills are to have just one subject and recite in the
caption which law the bill may be amending, repealing, or
reviving. " The unions argued that confusion arose from
deleting the words "any locally negotiated agreement" in
certain statutes PECCA amended and that the deletions
broaden the meaning of the legislation beyond its caption,
which reads "AN Act to amend Tennessee Code
Annotated, Section 5-23-107 and Title 49, relative to the
Education Professional Negotiations Act."88 The Attorney
General's office, however, has argued that the point of the
Tennessee Constitution's caption provision is to evoke the
overall purpose of the legislation.89 It contended that the
83 Blount Memo, supra note 74, at 6-8; Dickson Memo, supra note 74,
at 6-8; Sumner Memo, supra note 74, at 4-6.
8 Blount Memo, supra note 74, at 5-6; Dickson Memo, supra note 74,
at 5; Sumner Memo, supra note 74, at 3.
85 Blount Memo, supra note 74, at 6; Dickson Memo, supra note 74, at
6; Sumner Memo, supra note 74, at 4.
86 Blount Memo, supra note 74, at 2; Dickson Memo, supra note 74, at
2; Sumner Memo, supra note 74, at 7.
87 Blount Memo, supra note 74, at 3; Dickson Memo, supra note 74, at
2; Sumner Memo, supra note 74, at 7.
88 Blount Memo, supra note 74, at 2-3; Dickson Memo, supra note 74,
at 2; Sumner Memo, supra note 74, at 7.
89 Blount Memo, supra note 74, at 3; Dickson Memo, supra note 74, at
3; Sumner Memo, supra note 74, at 7.
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bill's caption fulfills that goal and does not extend beyond
what was in the EPNA.90
In making their arguments, the unions hoped to
enjoin the new legislation from taking effect, thereby
forcing negotiations to take place using the EPNA, as well
as a declaratory judgment stating that PECCA was
unconstitutional.9' To this point, none of the suits has been
successful, although none yet has reached a final
92judgment. In Dickson County, a judge denied the
injunction, citing a lack of irreparable harm to the Dickson
County Education Association. 93 Currently, the Dickson
County Board of Education and the Dickson County
Education Association are scheduling depositions in hopes
of resolving the matter.94
In Blount County, the local education association
similarly argued for an injunction.9 5 In particular, the union
argued that the PECCA provisions on transfers, dismissals
due to staff reduction, and director of school's
responsibilities exceeded the limits of PECCA's caption.96
Meanwhile, the Blount County Board of Education argued
that it was too early to judge the lawsuit, maintaining an
injunction was not necessary. 9 7 Additionally, the Blount
County Board of Education argued that even if PECCA is
Blount Memo, supra note 74, at 4; Dickson Memo, supra note 74, at
4; Sumner Memo, supra note 74, at 9.
9 Pierce Greenberg, Union's Injunction Request Denied, A
COLLECTION FROM THE LONG ROAD, Oct. 2, 2011, available at
http://www.piercegreenberg.com/?p=340; see TEA, Locals Allege,
supra note 73.
92 Greenberg, supra note 91.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Matthew Stewart, Judge Hears Blount Teachers' Union Claim,
DAILY TIMES, http://www.thedailytimes.com/LocalNews/story/Judge-
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unconstitutional, that alone would not necessitate a return
to collective bargaining, asserting that the General
Assembly could have theoretically repealed collective
bargaining and replaced it with nothing. 98
In Sumner County, additional First Amendment
arguments regarding the local education association's
freedom of speech and freedom of association placed the
suit in federal district court. 99 The Sumner County Board of
Education, however, argued that the Sumner County
Education Association was a non-entity and that the
Tennessee Education Association was acting on its
behalf.100 Because of that, the school board maintained,
there was no legal basis for dealing with the Sumner
County Education Association.o'0 That case is set for trial
on October 23, 2012.102
Despite these legal challenges, however, most of the
legislation's criticisms pertained to its fairness. Teachers'
unions across the state voiced their opposition because, in
their view, it silenced their input on district policies.' 0 3 ct'S
an attack on the rights of teachers to have a voice regarding
their working conditions, which are also the learning
conditions of students," said TEA spokesperson Alexei
Smirnov shortly after the bill was introduced. 10 Democrats
characterized the leeway given to local school boards as
unjust. 0 5 "The biggest difference between this amendment
98 Id.




103 See Tim Ghianni, Tennessee Teachers Fight Bill to End Collective




105 See Andrea Zelinski, Collective Bargaining Bill Clears Senate,
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and the law today is... they have to meet but they don't
have to consider their opinion," Senator Jim Kyle said
shortly before the bill passed.106
In essence, teachers' unions and their supporters
appeared to be fearful of the possibility that their contracts
could become overly one-sided. Under the old law, items
reaching an impasse required continued negotiation;
however, the new law gives school boards the power to
make a final decision free of outside input.o As the
Tennessee Education Department stated, "The
PECCA... [makes] it clear the board may address terms and
conditions of employment through policy if an agreement
has not or cannot be reached." 08
As a result of school boards' increased negotiating
power, combined with concerns about the issues prohibited
from entering negotiations, opponents have expressed
unease about what possibilities the law allows. For
example, teachers' unions across the country have opposed
merit-based pay schemes and bonuses for higher tests
scores, two items that the law specifically stated are non-
negotiable.109
Opponents also viewed the state government as
overstepping its bounds to pass a bill that they opposed and
over which the General Assembly and the general public
were divided." 0 Proposed "opt-out" provisions spoke to the
sentiment that the decision on collective bargaining take
106 Id.
107 Blount Cnty. Educ. Ass'n. v. Blount Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 78 S.W.3d
307, 322 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002); Tennessee Department of Education,
Professional Educators Collaborative Conferencing Act of 2011
Frequently Asked Questions, available at http://www.state.tn.us/
education/docfPECCAFAQJunel7.pdf (hereinafter "PECCA FAQs").
108 PECCA FAQs, supra note 107.
'0 Andrew J. Coulson, The Effects of Teachers Unions on American
Education, 30 CATO J. 155-156, available at http://www.cato.org/
pubs/journal/cj30n1/cj30n1-8.pdf.
110 Teachers Lose , supra note 7.
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place locally, where local education leaders could perhaps
better gauge community needs."'
VI. Potential Impact of the Bill
Because there are several stark contrasts between
the EPNA and its replacement, the potential impact of the
bill could be dramatic. Most fundamentally, the
replacement of collective bargaining with collaborative
conferencing provides more widespread access for teachers
through nonexclusive negotiating rights and a reduced
number of required votes to gain the right to conference.112
This increased access could be positive for teachers, but it
could also result in a more fragmented, less unified
message to local school boards. With the new law's
allowance of unilateral resolution of disputed issues, a
more disjointed message from teachers could result from
greater use of the board's ultimate power.
Additionally, local boards' newfound power to
resolve unsettled discussions could have a significant
impact in other ways. 1 3 Among the topics for collaborative
conferencing are teachers' pay, fringe benefits, insurance,
leave policies, and improving working conditions.114 While
EPNA ordered negotiation on these matters until the two
sides reached an agreement, under the new law, a local
school board may now alter one of these topic areas
without the endorsement of its employees." If school
boards chose to use their authority to act independently to
its fullest extent, the effects could be considerable.
Even more, the new law's inclusion of explicit
nonnegotiable items opens the door for other significant
111 Richard Locker, Senate Ends Bargaining by Teachers,
COMMERCIAL APPEAL, May 2, 2011, at Bl; Humphrey, supra note 53.
I12 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-605(a)-(b).
11 "See id § 49-5-609(d).
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education reforms in Tennessee without input from
teachers. The previous law had allowed negotiation of
topics outside of the ones specifically mandated, such as
differentiated merit pay and evaluation standards, but gave
both parties the opportunity to refuse to negotiate, while
allowing the other side to seek a court order demanding a
meeting on that issue.116 While the topics of negotiation
remained largely the same as under the EPNA, the new law
was unequivocal in its opposition to discussions outside of
its listed items for collaboration; and it barred discussion on
differentiated pay, expenditure of grants or awards,
evaluations, staffing decisions, assignment of employees,
and payroll deductions for political activities." These all
represent trendy areas of education reform discussion, but
only evaluation procedures have seen change in
Tennessee." School boards independently implementing
such changes could face controversy because of the lack of
outside input, and it could impact education statewide.
It is unclear what influence merit pay, for example,
has on the teaching force or students, although teachers'
unions have opposed the measures.1 19 In one instance, a
study performed on three hundred teachers in the Nashville
Metro School District showed little increase in student
performance among those whose teachers had participated
in the program.120 However, most studies on the effects of
merit pay are too recent to determine the long-term effects
116 TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-611(a) (2009) (repealed 2011).
117 TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-608(a)(5).
118 See Tenure Reform (SB 1528/HB 2010) - Talking Points, SCORE
(Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.tnscore.org/wp-content/uploads/
2011/03/TENURE-TALKING-POINTS.pdf.
119 Fredrick M. Hess & Martin R. West, A Better Bargain: Overhauling
Teacher Collective Bargaining for the 21st Century (2006), available at
www.hks.harvard.edulpepg/PDF/Papers/BetterBargain.pdf.
120 Michael Podgursky & Matthew Springer, Teacher Compensation
Systems in the United States K-12 Public School System, 64NAT'L TAx
J. 165, 182 (2011). Similar studies in Chicago, New York, and Round
Rock, Texas also revealed only marginal increase.
160
160
8.1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 161
of such legislation.121 Another form of differentiated pay
involves paying more to teachers of a subject area in short
supply. For example, nationally, schools lack qualified
math and science teachers. Collective bargaining
measures often leave administrators unable to take those
shortages into account when offering salaries, as has been
the case with Memphis City Schools.' 23 Now, school
boards can enact these changes without union support.
Personnel decisions, another nonnegotiable item,
also allow potentially significant leeway to local school
boards. For example, seniority determines which teachers
avoid layoffs pursuant to the collectively bargained
contract in Memphis City Schools.124 In July 2011, the
system laid off 150 teachers in compliance with the
contract.125 Among those laid off were four Teach for
America teachers and one who had taught for 27 years in
Johnson City, but for just one year in Memphis.126 Each
teacher's principal could attest to the talent of those
teachers who faced dismissal, but seniority rules
prevailed. 127 Under the new law, those teachers could have
possibly averted layoffs, had administrators decided to
change the system and deemed those teachers too talented
to dismiss.128
121 Id. at 186.
122 See Hess, supra note 119, at 24.
123 Id.; see Agreement Between the Board of Education of the Memphis
City Schools and the Memphis Education Association, an Affiliate of
the Tennessee Education Association and the National Education
Association Effective July 1, 2009 through June 30, 2012, available at
http://www.nctq.org/docs/17-07.pdf (hereinafter "Memphis
Areement").
Memphis Agreement, supra note 123.
125 Jane Roberts, Schools Caught in Seniority Quandary, COMMERCIAL
APPEAL, July 15, 2011, at Al.
126 id.
127 See id.
128 TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-608(a)(5).
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On the other hand, some believe the new law may
have little impact. In school districts where relations
between teaching organizations and school administrators
are cordial, it is possible, even likely, that the difference
between collective bargaining and collaborative
conferencing may be mere terminology. Dickson Schools
Director Jimmy Chandler said as much following the law's
enactment, stating, "It didn't bother us because we've
always worked well with our teachers. It's never been a big
issue for us. We try to do everything we can as far as
benefits and salaries [for our teachers]."129 Though
somewhat concerned with the law's potential impact if
relations deteriorate between educators and administrators,
Dickson's lead teachers' union negotiator agreed. 130
However, Dickson County has emerged as a site of a legal
challenge to PECCA, and perhaps the initial optimism there
and in other counties could wane.
At any rate, it is likely that this issue will remain a
part of the public discourse. The year 2012 is an election
year, and in the years ahead various collective bargaining
contracts will expire. This means educators and system
administrators will have to begin new negotiations under
the new law. As future rounds of negotiation unfold, the
practicability of this law will become apparent, and more
lawsuits may arise.
As Tennessee's SCORE notes and other studies
show, the most important factor in a child's educational
development is quality teaching.'31 If these studies are
129 Pierce Greenberg, Dickson Educators Respond to New Law,
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accurate, educational policies should work towards having
the best teachers possible in every classroom. Many of the
reform ideas such as differentiated pay and altered layoff
policy are somewhat unproven but offer intriguing
possibility. Giving school system leaders the opportunity to
implement those policies, and to some degree the
opportunity to experiment with them, has positive potential
for Tennessee, which is currently ranked among the
nation's worst in student achievement metrics such as
national assessment tests and percentage of citizens over
twenty-five years old with a bachelor's degree. 132 Increased
system flexibility can allow school administrators to be
more innovative. Collaborative conferencing achieves that
mission while still providing educators a voice in local
policies. While an outright bar to negotiations would have
given school boards too much power and represented the
state's acquiescence to the Tennessee School Boards
Association's wishes without compromise, the allowance
of collaborative conferencing strikes a balance, and
arguably makes the process of running an entire school
system easier. 133 In tandem with Tennessee's revised
teacher tenure law, the new policies reduce the friction
teachers' unions have generated and can lead to smoother
operations, which in turn can give rise to greater
innovation. While paying careful attention to the morale
and desires of the teaching corps, administrators should
seek to use their newly found opportunity to be bold, as
students stand to benefit.
132 The State of Education-2010, SCORE, available at http://www.
tnscore.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Score-2010-Annual-Report-
Full.pdf.
133 See Teachers Lose, supra note 7.
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VII. A Final Thought
Before the passage of the PECCA, forty-four
districts in Tennessee did not collectively bargain. The
Maryville Education Association, for example, an
organization through which teachers and administrators
formulate local school policies, operates without a
contract. 135  Still, teachers say the relationship is
cohesive. 136 "When we have really shown that we needed
additional funds, additional increases in taxes and those
types of things that have to happen in order to fund
education, they've always been supportive of us,"
Maryville teacher Stephanie Thom pson said.137 A similar
system exists in Alcoa, Tennessee. a38 Both superintendents
state that relations are pleasant, and the common goal of
education rises above pettiness.1 39 At the same time, nearby
Blount County Schools collectively bargained peacefully
before the new bill took effect, which demonstrates that
both systems can work effectively. 140 All three districts
typically register positive student achievement results.141
While different dynamics play a role in different school
districts, the fact that both systems can work successfully
should remind those on both sides of the debate that if
school employees and administrators share the common
goal of student achievement, positive solutions can surface.
134 Christine Jessel, Collective Bargaining in East Tennessee, Southern
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TRANSCRIPT
THE UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE COLLEGE OF LAW
SUMMERS-WYATr LECTURE
SEPTEMBER 27,2010
THE INTERSECTION OF RACE AND POVERTY
IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Stephen B. Bright
PENNY WHITE: Well, welcome. We are grateful that you
have joined us today for the Summers-Wyatt Lecture,
sponsored by the Center for Advocacy & Dispute
Resolution. As is our tradition, our guest speaker will be
introduced by a student in the Advocacy Concentration.
The introducer today is Sarah Graham-McGee, who
is one of the two Summers-Wyatt Trial Advocacy Scholars.
She is also a student in the Innocence Clinic, and for the
past two summers has worked as the clinical assistant to the
Innocence Clinic project. She is also a student member of
the Tennessee Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
(TACDL) and a founder of the UT chapter of TACDL. So,
Sarah, if you would.
SARAH MCGEE: There is an old adage that says, "Let
your life speak." Professor Stephen Bright has dedicated his
life to standing up for people, who either could not speak
up for themselves or whose voices were not being heard.
For over thirty years, Professor Bright has fought a system
that is content with injustice, where budgets speak louder
than guarantees to life and liberty, and where politics are
favored over due process. But he does not do it for the
money or for the acclaim. Since 1979, he has been speaking
up for indigent people facing the death penalty at the trial,
appeal, and post-conviction stages of the capital process.
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Much of his time has been spent at the Southern
Center for Human Rights, a public interest legal program
that provides representation to people facing the death
penalty, but he also represents prisoners in challenges to
cruel and unusual conditions of confinement, advocates
implementation of the constitutional rights of counsel, and
encourages judicial independence and alternatives to
incarceration. Professor Bright served as the Director of the
Southern Center from 1982 to 2011, and he currently serves
as its President and Senior Counsel. Before his career at the
Southern Center, Professor Bright earned a bachelor's
degree from the University of Kentucky, majoring in
political science, and went on from there to earn his law
degree from that state institution in 1976.
In fact, Professor Bright was born on a little farm
and raised in Kentucky, and he got his first job out of law
school at the Appalachian Research & Defense Fund in
Lexington where he fought for livable jail conditions and
the welfare and rights of the indigent. From there, Professor
Bright spent several years as a trial attorney at the Public
Defender Service in Washington, DC. A few years later, his
career path led him to capital work. Professor Bright has
twice argued and won cases before the United States
Supreme Court, including Snyder v. Louisianal and
Amadeo v. Zant.2 Both cases involved racial discrimination
in the composition of the juries. Both clients' convictions
and death sentences were reversed.
And even as we sit here this afternoon, the current
justices of the United States Supreme Court are considering
whether they will hear Professor Bright's next case4 , that of
Jamie Weis, who faces charges of a capital crime in
1 Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008).
2 Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988).
3 See generally Snyder, 552 U.S. 472; Amadeo, 486 U.S. 214.
4 Weis v. State, 694 S.E.2d 350 (Ga. 2010), petition for cert. filed (U.S.
May 2010) (No. 09- 715), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 100 (2010).
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Georgia, yet sat in jail for more than two years without any
lawyers to defend him.
This continued dedication shows that Professor
Bright's life continues to speak. He speaks for those in
unenviable positions, for the mentally ill, for the innocent,
and for the guilty. His words breathe life into the
constitutional promises we are familiar with, not the least
of which is the right to counsel.
I could probably spend the next forty-five minutes
continuing to list accomplishments and accolades from a
career that has spoken for justice, but no introduction
would be complete without mentioning a few of the many
awards he has received for his service to others. In addition
to the ACLU's Roger Baldwin Medal of Liberty and the
American Bar Association's Thurgood Marshall Award,
he's received honorary doctorates from six universities, the
Lifetime Achievement Award from the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the Kutak-
Dodds Prize presented by the National Legal Aid &
Defender Association.
Last but not least, Professor Bright has written a
number of law review articles, given testimony before
legislative committees at the highest levels on numerous
occasions, serves on countless advisory boards, and teaches
at prestigious universities like Harvard, Yale, Georgetown,
Emory, and now at the University of Tennessee's College
of Law, where we are so fortunate to have him co-teach the
Innocence & Wrongful Convictions Clinic.
In closing, and perhaps most amazing to me, we're
also talking about a teacher and a mentor who is truly
humble. On our very first day of class in the Innocence
Clinic this semester, this legend of indigent capital defense
walked into class, shook everyone's hand, looked every one
of us in the eye, and told us what a privilege it was for him
to be here. You will not find a person whose life speaks
with more dedication, brilliance, and humility, so please
join me in welcoming the University Of Tennessee College
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Of Law's first advocate in residence, Professor Stephen
Bright. (Applause.)
STEPHEN BRIGHT: Thank you, Sarah. Sarah McGee is
going to be a great public defender. Sarah, thank you very
much.
It has been a great honor for me to teach at this law
school, and it has been a great honor to have Sarah and her
other students in my class. I am a product of a very similar
law school a little north of here-it does not have quite as
good a football team-but I benefited from it as many of
you have from this law school. Although back in those
days, it was a little better than it is today. My law school
tuition was $250 a semester. I understand it has gone up a
little since then.
The purpose of the land-grant colleges (most of
which became universities) was to make education broadly
available by giving federally-controlled land to the states to
develop or sell to raise funds for colleges. It provided
opportunities for people in states like Kentucky and
Tennessee to go to college and learn about agriculture,
science, engineering, law, and other subjects. One could get
an education and go out in the world and strike a lick or
two for justice. It was a wonderful thing. I am grateful for
them. It is unfortunate that education has become so
expensive and graduates at saddled with enormous debt.
I have had a great relationship with this law school
and many people who are part of it. Dean Blaze had me
here years ago to celebrate the anniversary of the clinics. I
know what great work Jerry Black and other people do in
the clinics. I started practice at the Appalachian Research
and Defense Fund, a legal services program that serves the
coalfields of Appalachian Eastern Kentucky. Next door to
me in my office was Dean Hill Rivkin, who taught me so
much, who prevented the Army Corps of Engineers from
damming the Red River Gorge, and who stood up for poor
people in Eastern Kentucky in so many different ways, and
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who continues today with Brenda McGee, his wife, to stand
up for children.
I was with the Dean yesterday. He picked me up,
and we had to stop by the housing projects so that he could
meet with a client whose case was in court today. It is
marvelous that students here are involved in representing
children in truancy cases, representing children who are
being thrown out of school and protecting the rights of
children.
I recently was told about a child in Clarksville,
Tennessee, who is being held in the jail there and whose
family can only visit him by closed-circuit television. His
mother cannot touch her fifteen-year-old child. He is not
receiving any education. If the parents were doing to this
child what that jail is doing to him, they would be guilty of
child abuse or neglect. And yet that is what this public
institution, the jail, is doing. Which is why the work on
behalf of children by Dean Rivkin, Brenda McGee, and
students here is so important.
And also, of course, my great, wonderful friend
here, is Justice Penny White. I wrote about Justice White
after her retention election when she was on the Tennessee
Supreme Court, because I was interested in the pressures on
elected judges with regard to enforcing the Constitution.5 I
have learned from knowing her over many years and
having her speak to my classes at Harvard and Yale that
regardless of what the voters may have been tricked into
doing on that August day when only a few people showed
up to vote, the words "Justice" and "White" always go
together. You are extraordinarily fortunate to have her as
well as so many other great faculty members.
5 See Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice
be Done Amid Efforts to Intimidate and Remove Judges from Office for
Unpopular Decisions? 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 308 (1997) (describing the
campaign against Justice White which led to her defeat in a retention
election and including some of the mailings attacking her).
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I do not really co-teach a class at the law school. I
just visit occasionally Dwight Aarons's class on wrongful
convictions. I am honored to be able to do so and make a
small contribution to Professor Aarons's class.
Many good friends are part of your legal
community. Steve Johnson, who was a student here and an
outstanding intern at the Southern Center for Human
Rights, is a great lawyer in Knoxville. Mark Stephens, the
public defender, is a national leader in the representation of
poor people accused of crimes. The Community Law
Office of Knoxville is a model for the whole country.
The legal community and all of Knox County
should be proud that Mark Stephens is running the public
defender office. He will stand up for his clients, even if it
means filing a lawsuit and saying the office does not have
the resources it needs or the lawyers to do the job. Some
public defenders around the country are doing that and
some are not. Some are acquiescing to overwhelming
caseloads and a lack of resources that deny their clients
their constitutional right to counsel. But that is not
happening here because Mark Stephens stands up for his
clients and for the Constitution.
I admire the public defenders and other lawyers that
represent poor people accused of crimes. They face an
overwhelming task, as do the criminal courts. In the 1970s,
there were about 200,000 people in prisons and jails in the
United States. 6 That number had held, relative to the
population, pretty steady throughout our history.7 Then
over the next forty years there was an increase of 800
percent, so that today there are 2.3 million men, women,
6 Steven B. Duke, Mass Imprisonment, Crime Rates, and the Drug
War: A Penological and Humanitarian Disgrace, 9 CONN. PUB. INT.
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and children in our prisons and jails.9 The United States
now has the highest incarceration rate of any country in the
world.10
The United States is one of a handful of countries
that carries out ninety percent of all the executions in the
world along with China, Iran, North Korea, and Yemen.'I
The United States has become extraordinarily punitive.
There has been a tremendous increase in the number of
people coming through the courts and being sent to prison.
The courts are also taking on the enormous - and probably
impossible - task of deciding who should live and who
should die. It has put a tremendous, crushing load on all of
the criminal courts.
Most of these people going to prisons and death
rows come through the state courts. 12 Many state courts
have failed in their responsibility under the Sixth
Amendment to provide capable lawyers and fair and
reliable trials. The legislatures have failed to adequately
fund these programs. There is a great imbalance between
the resources for prosecutors and those for the defense of
9 Rough Justice, ECoNOMIST, July 22, 2010, www.economist.com/
node/16640389; The Pew Ctr. on the States, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS
IN AMERICA 2008 at 5 (2008) (reporting that, at the start of 2008,
American prisons and jails held more than 2.3 million adults, while
China had 1.5 million inmates and Russia had 890,000).
10 Too Many Laws, Too Many Prisoners, ECoNOMIST, July 22, 2010,
www.economist.com/node/16636027 (reporting that one in every 100
adults in America is in prison, which, as a proportion of total
population, is five times more than in Britain, nine times more than in
Germany, and twelve times more than in Japan).
1 See Amnesty International, DEATH SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS
2010 (2011).
12 See Paul Guerino, Paige M. Harrison, & William J. Sabol,
PRISONERS IN 2010 (December 2011) (a publication of the Bureau of
Justice Statistics of the U.S. Department of Justice) (reporting that state
correctional authorities had jurisdiction over 1,395,356 prisoners at the
end of 2010, while the federal prison population was 209,771. There
are additional prisoners in jails).
172
172
8.1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 173
the accused. The federal government has contributed to this
by providing millions and millions of dollars to state law
enforcement agencies, prosecution offices, crime
laboratories, and other state crime control agencies while
providing, with only a few exceptions, nothing for the
defense of those accused of crimes.
The right to a lawyer is the most fundamental right
a person has. The people who are making that a reality are
public defenders. They are working long hours, taking on
huge responsibilities - the life of another human being -
carrying caseloads that make them say every now and then
that surely this cup can be passed. And yet, they go on.
They keep going to work. They mentor young lawyers.
They work nights and weekends. I want to express my
appreciation to public defenders for the work that they do. I
know how incredibly difficult it is.
The New Yorker carried a cartoon which showed a
lawyer sitting across from his client and saying, "You've
got a pretty good case . . . . How much justice can you
afford?"I 3 Of course, a poor person accused of a crime
cannot afford any justice at all. And so the question is how
much justice is society going to give that person?
Tennessee can afford it. There is no question that every
government - state or federal - can afford to provide
representation. The question is whether they will provide
what the Constitution requires.
Robert Kennedy, the Attorney General of the
United States in the early 1960s, once said that the poor
person accused of a crime has no lobby.14 Legislators
respond to moneyed interests. The U.S. Supreme Court, as
the President has pointed out, has only made that worse
with its decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission.15 The faint voices of the poor are seldom
13 J.B. Handelsman, Cartoon, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 24, 1973.
14 Anthony Lewis, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 211 (1964).
" 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
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heard in legislative bodies seeking to please the rich and
powerful. Beyond that, governments that are trying to
deprive people of their liberty or even their lives are not
enthusiastic about providing lawyers for the poor who may
to defeat those purposes.
The states and localities are generous in giving
money to prosecute cases, but not to defend them. State and
local governments give money to law enforcement. The
federal government gives huge grants to law enforcement
and prosecutors' offices for all sorts of things from drug
task forces to dealing with domestic violence. And that
means more money for police, more money for
prosecution, more people being arrested, and more people
being charged with crimes. But the state and local
governments are very stingy when it comes to funding the
defense of those accused. And the federal government
seldom makes grants for the defense of the accused.
The Supreme Court said the states were required to
provide counsel in the case of Clarence Gideon, who was
convicted of breaking into a pool hall in Florida, denied a
lawyer at his trial, and then wrote a five-page petition to the
Court saying he had been denied his right to a lawyer.16
And, of course, the rest is history. Gideon v. Wainwright
said that every person accused of a felony has a right to a
lawyer.' 7 A few years later, the Court extended the right to
counsel to children in delinquency proceedings' and to any
person facing a loss of liberty.19
Anthony Lewis wrote a wonderful book about
Clarence Earl Gideon's case, Gideon 's Trumpet. In it, he
says:
16 See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
7 Id. at 342.
18 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
19 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1972).
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It will be an enormous social task to bring to
life the dream of Gideon v. Wainwright - the
dream of a vast, diverse country in which
every man charged with crime will be
capably defended, no matter what his
economic circumstances, and in which the
lawyer representing him will do so proudly,
without resentment at an unfair burden, sure
of the support needed to make an adequate
defense.
Of course, Gideon v. Wainwright is not a dream. It
is a constitutional requirement. The Supreme Court did not
say in Gideon that it would be a good idea to give people
lawyers. It said states were constitutionally required to give
people lawyers. It said the "'guiding hand of counsel"' is
required at every stage of the process. 2 1 But Gideon is an
unfunded mandate. No federal agency was established and
no federal dollars were allocated implement Gideon in all
of the states. Many state and local governments were
unwilling or reluctant to provide funds to implement
Gideon. It would be enormously costly if done right.
The Florida governor and legislature responded
promptly to Gideon. Within two months of the decision, the
Florida legislature created a public defender system in
every judicial circuit. Colorado created a state-wide
program in 1970. Missouri established its public defender
system in 1972 and had 14 public defender offices in the
state of the following year. Connecticut's legislature
created its public defender program in 1975. Tennessee did
not establish a public defender system until 1989.22 Other
20 Lewis, GIDEON's TRUMPET, supra note 14, at 205.
21 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342 (quoting Justice Sutherland in Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)).
22 The Tennessee General Assembly created the statewide system of
public defenders in 1989. See District Public Defenders Conference,
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states took even longer. Georgia created a public defender
system in 2003 that became operative in 2005. Montana
established a public defender system in 2006.
Some states, such as Alabama, Michigan and Texas
have not created public defender offices to this day. In
some states, judges appoint lawyers. A judge in Houston
has claimed that he has a great system - four lawyers who
represent all the people accused of crimes that come before
his court. But who are the four lawyers loyal to? Their
responsibility to zealously represent their clients may take a
back seat to the need to please the judge in order to keep
their jobs.
The availability and quality of lawyers for poor
people accused of crimes varies from state to state and even
from county to county within a state. While there is good,
even exemplary representation in some places, most states
and counties are more concerned with limiting costs than
providing quality representation and insuring fairness in
their courts.
At the Southern Center for Human Rights, we
decided in the 1990s that the representation provided to the
poor in Georgia was so bad, we would just keep pointing it
out and challenging it in court and see if anything changed.
People had been sentenced to death in Georgia in cases in
which their lawyers were parking their cars and then cross-
examining witnesses even though they missed the
prosecutor's direct examination. Three lawyers referred to
their clients in capital cases with a racial slur. One lawyer
did not even know there was a Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. He missed that day in
criminal procedure, and he never made up for it while he
was in practice.
In another case, it was discovered on the third day
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court-appointed lawyer was not the defendant whose case
was being tried. The court-appointed lawyer said, "Well, he
kept saying it's not me, it's not me. I thought he meant he
was not guilty." He did not even realize that the man sitting
next to him was not his client. We documented what was
happening and issued reports.23 We filed lawsuits
challenging the deficiencies in representation in different
counties and judicial circuits.
The chief justice of the Georgia Supreme Court
appointed a commission to investigate how bad it was and
what could be done about it. The commission did not have
much of a problem with the first part: determining how bad
it was. The District Attorney in Atlanta, Paul Howard, told
the commission that when he was in private practice after
graduating from law school, he learned right away how to
avoid being appointed to cases by the judges. He found that
if he did a good job for his client, the judges would not
bother him again about taking a court-appointed case.
The commission also heard from a lawyer who
contracted to take all the indigent cases in several courts.
He was known for meeting his clients and entering guilty
pleas a few minutes later. He told the commission that he
presumed that all his clients were guilty. Clients, mothers,
and others who had either been accused or their loved ones
had been accused also testified before the Commission. It
recommended the creation of a public defender system.
23 See Southern Center For Human Rights, "IF YOU CANNOT AFFORD A
LAWYER . . ." (2003), available at www.schr.org/files/resources/
indigentjrpt.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2012); Southern Center for Human
Rights, PROMISES To KEEP: ACHIEVING FAIRNESS AND EQUAL JUSTICE
FOR THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES (2000) available at www.schr.org/
files/resources/indigentrpt.pdf (last visited Feb, 5, 2012). See also
Stephen B. Bright & Lauren Sudeall Lucas, OVERCOMING DEFIANCE OF
THE CONSTITUTION: THE NEED FOR A FEDERAL ROLE IN PROTECTING
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN GEORGIA (American Constitution Society
Issue Brief, September 2010) available at www.acslaw.org/files/
Bright%20and%2OLucas%20-%2ORight%20to%2OCounsel.pdf (last
visited Feb. 5, 2010).
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The criminal courts are a foreign land, and people
accused of crimes need lawyers from the moment they are
arrested to guide them, answer their questions, explain their
choices to them, investigate their cases and give them
advice about the decisions they must make.
No case in the criminal justice system is a small
case. A woman was arrested in New York in 2007, and
bail was set at $10,000.24 No lawyer represented her at the
bail hearing, and the woman, who was the sole caretaker of
her husband, could not reach her court-appointed lawyer to
seek a bail reduction in order to care for her husband, who
needed transportation to dialysis treatment several times
25 2
per week. Days later, her husband died.26 She was also
unsuccessful in trying to reach the lawyer to obtain a bail
reduction or even a temporary release from jail to attend his
funeral.
Eventually, she contacted a prisoners' rights
organization that secured her release on her own
recognizance.27 Ultimately, the charge against her -
possession of a firearm found in the family car - was
dismissed.28 As this case illustrates, the process of arrest
and pre-trial incarceration may be a severe punishment,
regardless of guilt or innocence. A person who stays in jail
for two weeks after being arrested may lose his or her job
and home as a result. People may go from being right on
the margins of making it in society to being homeless.
Atteeyah Hollie, who is now a lawyer with the
Southern Center for Human Rights, was an intern from
Dartmouth College when she found a man, Samuel Moore,
who had been in a jail in Georgia for thirteen months. He
24 Hurrell-Harring v. State, 883 N.Y.S.2d 349, 360 n.3 (N.Y. App. Div.
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had never seen a lawyer, never seen a judge. He had been
arrested for loitering-just standing around. Atteeyah
checked and it turned out the charges against Mr. Moore
had been dismissed four months earlier. There was no legal
basis for the jail holding him, but no one had bothered to
call the jail and tell the people there that they had to release
him. He had just been lost. He was just a throwaway person
who was lost in the jail. A student intern from Dartmouth
got him out by letting the clerk's office know that he was
still in jail four months after the charges had been
dismissed.
Several of us have launched a website called
Second Class Justice. 29 We collect on the site information
regarding the lawyers provided to poor people accused of
crimes, racial discrimination in the criminal courts and
other information regarding the plight of the poor accused
of crimes. It includes historical developments like the case
of the Scottsboro Boys in Alabama which established the
right to counsel in capital cases30 and Clarence Earl
Gideon's case that established the right to counsel.31
It also includes examples of the racial
discrimination that takes place today in the criminal courts,
which is the part of our society that has been least affected
by the Civil Rights Movement. Outside of the courts, there
have been some significant changes: African Americans are
no longer denied the vote or barred from public schools,
lunch counters and public accommodations as they were
before the Civil Rights Acts of the 1960s. Nevertheless,
many people continue, consciously or unconsciously, to
have a bias against racial minorities. The decision-makers
in the criminal courts - predominantly white men - may be
29 Second Class Justice, www.secondclassjustice.com (last visited Feb.
5, 2012).
30 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Dan Carter,
SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (LSU Press,
revised edition, 2007)
3' Gideon, 372 U.S. 335.
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affected by those biases in areas such as charging, bail
decisions, plea bargaining, and the severity of sentence.
Even in communities with substantial African
American and Hispanic populations, things often look no
different than they did in the 1940s and 1950s. The
prosecutor is white, the judge is white, the court-appointed
defense lawyers are white, and the clerks and court
reporters are white. When the defendants are brought in,
the overwhelming majority are African American men
wearing orange jumpsuits handcuffed together. It looks like
a slave ship has docked outside the courthouse.
On the few occasions when trials are conducted, the
jury may also be all-white, even in communities with very
substantial African American or Hispanic populations.
They may be underrepresented in the jury pools. Some may
not receive jury summons. The ones that are notified and
appear in court may be struck for any number of reasons,
but if they survive the strikes for cause - the inability to be
fair and impartial - the prosecutor may exclude them from
service with peremptory strikes despite the Supreme
Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky,32 which
purportedly prevents such discrimination. As one observer
noted, "Even as segregationist barriers to equal opportunity
and achievement have crumbled in the free world, we have
fortified the racial divide in criminal justice. Denied a place
in society at large, Jim Crow has moved behind bars."33
Our website includes an important article about how
state and federal prosecutors decide where to prosecute
cases in order to minimize the number of racial minorities
on juries. For example, if the death penalty is sought for a
murder in New Orleans which has any kind of federal
32 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
33 Robert Perkinson, TEXAS TOUGH: THE RISE OF AMERICA'S PRISON
EMPIRE 9 (2010). Id. at 366 ("Although the ghosts of the Confederacy
have been, to a considerable extent, chased out of schools, lunch
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connection, the prosecution will probably not be in the state
court in Orleans Parish, which is 62% African American.
Instead, the United States Attorney there has prosecuted 10
black and Hispanic men in the Eastern District of
Louisiana, where the venire is only 31.4% African
American. 34 But if same crime occurs in neighboring
Jefferson Parish, which is 23% African American or other
Parishes where there are even fewer blacks, 35 it will be
prosecuted in the state courts.
The same is true in Richmond, St. Louis, and Prince
George's County, Maryland, where African Americans
make up the majority of the population in the state jury
pools. 36 As a result, more death sentences have been
imposed in the U.S. District Courts for the Eastern District
of Louisiana, the Eastern District of Virginia, the Eastern
District of Missouri and the District of Maryland than in
federal districts that include New York, Chicago,
California, and Florida, where far more murders occur.
The website includes summaries of the cases of
people who because of their poverty are not getting the
justice that is promised by what is etched over the entrance
to the Supreme Court Building, "equal justice under law."
As Hugo Black said in Griffin v. Illinois, "there can be no
equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends
upon the amount of money he has." 38
34 G. Ben Cohen & Robert J. Smith, The Racial Geography of the
Federal Death Penalty, 85 Wash. L. Rev. 425, 445-49 (2010), also
available at www.secondclassjustice.com/?p=57 (last visited Feb. 5,
2012).
3s African Americans made up 22.9% of the population of Jefferson
Parish in 2000. See U.S. Census Bureau, State & County Quick Facts
Alabama, available at http://QuickFacts.census.gov (last visited
December 30, 2011) [hereinafter "Census Bureau"]; see also Cohen &
Smith, supra note 34, at 443-45.
36 Cohen & Smith, supra note 34, at 450-61.
3 Id. at 436-37.
38 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
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That is certainly true, but we know that the kind of
justice one gets depends very much on the amount of
money one has. For example, Jamie Ryan Weis was
charged with capital murder, and was assigned two
lawyers. 39 Six months later, the lawyers were told that the
state indigent defense agency could not fund the case.40
There was no money for an investigator or any expert
witnesses. Jamie Weis suffers from schizophrenia; he is
delusional.41
The jail, to save money, took Weis off his
prescribed medication and put him on Thorazine, because it
is cheaper. The next day, he slit his wrists and hung himself
and almost died.42 It was his third suicide attempt.43 A
lawyer representing someone like that needs mental health
experts. But the lawyers were unable to investigate, to
consult with experts, and to develop any evidence in
mitigation of punishment. Eventually, there was not enough
money even to pay the lawyers.
The lawyers filed a motion for a continuance on the
grounds that they did not have funds to prepare for trial.
Jamie Weis is from West Virginia and to do an adequate
job preparing for the penalty phase of his trial, where a jury
was going to decide if he will live or die, the lawyers
needed to go to West Virginia and interview his Jarents,
other family members, school teachers, and others.
39 Weis v. State, 694 S.E.2d 350, 353 (Ga. 2010), cert. denied, Weis v.
Georgia, 131 S. Ct. 100 (2010).
40 Id.
41 Id. at 358.
42 Brief for Petitioner at 16, Weis v. State, 694 S.E.2d 350 (Ga. 2010).
43 Weis, 694 S.E.2d at 362.
4 See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (holding that anything
about the life and background of the offender may be considered in
mitigation); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985) (recognizing
experts as one of the "the basic tools of an adequate defense" and
holding that states must fund experts for indigent defense with regard to
any issue that is a significant factor at trial).
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At a hearing, the defense lawyers introduced
evidence to show they had no funds to defend the case. The
prosecutor responded not to the motion for a continuance,
but by making his own motion - with no notice to Jamie
Weis or to his lawyers - to replace the lawyers appoint the
local public defenders.45 He did not tell Weis, the defense
lawyers or the local public defenders he was going to do
this.
Jamie Weis and his lawyers were caught completely
by surprise. This illustrates the importance of the notice
requirement of the due process clause. It is essential to
fairness to know before a hearing what issues are to be
addressed at it. In a fair system that provides due process of
law, opposing counsel is not allowed to spring something
like this on a defendant and his lawyers. It denies them a
meaningful opportunity to be heard - for example, to find
the cases that say that once there is an attorney-client
relationship, it cannot be casually tossed aside by a judge
46and new lawyers substituted. The Tennessee Supreme
Court, like many other state supreme courts that have
addressed the question, has recognized the right to
continuity of counsel in a case where a judge removed an
appointed lawyer.47
45 Weis, 694 S.E.2d at 359.
46 There were a number of such cases in Georgia. See Grant v. State,
607 S.E.2d 586 (Ga. 2005) (reversing where trial judge removed
counsel who was familiar with the case and had an established
attorney-client relationship with the defendant); Williams v. State, 611
S.E.2d 51 (Ga. 2005) (same); Roberts v. State, 438 S.E.2d 905 (Ga.
1994) (same); Davis v. State, 403 S.E.2d 800 (Ga. 1991) (same); and
Amadeo v. State, 384 S.E.2d 181 (Ga. 1989) (same).
47 State v. Huskey, 82 S.W.3d 297 (Tenn. 2002) (holding that "any
meaningful distinction between indigent and non-indigent defendants'
right to representation by counsel ends once a valid appointment of
counsel has been made"). See also, e.g., Smith v. Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, 440 P.2d 65, 74 (Cal. 1968) (holding that "once
counsel is appointed to represent an indigent defendant, whether it be
the public defender or a volunteer private attorney, the parties enter into
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But the trial judge granted the motion as soon as it
was made. It was apparent that he knew it was coming. In
orally ruling on the motion, he cited cases, even giving the
volume and page number of the reporters in which they
appeared. It turned out it had all been rigged.
One of the public defenders appointed to represent
Weis was not certified to handle capital cases, was lead
counsel in 103 felony cases, and part of a defense team in
over 400 cases.48 The other was the administrator of a four-
county circuit public defender office and represented
clients in 91 felony cases.4 9 They filed three motions to
withdraw, describing their workloads and lack of resources
and stating, "counsel cannot, under the current state of
affairs, perform adequately in representing the Defendant,
no matter how good our intentions or diligent our
efforts."50 Because of their workloads, the public defenders
were ethically prohibited from taking Weis's case. 5 1
an attorney-client relationship which is no less inviolable than if
counsel had been retained"); McKinnon v. State, 526 P.2d 18, 22-23
(Aka. 1974) (same); State v. Madrid; 468 P.2d 561, 563 (Ariz. 1970)
(same); Clements v. State, 817 S.W.2d 194, 200 (Ark. 1991) (reversing
removal of counsel in interlocutory pretrial appeal); Harling v. United
States, 387 A.2d 1101, 1105 (D.C. App. 1978) (reversing conviction
because of substitution of counsel over defendant's objection); People
v. Davis, 449 N.E.2d 237, 241 (Ill. 1983) (finding that defense counsel
was improperly removed and holding "for purposes of removal by the
trial court, a court-appointed attorney may not be treated differently
than privately retained counsel").
48 Motion for Reconsideration [filed by public defenders] at 22, Weis v.
State, 694 S.E.2d 350 (Ga. 2010).
4 91 d. at 25.
so Supplement to Renewed Motion to Withdraw at 3, Weis v. State, No.
06R-097 (Pike County Super. Ct. Jan. 8, 2008) (emphasis added).
st See GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2001) (prohibiting
lawyers from handling a matter unless they can do so competently),
available at http://gabar.org/handbook/partiv-after-january-
1_2001_georgiajrules-oLprofessionalconduct/rule 11_competence.
Rule 6.2 states that "[fjor good cause a lawyer may seek to avoid
appointment by a tribunal to represent a person." Id. at R. 6.2. The
184
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52
Nevertheless, the first motion was promptly denied, and
the trial judge never ruled on the second and supplemental
motions.
This was going to be a legal lynching. The judge
was giving Weis a couple of public defenders who would
do their best, but they could not possibly represent Weis
competently with their caseloads and without resources for
investigation and expert witnesses. This did not matter to
the judge or perhaps it was the point - to give Weis a
perfunctory trial at which he would be sentenced to death,
check off the box that said he had a lawyer, and send him to
death row.
Weis moved to dismiss the indictment based on
denial of his rights to counsel and a s eedy trial.53 The trial
judge summarily denied the motions. Weis appealed. His
argument was straightforward: If the State is going to seek
the death penalty, it must meet its constitutional obligations
to provide counsel and resources necessary for a fair trial.
If the State lacks the resources to do this, then it should not
be allowed to seek the death penalty.
The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed by a vote of
4-3.56 The four justices in the majority said the delay in the
case was the fault of Weis and his lawyers because they did
not "cooperate" with the appointment of the public
defenders, the same public defenders who protested their
comment to the rule clarifies that "[g]ood cause exists if the lawyer
could not handle the matter competently." Id. at R. 6.2 cmt. 2 (2001).
52 Transcript of Hearing at 25-27, State v. Weis, No. 2006R-097 (Pike
County Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2007) (trial judge states to public defenders:
"the two of you are going to represent him until I get told differently by
somebody" and notes the objection of the public defenders).
s Weis, 694 S.E.2d at 354.
54 Id.
ss Id.
56 Id. at 358.
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appointment and asserted that it was impossible for them to
represent Weis.
However, the Georgia Supreme Court majority
found their ethical responsibility was not to reject the case
because they could not handle it competently, but to do the
58best they could. In short, Weis was penalized for asserting
his right to counsel and refusing to go along with lawyers
who admitted they could not represent him competently. As
a result of a mandamus action that Weis filed against the
judge he was ultimately able to get his original lawyers
back, assisted by counsel from the Southern Center for
Human Rights. At a trial in July 2011, he was sentenced to
life imprisonment without possibility of parole.
A couple of Louisiana cases illustrate how judges
can influence the outcome of cases by their appointment of
lawyers to defend the poor. The first is described in a
remarkable book, In the Place of Justice: A Story of
Punishment and Deliverance (2010), by Wilbert Rideau,
who spent 44 years at the Louisiana State Penitentiary,
usually called Angola. Rideau was sentenced to death three
times. His first conviction was reversed in an important
Supreme Court case for failure to grant a change of
venue. 60 But he was sentenced to death a second and third
time. He was not executed only because of the Supreme
Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia,61 which prevented
the execution of all of those under death sentence at the
time. Rideau was the publisher of the prison's award-
winning magazine, The Angolite, which was allowed to
publish without censorship for many years.
1 Id. at 356.
51 Weis, 694 S.E.2d at 357 (citing GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.3 for the proposition that the public defenders should have acted with
"reasonable diligence" even though they never represented Weis).
5 Bill Rankin, Life Without Parole for Killer Who Had Been Denied
Counsel, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, July 14, 2011.
6 Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
6'408 U.S. 238 (1972),
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Rideau won a new trial in 2005. As he describes in
the book, the first issues at his retrial in Lake Charles,
Calcasieu Parish, was whether he would be represented by
the two lawyers who had successfully won him a new trial
and were thoroughly familiar with his case or, by two
lawyers the judge appointed, the local public defender and
another lawyer who had recently lost a capital case there.
The public defender protested being appointed because he
had four capital cases among the 400 felony cases he was
defending.
There was a long battle over who would represent
Rideau, which is described in the book. Eventually the two
lawyers who knew his case and had won the new trial
represented Rideau at the retrial. For the first time, Rideau
was represented by real lawyers who investigated the case
and presented a defense. The jury returned a verdict of
manslaughter and Rideau, who had served far beyond the
maximum sentence for that crime walked out of court that
day and he spent the next year writing his book
Five years later, another man, Jason Manuel
Reeves, faced the death penalty before the same judge in
the same place, Lake Charles, Calcasieu Parish,
Louisiana.62 Reeves was tried twice. At his first trial he was
represented by lawyers from the Capital Defense Project of
Southeast Louisiana who specialized in the defense of
capital cases. At that trial, the jury was unable to agree on
64
the issue of guilt and a mistrial was declared. One would
think that the same lawyers, being thoroughly familiar with
the case and specializing in defending death penalty cases,
would represent Reeves at his retrial.
However, as in Weis and as often occurs in
Louisiana, the government claimed that there was not
sufficient funding for the defense. The trial judge could
62 State v. Reeves, 11 So.3d 1031 (La. 2009).
13 Id. at 1047.
' Id. at 1047-48.
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have ordered the State or the Parish to either provide
funding for a proper defense or forgo seeking the death
penalty. Instead, the judge removed Reeves's lawyers and
appointed the local public defender - the same public
defender that the same )judge tried to foist on Rideau -
would represent Reeves. 5 Once again, the public defender
protested, arguing that he could not represent Reeves
because of his excessive caseload.
This time, the judge prevailed. Reeves, represented
by the public defender and another lawyer was, as
expected, convicted and dispatched to death row. The
Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and
death sentence, holding that poor defendants have no right
66to continuity of counsel.
In each of these three cases, the trial judges sought
to bring about a certain result through the appointment of
counsel. When judges appoint lawyers that are not up to the
task of defending the cases, it determines the outcome.
Rideau and Weis would not have had an adequate defense
and any chance at their trials if they had been represented
by the overworked public defenders that the judges tried to
impose upon them. Reeves did not have a chance because
the judge assigned his case to a public defender with an
overwhelming caseload. What the trial judges did in these
cases is highly improper, but not at all that uncommon in
many jurisdictions. The American Bar Association calls for
the independence of counsel from the judiciary as the first
of its Ten Principles for Indigent Defense.67 These cases
illustrate why that principle is so important.
65 Id. at 1053.66 Id. at 1065-66.
67 See American Bar Association, TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC
DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM, at 1, 2 (2002), available at
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/downlo
ads/sclaid/indigentdefense/tenprinciplesbooklet.authcheckdam.pdf (last
visited Feb. 5, 2011).
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The Georgia Supreme Court relied on Reeves in
upholding the substitution of counsel in Weis.68 Then it
applied its decision in Weis to do even greater violence to
the constitutional right to counsel in Phan v. State.69 The
capital case against Khanh Dinh Phan had been pending for
over five years without trial because the Georgia public
defender agency was again unable to provide funds for
attorneys, investigators, and expert witnesses. 70 The agency
originally agreed to pay Phan's lawyers $125 per hour, but
reduced the amount to $95 per hour and then did not pay
them at all after August 30, 2008.71 It also refused to fund
an investigation that was recognized as constitutionally
required.72
On a pretrial appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court, in
another 4-3 decision, remanded the case to the trial court to
consider appointing other counsel.73 The majority went
beyond its decision in Weis, in which it approved a judge's
replacement of defense counsel, and placed an affirmative
duty on trial courts to interrupt and disregard ongoing
attorney-client relationships instead of enforcing the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. On remand, the trial court in
Phan - which had already found that there is no funding
available for defense representation from any source - is to
shop for lawyers who will work for little or nothing yet
somehow represent Phan in accordance with recognized
performance standards, even without resources for
74necessary expert and investigative assistance.
68 Weis, 694 S.E.2d at 355.
69 Phan v. State, 699 S.E.2d 9 (Ga. 2010).
70 Bill Rankin, 5-Year Delay Kills Case, Suspect's Lawyers Argue,
ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Mar. 10, 2010, at B8.
71 Phan, 699 S.E.2d at 703 n.l (Thompson, J., dissenting).
72 Id. at 698.
" Id. at 699.
74See, e.g., Welsh S. White, LITIGATING IN THE SHADOW OF DEATH:
DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN CAPITAL CASES (2006) (describing the
demands upon defense lawyers in capital cases); American Bar
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The witnesses with regard to both guilt-innocence
and mitigation are in Vietnam. The survivor of the murders
with which Phan is charfed fled to Vietnam and all of
Phan's family lives there. The majority in Phan said the
investigation might be accomplished in the most superficial
manner - "such as phone or internet interviews of
witnesses."76 However, a thorough investigation requires
following leads, surveying the physical environment in
which the client developed,77 talking to people who may
not be available by telephone or internet, conducting
repeated in-person interviews, assessing the impact that
witnesses will have on the jury, and preparing the witnesses
for direct examination and cross examination.
Association, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, reprinted in 31 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 913 (2003) (setting out detailed guidelines which constitute the
standard of care required for the proper defense of capital cases).
" Phan, 699 S.E.2d at 697.
7 6 Id. at 699.
1 See Gregory J. Kuykendall et al., Mitigation Abroad: Preparing a
Successful Case for Life for the Foreign National Client, 36 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 989, 1009-11 (2008) (describing the need to survey the
physical environment where the client has lived, particularly in the case
of those who have lived in foreign countries).
7 See Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 453 (2009) (finding counsel
ineffective for "not even" taking the first step of "interviewing
witnesses" or requesting records); William M. Bowen, Jr., A Former
Alabama Appellate Judge's Perspective on the Mitigation Function in
Capital Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REv. 805, 814 (2008) (describing the
importance of "in-person, face-to-face, one-on-one interviews with . . .
the client's family, and other witnesses who are familiar with the
client's life, history, or family history" and the need for "multiple
interviews" with some witnesses "to establish trust, elicit sensitive
information"); American Bar Association, Guidelines for the
Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases, Guideline 10.7 - Investigation & Commentary to Guideline
10.7, reprinted in 31 HOFSTRA L. REv. 913, 1015-26 (2003) (discussing
need for interviews of client and various witnesses by defense counsel,
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For poor people accused of crimes in Georgia and
Louisiana - even those facing the death penalty - lawyers
are now fungible and subject to replacement based on cost
considerations at any time. Even worse, minimizing costs is
recognized as a legitimate reason to replace counsel. The
state is rewarded for not funding indigent defense by
leaving the person accused virtually defenseless.
A defense lawyer who suggests that an investigation
is needed can be swapped for a lawyer who will not
investigate or will conduct only a superficial investigation.
The poor are left with lawyers who may be overwhelmed
with other work, who may not be qualified to handle their
cases, and who, even if they cannot competently represent
them, do not have the same ability as other lawyers to
invoke their ethical obligation to decline representation.
This is not "equal justice for all." It is not even second class
justice; it is no justice at all.
A judge played an even more sinister role in
assigning counsel to represent Gregory Wilson, who was
facing the death penalty in Kentucky. Wilson protested
repeatedly about being represented by a lawyer who had
given Wilson his phone number and when Wilson called it,
it was answered "Kelly's Keg."7 9 The lawyer practiced out
of that bar, which was right across the street from the
courthouse in Covington, Kentucky. All of Wilson's pleas
for a new lawyer were rejected by the judge. He was
sentenced to death in a trial that was a farce.80
However, when Wilson raised on appeal the denial
of his right to a lawyer, the Kentucky Supreme Court said it
79 Wilson v. Commonwealth, 836 S.W.2d 872, 878 (Ky. 1992); see also
Stephen B. Bright, Death Trials That are a "Charade" and a Farce Do
Not Deter Kentucky's Efforts to Execute, SECOND CLASS JUSTICE
(2010), www.secondclassjustice.com/?p=164.
80 See Wilson v. Rees, 624 F.3d 737, 739 (6th Cir. 2010) (Martin, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) ("Wilson's defense
counsel failed him and the principles of our legal system. From the very
beginning of the case, Wilson's defense was clearly a charade.").
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was Wilson's fault - that he should have cooperated with
the lawyer.8 1 Wilson loses either way. If he cooperates with
the lawyer, he is not going to be properly defended by a
lawyer who works out of a bar and is not capable of
defending a capital case. If he complains and tries to get
competent counsel, which is what the Constitution
guarantees, the courts hold that he did not cooperate.
Jeffrey Leonard, a twenty-year-old, brain-damaged,
African American man was sentenced to death by a
Kentucky jury that did not even know his name or anything
else about him.82 He was tried under the name "James
Slaughter." 83 His lawyer conducted no investigation and
never learned his client's name or that he was brain
damaged.84 The lawyer testified that he had tried four death
penalty cases, which was not true. He also testified that he
headed an organized crime 8Frosecution unit in New York,
which was also not true. The Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals nevertheless upheld Leonard's sentence, holding
that the outcome would not have been any different even if
Leonard had been competently represented.
Race
Holly Wood was a victim of both the Alabama
education system and its second class system of justice.
Wood shot and killed his girlfriend. There is no question
about his guilt. But at the penalty phase of his trial - where
the question was life or death - the sentencing decision is
" Wilson, 836 S.W.2d at 879.
82 Slaughter v. Parker, 450 F.3d 224 (6th Cir. 2006).
3 Id. at 228.
M Id. at 234.
" Id. at 229-30 n. 1; Andrew Wolfson, Lawyer Radolovich to Give Up
License, COURIER-JOURNAL, Feb. 6, 2007, at lA.
86 Id. The lawyer was later indicted for perjury. Id. The charges were
dismissed in exchange for him resigning from the bar. Id.
" Slaughter, 450 F.3d at 234, 242.
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to be a "reasonable moral response" to this crime.8 The
life and background of Holly Wood was essential to
deciding that issue. But the jury did not learn anything
about Holly Wood because his court-appointed lawyers did
not even obtain school records and interview special
education teachers in the same community where they
practiced.
As a result, the lawyers did not present testimony by
the teachers "that Wood's IQ was probably 'low to mid
60s,' that Wood was 'educable mentally retarded or
trainable mentally retarded,"' "that all of the special
education students, regardless of age or grade level, were
placed in one room in a basement; the lighting was barely
adequate; the room would flood when it rained a lot; and
the students were known around school as the 'moles' that
'lived in a mole hole,"' and "that Wood - even today - can
read only at the third grade level and can 'not use
abstraction skills much beyond the low average range of
intellect. ,,89
James T. Fisher, Jr. spent 26 /2 years in the custody
of Oklahoma - most of it under sentence of death - without
ever having a competent lawyer and, as a result, without
ever having a fair and reliable determination of whether he
was guilty of any crime. Fisher, a black man, was convicted
in 1983 of the murder of a white man based on the dubious
testimony of the man originally charged with the murder.
The lawyer assigned to represent him tried Fisher's case
and twenty-four others during September of 1983,
88 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989) ("Rather than creating
the risk of an unguided emotional response, full consideration of
evidence that mitigates against the death penalty is essential if the jury
is to give a 'reasoned moral response to the defendant's background,
character, and crime.').
89 Wood v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1281, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008) (Barkett, J.,
dissenting), aff'd, 130 S. Ct. 841 (2010).
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including another capital murder case the week before
Fisher's trial.90
The lawyer called no witnesses at either the guilt or
penalty phases of Fisher's trial other than Fisher. He made
no opening statement or closing argument at either phase.
The lawyer said only nine words during the entire
sentencing phase of the trial. 91 Four of the words were "the
equivalent of judicial pleasantries" and the other five
"formed an ill-founded, unsupported and ultimately
rejected objection to one portion of the prosecutor's closing
argument." 92 The nine words contained no advocacy on
behalf of Fisher.
On appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals pronounced itself "deeply disturbed by defense
counsel's lack of participation and advocacy during the
sentencing stage," but it was not disturbed enough to
reverse the conviction or sentence. 93 It held that the
outcome would not have been different even without the
incompetent representation.9 4
Nineteen years after Fisher's trial, a federal court of
appeals set aside the conviction, finding that Fisher's
lawyer was "grossly inept," and disloyal to his client by
"exhibiting actual doubt and hostility toward his client's
case." 95 It found that he lawyer "destroyed his own client's
credibility and bolstered the credibility of the star witness
for the prosecution," and "sabotaged his client's defense by
repeatedly reiterating the state's version of events and the
damaging evidence he had elicited himself."96 The Court
observed that the prosecution's case against Mr. Fisher
"was not overwhelming" but "in essence a swearing match
9 Fisher v. Gibson, 282 F.3d 1283, 1293 (10th Cir. 2002).
91 Id. at 1289.
92 Id. (quoting the district court).
93 Fisher v. State, 739 P.2d 523, 525 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987).
94 Id.
9 Fisher v. Gibson, 282 F.3d at 1298.
96 Id. at 1308.
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between Mr. Fisher and [the state's witness], either of
whom could have committed the murder." 97
Oklahoma gave Fisher a second trial in 2005 and a
lawyer who was drinking heavily, abusing cocaine and
neglecting his cases. 98 The lawyer physically threatened
Fisher at a pre-trial hearing and, as a result, Fisher refused
to attend his trial.99 He was convicted and sentenced to
death again. This time, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals recognized that Fisher had again been denied his
right to counsel and that it made a difference. 00 His
conviction was reversed again. Instead of trying Fisher a
third time, prosecutors agreed to Fisher's release in July,
2010, provided that he be banished from Oklahoma
forever. 01 Fisher may not have been guilty of any crime -
he never had a constitutional trial - but he spent 26 2 years
in custody.
The consequences of inadequate representation are
enormous. Todd Willingham, was convicted of arson in
Texas after his house burned down and his three children
died in the fire.102 An assistant fire chief and a deputy fire
marshal testified that in their opinion the fire was arson.
Another man, Ernest Ray Willis, also was sentenced to
death in an almost identical arson case. But Willis was
fortunate - a law firm from New York represented him in
post-conviction proceedings. The firm devoted more than a
9 Id.
98 Fisher v. State, 206 P.3d 607, 610-11 (Okla. Crim. App. 2009).
9 Id. at 610.
' Id. at 612-13.
101 See Dan Barry, In the Rearview Mirror, Oklahoma and Death Row,
N.Y. TIMES, August 10, 2010. For additional discussion of James T.
Fisher's case, see Man Spends 26 years on Oklahoma's Death Row
Without Ever Receiving Effective Counsel, available at www.
secondclassjustice.com/?p=198.
102 David Grann, Trial by Fire: Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?,
NEW YORKER, Sept. 7, 2009 at 42, available at http://www. newyorker.
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dozen years to the case and spent millions of dollars on fire
consultants, private investigators, and forensic experts to
analyze the evidence in his case and point out that the
expert testimony at his trial was based on theories and
assumptions that had been completely discredited.10 3
Those same theories were the basis for the opinions
in Willingham's case that the cause of the fire was arson.
For example, an expert told the jury that intricate patterns
of cracks on glass - "crazed glass" - recovered from the
scene was proof than an accelerant had been used to start
the fire.'1' However, studies have found that crazed glass
results from cold water hitting hot glass, such as when a
fire department sprays streams of water on a fire, trying to
put it out.105 There were similar explanations for other
testimony given in both the Willis and Willingham cases.106
When the law firm took its evidence to the
prosecutor in Willis' case, the prosecutor consulted his own
expert and concluded that there had not been arson.107
Willis was released. An expert who examined the evidence
in Willingham's case reached the same conclusion - that
there had been no arson. Willingham did not kill his one-
year-old twin girls and his two-year-old girl when he had
no motive to do so. But Willingham's case had already
been through the courts. Texas executed Willingham on
February 14, 2004. A switch of the lawyers in the two cases
could have changed the outcomes. It is likely that if the
New York law firm had taken Willingham's case, he would
be alive today, and Willis would be dead.
Judge Alvin Rubin of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, observed that "the
Constitution, as interpreted by the courts, does not require
103 Id. at 56.10Id.
105 Id. at 58-59.
'MId. at 59-62.
107 Id. at 62.
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that the accused, even in a capital case, be represented by
able or effective counsel."' 08 The courts have lost sight of
justice in a tangle of procedural rules, pretenses and
administrative concerns so that finality - not justice - has
become the ultimate goal of the criminal courts. Judges are
concerned about moving dockets, not competent
representation for the accused. Politicians talk about
lawyers getting people off on technicalities. However, the
Bill of Rights is not a collection of technicalities. People
are getting killed on technicalities - procedural rules
created not by James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, but
by William Rehnquist and others on the Supreme Court and
by the Congress.
Nevertheless, the system has its advocates, and
Judge Richard Posner of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is one of them. He wrote,
"I can confirm from my own experience as a judge that
indigent defendants are generally rather poorly
represented."' 09 He and I are in agreement with regard to
that. But Judge Posner went on to say:
But if we are to be hardheaded we must
recognize that this may not be entirely a bad
thing. The lawyers who represent indigent
criminal defendants seem to be good enough
to reduce the probability of convicting an
innocent person to a very low level. If they
were much better, either many guilty people
would be acquitted or society would have to
devote much greater resources to the
prosecution of criminal cases. A bare-bones
108 Riles v. McCotter, 799 F.2d 947, 955 (5th Cir. 1986) (Rubin, J.,
concurring).
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system for defense of indigent criminal
defendants may be optimal.' 10
Notice what he missed. He said that if the lawyers
were any better, more guilty people might be acquitted. He
missed the point that if the lawyers were any better, more
innocent people would be acquitted. That apparently did
not even occur to him. And, of course, this bare-bones
system is only for poor people. It is not for commercial
cases or cases that rearrange the assets of the upper one
percent of people in society. It is only for poor people.
The question of what kind of system of justice we
have for poor people accused of crimes is not about being
tough on crime or soft on crime. It is about equal justice. It
is about whether we have a fair and reliable system for
deciding guilt or innocence and, for the guilty, the proper
sentence. But as fundamental as the right to counsel is and
as much as it may be celebrated in the abstract, governors
and legislators throughout the country have convinced
themselves that they cannot afford anything but justice on
the cheap.
Officials all over America say with regard to
indigent defense programs, "We don't want a Cadillac, we
just want a Chevy" or that poor defendants are not entitled
to zealous representation; they are only entitled to adequate
representation. Harold Clark, when he was chief justice of
Georgia, pointed out to the legislature:
We set our sights on the embarrassing target
of mediocrity. I guess that means about
halfway. And that raises a question. Are we
willing to put up with halfway justice? To
my way of thinking, one-half justice must
"o Id. at 164.
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mean one-half injustice, and one-half
injustice is no justice at all.'
We need to overcome this poverty of vision. We are
talking about life and liberty, so why wouldn't we want a
Cadillac? If we can spend over a trillion dollars to fight
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and $64 billion every year to
keep people in prisons and jails,112 surely we can spend a
fraction of that to make sure the courts are convicting only
guilty people, making a fully informed decisions with
regard to sentences, and treating people fairly.
There is going to be a reckoning at some point. It
may be while you are lawyers, those of you who are
students. Because the day will come when it becomes
necessary to sandblast the phrase "equal justice under law"
off the Supreme Court building and acknowledge that we
are never going to have it. Maybe the Court will replace it
with something like, "Your American Express card
welcome here."
I want to end by asking you to do something about
the quality of representation for poor people accused of
crimes. No matter what kind of lawyer you are when you
graduate from this law school - or what kind of lawyer you
are now - whether you are a wealthy commercial lawyer, a
prosecutor, a leader of the bar, a public official, a business
person or any other kind of lawyer - you have a
responsibility to see that poor people accused of crimes are
"I Chief Justice Harold G. Clarke, Annual State of the Judiciary
Address, reprinted in FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Jan. 14, 1993, at 5.
1 There are various ways to calculate the cost of the wars, but it is
clear that they are in excess of a trillion dollars. The Watson Institute
at Brown University found that a conservative estimate was $3.2
trillion in constant dollars and a more reasonable estimate puts the cost
at nearly $4 trillion. See http://costsofwar.org/article/economic-cost-
summary (last visited February 3, 2012). "Every year America spends
close to $66 billion to keep people behind bars." Shima Baradaran, The
Right Way to Shrink Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2011.
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capably represented. Lawyers have a monopoly on legal
services. Lawyers get very rich because of that monopoly.
But that monopoly is more than a get-rich-quick scheme. It
comes with responsibility for the integrity of the system.
Lawyers are trustees of the system of justice.
If you are a prosecutor or attorney general, you can
provide the kind of leadership that Walter Mondale, the
Attorney General of Minnesota and later Vice President of
the United States, provided when Clarence Earl Gideon's
case was before the Supreme Court. Florida asked other
states to file amicus curiae briefs in support of its position
that there was no right to a lawyer. Mondale joined with
attorneys general of 23 states to file an amicus brief in
support of Gideon and the right to counsel." 3 He and his
fellow attorneys general recognized that if we are going to
have a fair system, those accused of crimes must have
lawyers. That kind of leadership from public officials is
missing today. Instead, some prosecutors have opposed
efforts to improve indigent defense as a strategy for gaining
advantage and winning cases.
You must provide the leadership that is urgently
needed if the criminal courts are going to be legitimate and
credible. If we are going to have a fair system, public
defender programs and other lawyers who represent the
poor must have adequate resources, reasonable caseloads,
investigators, and access to experts. That is essential for a
properly working adversary system. But in Tennessee and
other states, the legislatures are not providing the resources
needed and are threatening to cut them.
No matter what kind of practice or business you are
in, you can help change that. Go to the criminal courts in
your jurisdiction and see how they operate. What can of
representation is being provided? The criminal courts are
out of sight and out of mind for most people because they
deal with poor people and a grossly disproportionate
113 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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number of people of color. It is important for all lawyers to
see what is happening in those courts. In many
jurisdictions, you will be shocked by the demeaning way
the accused are treated, the careless attitude many court-
appointed lawyers have toward their clients, the arrogance
and rudeness of the judges and prosecutors, the lack of
advocacy for defendants, and the arbitrary way in which
cases are resolved.
Once you have knowledge, you can use it. You can
convince legislators, most of whom know nothing about
indigent defense, of the importance of lawyers for the poor.
You can get other members of the bar and bar organizations
involved. You can explain why representation by counsel is
essential to the proper working of the adversary system.
You can point out that when innocent people are convicted
because of poor legal representation, the actual perpetrator
of the crime remains free to commit other crimes. You can
educate people that the Bill of Rights is not a collection of
technicalities, but the most precious part of our
Constitution. You can support your local public defender
office by providing some pro bono assistance on some
cases.
The representation of people accused of crimes is an
issue constantly exploited by demagogues, who say that
society should not waste money defending people who
have done terrible things. They play on fear and ignorance.
Lawyers must stand up to them. Lawyers must explain that
the days of the lynch mob - and the perfunctory trial
known as a "legal lynching" - are behind us. Today, every
person accused of a crine, no matter how heinous, is
entitled to a capable lawyer with the resources needed to
defend that person in the adversary system. Every
American should be proud of it when it works and ashamed
when it does not. Everyone must understand that it will not
work unless the legislatures provide the resources
necessary for public defenders to do the job.
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I hope that some of you will be that capable lawyer
for some of the poor accused of crimes. You can work as
public defenders, representing your clients with care and
diligence. Just as with the Underground Railroad at the
time of slavery, you may not be able to change the whole
system, but you can help one person at a time. Legislatures
may fail. Courts may fail. The executive branch may fail.
But individual lawyers can take cases, counsel clients,
investigate their cases, be their advocate, and tell their
stories. It will make a difference. It will make the right to
counsel a reality for that person and that person's family.
And you will find it a very fulfilling and important way to
spend a life in the law.
I was fortunate to grow up during the Martin Luther
King, Jr. era in American history - the time between the
Montgomery Bus Boycott and the assassination of Dr. King
in 1968. The essential lessons that Dr. King taught us
during his thirty nine years of life were that nothing was
more important than ending racism and poverty and
nothing was less important than how much money one
made doing it. Our society did not follow those lessons, but
we as individuals can. We need to make a sustained
commitment to equal justice and to providing high quality
representation for poor people whose lives and liberty are
at stake.
Dr. King often said we stand on the shoulders of
others so that someday others can stand on our shoulders.
When you are working to improve representation of the
poor and to end race discrimination in the criminal courts,
you are standing on the shoulders of Thurgood Marshall
who just a few years after graduating from the law school
at Howard University, went by train from Baltimore to
Oklahoma City, and then took a bus to Hugo, Oklahoma, to
defend a man in a death penalty case. 114
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You stand on the shoulders of Clarence Darrow,
who, late in his career, tried a case to an all-white, all-male
jury on behalf of African-Americans who had the audacity
to move into an all-white neighborhood in Detroit and were
on trial for murder.' 15 He stood before the jury and said that
the case was about race.116 He asked the jurors to deal with
the reality of race relations in Detroit and their own
attitudes about race. 117 The first trial ended in a mistrial. At
the second and final trial, before another all-white, all-male
jury, after again talking frankly about race, Darrow won an
acquittal for Henry Sweet." 8
And you are standing on the shoulders of two
African American lawyers who were practicing law in
Chattanooga in the early 1900s, Noah Parden and Styles
Hutchins. They were asked to take the case of Ed Johnson,
an innocent man, who had been convicted of rape and
sentenced to death.119 Johnson's father met with Parden and
asked him to take the case. He was unable to pay a fee.120
After discussing the consequences of taking the case,
including the possibility of a lynch mob coming after them
if they took it, Parden and Hutchins took the case.121 While
working on the case, there was an attempt to burn down
their offices and shots were fired into Parden's house. 122
Parden took a train to Washington and argued for a stay
" For a full account of the trials, see Douglas A. Linder, The Sweet
Trials: An Account, www.law.umkc.edulfaculty/projects/ftrials/sweet/
sweetaccount.htm (last visited May 17, 2010); see also KEVIN BOYLE,
ARC OF JUSTICE: A SAGA OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND MURDER IN THE JAZZ
AGE (2004).
"6 Linder, supra note 115; BOYLE, supra note 115, at 292-95.
"7 BOYLE, supra note 115, at 292-95.
"' Id. at 299, 336.
119 The case is described in Mark Curriden & Leroy Phillips, Jr.,
CONTEMPT OF COURT: THE TURN-OF-THE-CENTURY LYNCHING THAT
LAUNCHED A HUNDRED YEARS OF FEDERALISM (2001).
12 0 Id. at 133.
2 Id. at 139.
122 Id. at 178.
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before Justice John Marshall Harlan.123 After conferring
with other members of the Court, who decided to accept the
case for review, Justice Harlan granted the stay.124
When word of the stay got back to Chattanooga, a
mob stormed the jail and took Ed Johnson to the bridge
than goes over the Tennessee River in Chattanooga. They
shot him and hung him off the bridge.' 25 Noah Parden and
Styles Hutchins experienced constant threats against their
lives and rocks were thrown through the windows of their
homes and office. 126 The Sunday after the lynching a
minister preached a sermon against lynching. His house
was set on fire.127 A short time later, Noah Parden and
Styles Hutchins left Chattanooga and never returned.128
Noah Parden and Styles Hutchins set a remarkable
example for us to follow. When they were decided whether
to take the case of Ed Johnson, they knew that if they took
it, nothing would ever be the same again. They knew they
would put at risk the law practice they had built in the
segregated South and their ability to remain in the
community that was their home. They even considered the
possibility that they might be lynched if they took the case.
And yet, Noah Parden and Styles Hutchins said, yes, we
will take the case. "'Much has been given to us by God and
Man,' Hutchins said. 'Now much is expected."'l
29
You will not be called upon not to make decisions
like the one they made. However, the question of whether
our society will provide representation to the poor and
achieve equal justice is ever present. Our answers as
lawyers must be the same as Noah Parden and Styles
Hutchins: yes, we will take the case. Much has been given
123 Id. at 12-17, 179-80, 188-89.
124 Id. at 192-96.
125 Curriden & Phillips, Jr., supra note 119, at 200-214.
126 Id. at 234.
127 Id. at 235.
128 Id. at 234, 348-49.
129 Id. at 139. See Luke 12:48.
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to you - you are exceptionally fortunate. Much is expected
from you. I urge you to take on the case of fairness, equal
justice, and the right to counsel. I urge you to become
public defenders and make the right to counsel a reality. I
urge you to dedicate yourselves to overcoming the
nightmare of hostility and fear mongering that is going on
in this country and to being a part of making good on the
promise of equal justice under the law.
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APPENDIX
TRANSCRIPT OF VIDEO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PUBLIC
CHAPTER No. 4981
HOUSE BILL 1358
April 12, 2011: House Judiciary Subcommittee
Rep. Vance Dennis (R-Savannah, District 71): Thank you,
Mr. Chairman. This is a bill that corrects a problem that has
arisen as a result of a court proceeding in regards to
motions for summary judgment and the standard for
determining those. I have an amendment that corrects some
of the language to basically revert back to the existing
standard prior to that court decision being made. And with
that I'd move passage of the bill.
Chairman (Rep. Jim Coley, R-Bartlett, District 97):
There's a motion on the bill. Second.
Rep. Dennis: And I would also move passage of the
amendment 557077.
Chairman: There's a motion and a second. Representative
Dennis, you're recognized on the amendment.
Rep. Dennis: Without any questions, I'll just renew my
motion on the amendment.
Chairman: Representative Sontany?
Rep. Janis Baird Sontany (D-Nashville, District 53):
Could you explain this just a little bit?
Rep. Dennis: Sure, the court--briefly, I'm not an expert on
it but I'll do the best I can. We could go out of session here
if an expert--but basically, the gist of it is, I think last year
or the year before, the Supreme Court made a decision that
changed the way they'd historically applied- the standard
they'd historically applied to summary judgment decisions.
And they did it in such a way that it makes it almost
impossible for the court to award summary judgment. They
potentially shifted the burden of proof to the plaintiff that's
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almost--it's basically created almost an impossible standard
to achieve summary judgment. So the intent of the bill is
to--so that if there is no genuine, no real disputed issue of
fact, and it's just a matter of law to enable the court to go
back to making that decision in granting a summary
judgment motion. And it shifts the standard from what-
the standard that the court adopted, it shifts it back to what
it was prior to that decision and what it had been in
Tennessee for the last, I don't know, twenty, thirty years,
and it mirrors the federal standard for decisions on
summary judgment.
Rep. Sontany: So tell me what summary judgment is and
we're talking about the moving party what are we talking
about there?
Rep. Dennis: Well, summary judgment-- going back to--
well, let's start at the beginning. You file a lawsuit, you've
been wronged, or for whatever reason you file a lawsuit,
alleging somebody has harmed you or somebody owes you
something. The other side files a response to that. Then you
do discovery, you share all your information. Once you've
shared all your information, if there is no real disputed
issue of fact then either side can move the court to grant
them summary judgment. Which basically means you're
filing a motion with the court saying there is no issue of
fact, everybody's stipulated that these are the relevant facts,
and once you're at that point it's a matter of law based on
those facts that the person who's claiming that they're
entitled to something is not entitled to it purely as a matter
of law. And the judge has the power at that time to make a
decision on that motion for summary judgment. But to get
to that point you've got to have everybody agreeing there
are no issues of - no disputed issues of material fact. So
once you get to that point, the judge makes a decision. And
the court shifted its standard of proof to the extent that the
person moving for summary judgment has to essentially
prove a negative in what they did. And I'd have to get
somebody that's more fluent on summary judgment
207
207
8.1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 208
practice and civil practice to explain it much better than
that. But that's generally-- when you have a motion for
summary judgment, your movant is moving the court to
give them judgment before you get to a trial because there
are no disputed issues of fact. It's purely a matter of law
that the judge has to decide under the law. It's not
something that a jury has to make a decision about which
facts are right or you're contesting those issues of fact in
order to be able to grant summary judgment.
Chairman: Representative Coley, you're recognized.
Representative Dennis, would you consider rolling this bill
to next Wednesday's calendar?
Rep. Dennis: I'll be glad to.
Chairman: Thank you. Wednesday the 2 0 'h. If there is no
objection it's rolled.
April 27, 2011: House Judiciary Subcommittee
Chairman: Representative Dennis, you're recognized on
House Bill 1358.
Rep. Dennis: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. House Bill 1358
as amended will basically change the current standard for
obtaining summary judgment in response to a 2008
Supreme Court decision that fundamentally changed how
you look at the Supreme Court-summary judgment issues.
So for the purpose of bringing up the amendment, I move
passage on the bill.
Chairman: It's been moved and properly seconded. Any
questions? We have an amendment. Everybody have-it's
the drafting code. Representative Dennis.
Rep. Dennis: Mr. Chairman, the drafting code on the
amendment-there may be one or two amendments in your
packages resulting-reflecting on various revisions over
the course of the last few weeks. But the one I intend on
moving today is the last four of the drafting code, 8296,
which I hope is in your package.
Chairman: Is there a motion on the amendment?
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Rep. Dennis: I move the amendment.
Chairman: Seconded. All those in favor of amendment
number one, say aye. Those opposed. The ayes have it.
Rep. Karen Camper (D-Memphis, District 87):
[Inaudible]
Chairman: I'm sorry. I apologize.
Rep. Camper: [Inaudible]
Chairman: You don't have one?
Rep. Camper: [Inaudible]
Chairman: We are. You want to talk-we are.
Rep. Camper: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was hoping
that he was going to give us an explanation of the
amendment before we took it to a vote.
Chairman: Okay. All right. Well, that's fine. I
withdraw-I made the second, and withdraw the motion
and so we're back on the bill unamended. So go ahead and
ask your question.
Rep. Camper: Well, you moved and seconded to bring
it-the actual motion and second so that we could discuss
it. So that's the posture I thought we were in before you
were going to a vote. So I want us to be in a posture of
discussing so that he can tell us what this--thank you , Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman: I understand, so we are-we're on the
amendment. Okay. And the motion's been made and
properly seconded. All right. Okay. All right. Discussion.
Representative Camper.
Rep. Camper: I hope he's going to tell me what this do.
[Laughter from Chairman and others]. Because the
amendment is so different than what I was looking at, so I
had a great expectation that he was going to outline for us
what all of these "whereases" meant so we can know what
we're about to vote on.
Chairman: By the way, your comment is going to be one
of the comments that we have on the Best of the 107
209
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General Assembly CD, which will be available in August
this year. Representative Dennis, you're recognized.
Rep. Dennis: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The substance of
the bill is pretty similar on both sides. The "whereases," as
you refer to them, are kind of the explanations of what has
happened in our courts giving rise to the need for this
change. Basically, it just addresses, if you want to follow
along with the amendment, that there's a particular
Tennessee Supreme Court case called Hannan versus Alltel
Publishing where the court kind of changed how they look
at and apply Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
dealing with summary judgments and made a really, at least
in my opinion, made a wrong-- an incorrect decision. They
made it--they established a standard that makes it almost
impossible for a court to grant summary judgment because
it requires the nonmoving party-- or the moving party to
essentially prove a negative. So basically, the intent of this
bill and the language in this bill as far as what it actually
does in establishing the review on a motion for summary
judgment simply states that the person--a party who moves
for summary judgment who does not bear the burden of
proof at trial shall prevail in their motion for summary
judgment if it either: submits affirmative evidence that
negates an essential element of the non-moving party's
claim or demonstrates to the court that the nonmoving
party's evidence is insufficient to establish an essential
element of the nonmoving party's claim. So that's-
basically it goes back to what the standard was in
Tennessee for several years prior to 2008 when the
Supreme Court changed that.
Chairman: Representative Camper, you're recognized
whether I've got the microphone or not.
Rep. Camper: Thank you, sir. And so what you said was
that in the Supreme Court decision they made a change of
something. So what was this change that you're talking
about and was it outside of the--you have here Rule 56 of
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Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. What is it that was
different about what they did that got us to here?
Chairman: Representative Dennis, you're recognized.
Rep. Dennis: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Basically, and
I'm--this is not an area that I'm completely an expert. We
have, I think, a more skilled guest with us that might can
explain it a little better than I can but I can tell you
basically and if you want further explanation, certainly we
can go out of session to do that. Basically, they changed the
standard to make it-- they put an additional burden on the
party who moves for summary judgment. Who's moving to
show the court that their--that the case should stop here and
not go to jury because the person who's on the other side is
not entitled to the relief that they're requesting. Basically
requiring--this would go back to the standard that was in
place for a number of years before, under the Byrd case
essentially, which is a several-year-old Tennessee case.
This would codify the standard under the Byrd case and
effectively reverse the standard that the Supreme Court put
in place under the Hannan case. And if that doesn't explain
it any better I'll be glad to go out of session to let
somebody explain it that's a little better than I.
Rep. Camper: I think that would be good, if it's possible.
Chairman: If there is no objection we will stand in recess.
Who is it that needs to speak?
Rep. Dennis: I know we have a, there's an individual here
who can clarify a little better. Certainly if you wouldn't
mind coming up and introducing yourself.
Benjamin Sanders (Farm Bureau Insurance): Thank you
Representative. I'm Benjamin Sanders with Farm Bureau
Insurance. Representative Camper, this bill is not our bill
but I think we've adopted it because it's just such a good
idea in our opinion. So let me explain my understanding of
what Representative Dennis' bill does. Summary judgment
is a judicial tool that determines whether a case should go
to trial or not. In other words, if Representative Dennis sues
me then I can challenge under our old standard of summary
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judgment, I can move for summary judgment and challenge
the sufficiency of evidence. And essentially saying if you
don't have enough evidence to go to trial we need to stop it
right here. Under the old standard, the court could grant
that. They could say, if he doesn't prove evidence now
we're not going to the time and expense of going to trial.
Under the standard that they adopted in 2008, they changed
that. Instead of granting summary judgment by me
challenging his evidence, they put the burden on the
defendant and said that I-- that we now have to prove that
he can't prove his case. So, in other words, if I move for
summary judgment now, under the new standard, all
Representative Dennis has to say is, I'll prove it at trial and
doesn't have to show at that point that he has any evidence.
So what we are seeing is a lot of cases that have no dispute
of facts that are going to trial that probably shouldn't go to
trial. Does that help explain it?
Rep. Camper: It does to some degree but I'm trying to
see--if this practice has been successfully working, you're
saying that in this one case--I guess we've adopted this and
it has been working for, how long?
Mr. Sanders: The-Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure is what governs summary judgment. And that's
been in place, I don't know when exactly it was rewritten,
I'm going to say twenty or thirty years ago, and it was
adopted to also be in line with the federal rule and the
reason for that is to make sure that you can't pick and
choose what jurisdictions you file in to go to the most
favorable court. The rule hasn't changed. But in 2008, the
Supreme Court changed their interpretation of that rule.
Rep. Camper: Which, that's what Supreme Courts kind of
do in a way, they interpret the rule and apply it based on the
evidence presented before them.
Mr. Sanders: That's correct. And when they made the
ruling on that case, all the lower courts had to follow their
new standard that they adopted.
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Rep. Camper: So what that would say to me, then, is that
there was something about that case that the rule allowed
them reasonable leeway to adopt--
Mr. Sanders: That's correct.
Rep. Camper: So I see the rule as being flexible in that
way so now we're going to do what, say they can't do that,
is that what this is going to say, that they could not have
made that determination based on the rule that they were
looking at, at that moment in time?
Mr. Sanders: I think, what I'm hearing, Representative, is
that you're correct in that the court had the leeway to make
that interpretation in 2008. I think what this bill says is that
it is public policy that summary judgment should be able to
be granted if you can't prove your case.
Rep. Camper: What? I'm sorry.
Mr. Sanders: I think--I think you're correct in that the
Supreme Court certainly had the authority to make a
different interpretation of that rule. What this bill says is
that it's the public policy of Tennessee that if you don't
have enough evidence to go to trial for your case that you
shouldn't move past the summary judgment stage.
Rep. Camper: Oooh, I think that's tying the hands of the
Supreme--Thank you. I appreciate that.
Chairman: Any other discussion? Representative
Sontany, you're recognized, ma'am.
Rep. Sontany: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe that
we have someone else here that would like to speak on that
issue as well, so if we can continue in recess and hear from
Mr. Janney.
Chairman: Just approach the podium and just tell us who
you are for the record, please. Go ahead, sir.
Doug Janney (President of the Tennessee Employment
Lawyers Association): Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and
members of the committee. I'm Doug Janney, President of
the Tennessee Employment Lawyers Association. Actually
here to speak on another bill this afternoon but I wanted to
address some of the points on this summary judgment bill.
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This proposed bill actually goes farther than the Byrd case
which was the case that governed summary judgment
motions in Tennessee before Hannan versus Alltel, and it
goes farther than the standard in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56. And the way that it goes farther is by giving
the defendant the opportunity to prevail on a motion for
summary judgment without ever giving the plaintiff the
opportunity to respond in some circumstances. It says that
the moving party shall prevail on its motion if it submits
affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of
the nonmoving party's claim or demonstrates that the
nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient. If it submits an
affidavit saying, well, the nonmoving party's evidence is
insufficient to the court's satisfaction, then the nonmoving
party may not get any opportunity to respond and have the
lawsuit dismissed. And that's inconsistent with summary
judgment practice in federal courts and in state courts and
the way it's always been done. You have to give the
nonmoving party an opportunity to respond. Additionally,
this amendment says it applies only to defendants and not
to plaintiffs. And from our perspective, it doesn't happen
very often in personal injury cases, but in employment
cases sometimes the plaintiff files a motion for summary
judgment even though the plaintiff bears the burden of
proof at trial. This amendment carves out plaintiffs and
says that if you file a motion for summary judgment,
plaintiff, we're not treating you the same way; because you
bear the burden of proof at trial, you still have to go submit
additional evidence. But, so, this amendment is treating
defendants and plaintiffs different. That's what that
language that says "if they bear the burden proof at trial"--it
should be at the very least, it should be the same standard
under Rule 56 for both plaintiffs and defendants. Rule 56 in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and rule 56 in the state
Rules of Civil Procedure don't make any distinction
between a plaintiff and a defendant; it doesn't say anything
about whether you bear the burden of proof at trial. It only
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says you have to create a genuine issue of material fact.
And that's the issue here. It was stated earlier that the
plaintiff can throw up his hands up and say, I'll prove it at
trial. That's not correct. The plaintiff still bears the burden
of producing evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of
material fact to the trial court's satisfaction. They can't just
bring a frivolous lawsuit and say I'll prove it at trial. Under
Rule 56 they still must demonstrate a genuine issue of
material fact. And so we would encourage you to go with
the text of the rule. Go with the text of Rule 56. Don't
codify this amendment. At least pass it to 2012. Thank you.
Chairman: Any questions? Yeah, Representative Dennis,
you're recognized.
Rep. Dennis: Just briefly I guess I take exception to your
first point that the summary judgment motion could be
granted simply on--by the moving party submitting an
affidavit, as under Rule 56 as it is, the nonmoving party
certainly at the hearing on the motion for summary
judgment will certainly have the opportunity to put on
proof that the--that it is not--that the evidence is not
appropriate and that there is a genuine issue of material
fact. So the assertion that the nonmoving party is not going
to have the opportunity to present proof to the contrary at
the motion for summary judgment is not quite correct.
What am I missing when you say they are not going to be
able to present that proof?
Mr. Janney: What if the trial court gets your--you're the
defendant, you move for summary judgment, the trial court
gets your affidavit, cancels the hearing, and grants
summary judgment for you?
Rep. Dennis: I don't think that the court can do that. Can
the court do that now without hearing from the other side,
an opportunity to be heard? I don't think that's-I don't
think this bill changes the interpretation of Rule 56 and I
don't think the court would go anywhere near allowing and
approving that kind of interpretation. That's not the intent
of the bill at all. I don't think that's what it does.
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Mr. Janney: Well, that's--it may not be the intent but
that's the effect it could have. It may not have that effect
but under this, under this rule if you submit affirmative
evidence that negates an essential element of my claim,
then I don't have a-I don't necessarily have an
opportunity to respond. The court can cancel the hearing,
not have a hearing on it, and grant summary judgment
without giving me an opportunity to respond.
Rep. Dennis: There are other rules outside of just this
particular statute that apply to those hearings and would
allow you to have that hearing. Just because it doesn't
specifically say in this statute that you would be entitled to
have a hearing and put on proof to the contrary doesn't
mean it's not so and it's not covered in other sections of the
code or in other parts of the rules. So, to say that just
because the statute doesn't-just because this statutes says-
-doesn't specifically say that you have the right to have a
hearing on that summary judgment motion doesn't mean
it's not covered in other sections of the rules, to do that. So
I still-I disagree strongly with your assertion that the
nonmoving party wouldn't be able to put on proof. I just
don't see where you're getting that, other than just because
the statute doesn't specifically say it. My response is it
doesn't have to; it's covered by other sections of the rules
of procedure.
Mr. Janney: Well, there are local rules that say that a
party can get a hearing in some courts not in all courts. But
if you read this language in this statute a defendant can
argue that we've submitted this evidence, there's no need to
have a hearing on it. We've submitted an affidavit evidence
that negates an essential element of their claim or that their
evidence is insufficient. And, this is mainly directed at
subsection one that says "submits affirmative evidence that
negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's
claim." What if you submit affidavits and depositions and
evidence with your motion that negate an essential element
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of the claim? Could the trial court not in its discretion grant
the motion?
Rep. Dennis: I don't believe so because both sides are
going to have the right to have an opportunity to be heard
on that motion just like any other motion that's filed. You
file a motion, you have a hearing on that motion, the court
hears both sides and it makes a decision after that. And
that's well settled and established in law and every other
motion I've ever seen unless there's specific authority to
enter an ex parte order, only hearing one side, and I've
never had a case where we didn't have a hearing really
quick after the court entered an ex parte order. You don't
file a motion and get it granted without having a hearing
and the opportunity for both sides to present whatever
evidence they have and the reasons why. That's a
misstatement of the actual practice, not this particular
section of the code. And I really don't-- wouldn't have a
problem with putting that specific language in there if it
made you happy. But I talked to you about this a few weeks
ago and I never got any language from you that I recall to
try to fix it to put anything in there to specifically say that.
So to come into here and assert that this is going to be a
great departure from existing state and federal standards
simply because it doesn't specifically outline the rights to
that hearing that are provided for in other sections of the
law and code, is not accurate in my opinion. But I'm
certainly opened to being convinced otherwise.
Mr. Janney: Well, Rule 56--under Rule 56, the
nonmoving party should have the opportunity to respond
and maybe this amendment could insert something in there
that says in all--any time a motion for summary judgment is
filed, the nonmoving party shall have an opportunity to
respond. But the other thing that I'm concerned about is
why is this applicable only to defendants and not to
plaintiffs? What if I file a motion for summary judgment in
a family medical leave act case where you've interfered
with my rights to medical leave and fired me while I'm on
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medical leave instead of returning me to my job? And then
because I bear the burden of proof on that at trial, I don't
enjoy the benefits of your amendment. Why is that?
Rep. Dennis: I believe the intent is not--and that's why it
doesn't specifically say plaintiffs or defendant, the standard
should be different in my opinion as to when you're
moving for summary judgment as to the person who bears
the burden of proof. If you've got to put on proof at trial
and convince a jury that something has happened, if you
have that burden of proof, then to get to that trial you need
to be able to show that you've got some proof to do that.
You need to be able to "put up or shut up" at that summary
judgment stage, which is the federal standard, essentially.
And that is the intent of the bill. I think that is the language
of the bill. And that is what, at least in my opinion, should
be the standard.
Mr. Janney: The standard should be uniform. It should
apply to--irrespective of whether you're the plaintiff or the
defendant, whether you bear the burden of proof at trial or
whether you don't bear the burden of proof at trial, Rule 56
is the same for all parties in all courts. And this saying that
if you're moving for summary judgment and you still bear
the burden of proof at trial that you can't get summary
judgment on a case where you're entitled to it, say if you're
the plaintiff moving for summary judgment, it's just not-
it's not drafted evenhandedly for both plaintiffs and
defendants. It's only giving defendants the opportunity to
make use of this amendment. And that is not in accordance
with the spirit and intent of Rule 56 of either the federal or
the state Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rep. Dennis: Well, I guess we'll just have to agree to
disagree, I guess, because that is the only functional way
that I see that it would be able to work. You have to
distinguish between the--I mean from the practical aspect
between the entity who has the burden of proving
something to the jury and the party who has no obligation
to prove anything at all to the jury.
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Mr. Janney: So it applies--
Rep. Dennis: That's the difference.
Mr. Janney: In a case where a plaintiff files a motion for
summary judgment, they don't-- they can't follow your
amendment because they still bear the burden of proof at
trial. So what does that mean in those cases? How are
those motions addressed--to be addressed by the courts in
light of this amendment?
Rep. Dennis: Under the existing standard.
Mr. Janney: Well, this is codifying a different standard.
And it--we ought to just go with the text of Rule 56 rather
than trying to codify something that is not applicable to
every situation.
Rep. Dennis: The problem with going with the language
of Rule 56 is we're not attempting to change the language
of Rule 56. We are attempting to change how it's
interpreted because the Rule--the language of Rule 56 has
not changed. The court interpreted it one way under the
Byrd case and the court interpreted--changed their
interpretation significantly in 2008 under the Hannan case.
So codifying the existing rule language doesn't do anything
because if you don't get to the underlying elements of how
that rule is interpreted, then it's pointless to codify the rule
because the rule is already essentially codified in that it is
adopted as Rule 56 of the rules of court. So to do what
you're proposing and codify the language of the rule does
nothing.
Mr. Janney: Right. Yeah, I'm not suggesting codifying
anything. I don't think you should codify anything. I think
you should let the courts-let the--the section of T.C.A. 16-
3-402 says that the Tennessee Supreme Court prescribes
the Rules of Civil Procedure and the way in which motions
for summary judgment are handled. And so perhaps the 16-
3-402 ought to apply and let the courts say how pretrial
motions to dismiss lawsuits are handled.
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Chairman: Time out. Representative Watson, you're
recognized.
Rep. Eric Watson (R-Cleveland, District 22): Just making
a motion to go back into session, I want to make a
comment. Granted? Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman: No objection? We go back in session.
Rep. Watson: Representative Dennis, would you agree to
maybe sit down with John Day and Jimmy Bilbo between
now and the full committee and just straighten some of this
out? Maybe if we've got to write something different.
Rep. Dennis: I will be most certainly glad to do that
between now and then. I know some of my friends with the
Trial Lawyers' Association have looked at that specifically.
Mr. Day, I believe, has looked at this amendment and we
made some changes specifically after recommendations
from Mr. Day in particular, I believe. So I will be more
than glad between now and full to talk to all interested
parties.
Rep. Watson: Now, Mr. Bilbo, is that okay? Wave your
hand there. Y'all get together before next week then.
Thank you, sir.
Chairman: OK. We're back on the amendment. It's been -
-the motion's been made and is properly seconded. All in
favor of the amendment say aye. Aye. Those opposed? The
ayes have it. Those who want to be listed as "no," please
raise your hand, and we'll record you as "no." Now, we're
back on the bill as amended. Question? The question's been
called. No objection to the question? Seeing none, all in
favor of sending 1358 to the full committee say aye. Aye.
Those opposed no. Moves to the full committee. This also
will be one of the highlights on the best of the 107th
General Assembly.
***HB 1358 sent to full committee.
May 3, 2011: House Judiciary Committee
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Rep. Dennis: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This bill
establishes a standard procedure for establishing who has
the burden of proof in a motion of summary judgment, and
it would codify the court's previous status prior to a
Supreme Court decision in 2008 and take us back to the
way the law was on summary judgment before 2008. There
is an amendment, drafting code 8296, and I move passage
of the amendment.
Chairman (Rep. Watson): Motion second on the bill.
Motion second on the amendment. Does everyone have the
amendment? 8296. Any discussion? Representative Moore,
you're recognized sir.
Rep. Gary Moore (D-Joelton, District 50): Thank you,
Mr. Chairman. Representative Dennis, I'm looking at the
amendment which is quite substantially--does it
substantially change the original language?
Rep. Dennis: No, it doesn't. The original language is very
similar to the bill. The amendment added several
paragraphs on--talking to other folks on both sides of the
issue involved with the case, they thought it would be best
to put into the bill some of the history leading up to the
reason to help clarify what our intent was and that's the
reason for that. The actual statutory language is at the very
bottom and it's only the last one, two, three, four, five, six,
the last seven pages-- last seven lines on page one.
Rep. Moore: Thank you.
Chairman: Representative Camper.
Rep. Camper: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Representative
Dennis, if I remember last week we were in the middle of
some said discussion about this. And this dealt with the
Rule 56, right? That's what we're talking about.
Rep. Dennis: That's correct.
Rep. Camper: And based on how the Supreme Court is
interpreting that rule, is what this goes to address.
Rep. Dennis: Yes.
Rep. Camper: So would this piece of legislation then,
because this was a concern I had last week--and I know we
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had to leave because of the storms--going to in some way
tie the hands of the courts because right now the rule allows
them, based on the evidence presented before them, to
make a decision? So, to me, it appears now we're going to
go back and say to them, there was something wrong in
your decision making process so we're going to now do
something with that rule that would allow you to only look
at it and see it this way. Is that what this is doing?
Rep. Dennis: Well--
Rep. Camper: What are we doing? Because I think the
rule gives them some latitude to look at the evidence and
make a decision. But we want to go back and overturn it, it
appears.
Rep. Dennis: The issue is not being able to look at the
evidence and make a decision. The judge--the court still
has the power to do that. You're not changing that at all.
The only thing you're changing is who has the burden of
proof on a motion for a summary judgment. Motion for
summary judgment is when you finish your discovery
issues, everybody's shared all their information, if there is
some legal reason or some factual reason why you're not
entitled to the relief that you're asking for. Or why the
person who's filed the suit is not entitled to that, then the
defendant can file a motion for summary judgment asking
the court to dismiss the case because as a matter of law this
should never be decided by a jury because there is a clear
cut reason that this case can't be--this person can't get the
relief they're asking for. And this deals specifically with
who has the burden of proof on that motion as far as
establishing that there is no real issue in contention here
and which side has to prove what to--either that there is a
problem or there's not a problem that the jury should hear.
Rep. Camper: So in the decision that we are citing here,
who had that burden of proof and how does this change or
get at that? In the case that's in the first whereas clause.
Rep. Dennis: The Hannan versus Alltel Publishing case
was a case that the Supreme Court decided in 2008 where
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they basically reversed what they had been-what had been
the standard in Tennessee for many years and what the
federal standard was and still is. They kind of reversed that
and required the party who was moving for summary
judgment to--they shifted it from the person who was
bringing the claim to be able to show that there was a real
issue to be decided by a jury. They kind of reversed that
and said the person who's being sued has the burden of
proving to the court that there's no way that the plaintiff
can win this case. And that's not what the state standard
had been ever before and it's not what the federal standard
is at all. So the purpose of this bill is to move it back to
what the state standard was for--prior to 2008 and to what
the federal standard still is. That the moving party has to
show to the judge that there is some-there is an issue here
that a jury needs to decide, and once they show that, then
the judge has to let it go to the jury. But this is just dealing
with when there's an issue that there is no dispute, the
plaintiff has got to "put up or shut up" under this bill. Right
now the court's taken that away and that's not the prior
standard for Tennessee and that's not the federal standard
as it is now.
Rep. Camper: And how's--
Rep. Dennis: So we're codifying--
Rep. Camper: So how're they going to achieve that? I
need to see practically how they're going to achieve that
with this language you've put here at the bottom. Tell--
make me see how that's going to work. Can you? Like,
how is this going to achieve what you just said? You
perceived that there was a problem. Does this solve that
problem, and how is this solving that problem, is what I'm
trying to get at.
Rep. Dennis: The person who's being sued, if they file a
motion for summary judgment saying, judge, there's no
way the plaintiff can win this case as a matter of law or
based on all the facts that are here, there's no way that the
plaintiff can win this case. And if they can show the court
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that that's true-the case--if they allege that there's a
specific reason why they can't prove their case, then that
shifts the burden of proof to the plaintiff. The plaintiff has
got to show at that motion for summary judgment that there
actually is an issue here for the judge to be decided.
Rep. Camper: All right, I think I understand what you're
saying. Okay, also, Mr. Chairman, last week there were
some people to speak and I'm wondering are these people
still here or did they show up? Did anybody want to speak
on this and would be ok with you? Because we were in the
middle of the tornadoes and all this stuff last week, so I
don't know if they are or if they come back.
Chairman: Representative Camper, also the legal counsel
can advise you of some of that stuff, too, because we've
been told it might affect Mallard in a sense. I believe some
of your question--she can address that also if you need her
to. Is anyone here to speak? No one. Okay. Chancellor
Bryant, you can speak if you need to. Okay. Jimmy
Matlock? Representative Dennis, do you care to just roll
this down just a notch or two?
Rep. Dennis: Be glad to.
Chairman: Thank you, thank you, sir.
Rep. Dennis: I would add, Mr. Chairman, that we've
worked with the-I guess, the trial bar, the Trial Lawyers'
Association, in drafting this language. It's my
understanding they're not--they don't have any intent to
oppose this bill. Although there was an attorney here last
week who had some issues but he is not with-he was not
representing the Trial Bar Association.
Chairman: Sounds good. Without objection we'll just go
ahead and go back to item number one.
***House Judiciary Committee moves on to two other bills
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Chairman: That takes us back to item 26, HB 1355,
Representative Dennis, you're recognized, sir.
Rep. Dennis: Thank you Mr. Chairman, I think we had
already moved 26 but if we hadn't approved it, I'd renew
my motion on item 26.
Chairman: Representative Camper, you are recognized.
Rep. Camper: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was--I
actually was trying to get to legal to get that question
answered but 1920 came up and it was so important I was
trying to hear it too. So I wasn't really able to get to you
because we got into 1920. So I was trying to figure out in a
case like I am a--Karen Camper is a citizen who is trying to
file a suit against some said corporation, big corporation,
let's say AT&T, and we go before, for summary judgment,
I guess. How would this bill impact that process? So, I'm
this just regular person. I believe there's been an
employment problem, I feel like they've done something
wrong to me and I want to file a lawsuit. How is that--this
bill going to impact that?
Chairman: Counsel, item 28, House Bill 1358.
Counsel (unidentified woman): This bill would change the
standard by which the court uses to determine when the
burden would shift to the nonmoving party as it reads.
Rep. Camper: Okay. I guess the nonmoving party is, in
this case was AT&T, the company that I cited. Who--what
do you mean--I'm sorry, make me, I'm like just a citizen. I
don't get it. Tell me. You're trying to explain this to
somebody that don't understand. Thank you.
Counsel: You make a motion for summary judgment if
you don't believe that the evidence that's been presented
establishes--a movant for summary judgment would move
for summary judgment if they feel that the evidence that the
other side has presented does not establish a particular
claim, that it has not met its--the elements of a particular
claim--am I talking legal?
Rep. Camper: Well no, that's okay. So I file a said
lawsuit against this company. The company wants this
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summary judgment. Is that what you're saying? Okay, so
now that they want this summary judgment, there are rules
in place on how that works today. Is that what you're
saying?
Counsel: There are rules to govern the procedure and the
interpretation of that procedure would be affected by this
statute.
Rep. Camper: Okay, so how then is that-how-what is
that effect that this has on it?
Counsel: Currently, the Supreme Court, the Tennessee
Supreme Court, has made a declaration in the case Hannan,
and that was in 2008, and this would--
Rep. Camper: What did they say in Hannan? Because
what you're basically saying is that's going to be the law of
the land right now if nothing happens.
Counsel: In Tennessee, I'm quoting from the case-
Rep. Camper: That's fine.
Counsel: A moving party who seeks to shift the burden of
production to the nonmoving party, who bears the burden
of proof at trial, must either, one, affirmatively negate an
essential element of the nonmoving party's claim, or two,
show that the nonmoving party cannot prove an essential
element of the claim at trial.
Rep. Camper: So, this bill now is going to--
Counsel: Change that standard.
Rep. Camper: Change that standard. Okay, thank you. So
what you're saying, Representative Dennis, is that with the
decision they made, that was somehow a change. Is that
what you're saying?
Rep. Dennis: Let me kind of use your hypothetical. You
work for AT&T. AT&T fired you. You think they fired you
wrongly. You sued them. They file a motion for summary
judgment that says you never worked for me-you're
alleging that-you sued the wrong person. You never
actually worked for me. You've got the wrong person sued.
The question is whose burden--who's got the burden of
proof on that summary judgment motion, who's got the
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burden of proof to prove whether or not you worked for
them to the judge in order to move that case forward.
Under the old standard, and under the federal standard, they
would have to-they would raise the allegation that, no,
you never worked-this person never worked for me, and
then you would have to prove to the judge before this goes
to a jury that, yes, you actually did. In 2008, the court
reversed that and said no the employee, just because you've
alleged they fired you wrongfully, they've got to prove--
this case is going to a jury unless they can prove
beforehand that you didn't work for them. The issue is who
has the burden of proof on that motion for summary
judgment at that proceeding after you've shared all your
information, you're there just on a motion for summary
judgment, who's got to prove that there's an actual claim
there that needs to go to the jury. You as the plaintiff or the
defendant--does the defendant have to prove a negative,
prove that you don't have a claim? It's kind of technical but
that's about as good as I can do to summarize the issue.
But the standard that we're codifying, attempting to codify
here, is the standard that we used prior to 2008 and the
standard that the federal law--if the suit's filed in federal
court, it's the standard that the federal courts use still to this
day.
Rep. Camper: And so there--I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman, to
keep going on. So, okay, so then this particular case that
we're using as a basis for this decision made it from the
lowest all the way up to the Supreme Court level. And now
what we want to do is put in statute that says, we don't
need to do it that way when it went through the various
levels. So everybody got a chance in that process, each of
the court levels got a chance to make a decision and it was
appealed and it went higher and the decision was the same,
and then it was appealed and it went higher. And what
you're saying now is, hey, you got it wrong so let's--
Rep. Dennis: Yes, that's exactly it. The court got it wrong.
The court changed its standard. The court changed its
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standard that it had always applied. The court changed the
standard away from what the federal courts apply. And
we're saying yes, we do that all the time. If the court makes
a decision wrong, incorrectly, if the people think it was
done incorrectly, we change the law to rein that in unless
it's a constitutional issue which has constitutional
protections that are greater than normal. But yes, the court
adopted a standard that was too far to one side. If we codify
this, we will be bringing that standard back in line with
what it was prior to 2008 and what the federal standard is
now.
Chairman: Go ahead. Representative Stewart.
Rep. Mike Stewart (D-Nashville, District 52): Here's my
question. You know, I understand what you're saying
about policy. You know, we set the policies and courts
apply the policies. So it makes sense for us to-- if we say X,
that's the policy. My question is, though, aren't we here
just talking about a rule? I mean, Hannan versus Alltel,
what you're trying to do is reverse what the Supreme Court
said about how Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is applied,
right?
Rep. Dennis: Essentially, sort of. Who has the burden of
proof to prove that particular motion for summary
judgment in--under Rule 56 should be granted.
Rep. Stewart: Well, I guess, is this just--all your bills are
your bills but is this your own personal view? I mean, I'm
just curious what brings you to select this particular ruling
by the Supreme Court out of hundreds of rulings about the
Rules of Civil Procedure over the years to reverse this one?
Rep. Dennis: Well, I think there's a lot of concern within
the business community in particular that we've gotten to a
point where cases with no real merit are getting--are going
to juries because of this particular decision. And that's
kind of the issue that it's trying to address. It is my
personal belief that this is the appropriate standard, the
standard under the Celotex case under federal law and the
Byrd standard as it basically adopted the Celotex standard.
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It was the--is the appropriate standard that we should be
using in determining whether or not summary judgments
should be granted. But, so, it is my personal position that
this is the correct standard, but in addition I believe a great
deal of the business community, small and large, and those
who are concerned about getting rid of frivolous
complaints, frivolous lawsuits before it gets to a jury, the
time and expense of a jury trial if there is no real issue of
fact to be decided by a trier of fact. This is the appropriate
standard to use when determining that so that you avoid the
unnecessary time and expense of a full blown jury trial if
there is no real issue of fact, if there is no real issue of fact.
Rep. Stewart: Well, I guess my concern is on a rules case,
do we really want to--you know, it's different from creating
an environmental law or a law about where someone can
carry a gun. You know, those are our--that's our job, we
can make that decision, okay. But I'm worried-it seems
like this is a bad precedent because the courts ultimately
create these rules. We have a hand in it, but aren't we
really encroaching upon an independent branch of
government? You know, the reason I say that-- you think
back, you know, where Roosevelt, a very popular
President, ran into trouble with his own Democrats is when
he tried to pack the Supreme Court and the Democratic
Senate said no because they respected--even though they
had respect for the President, they respected even more this
separate branch of government. Seems to me what we're
doing here--set aside, I'm not an employment lawyer so I
don't deal with this issue--but I mean if every time the
Supreme Court says something about a rule that we don't
like, if we're going to start getting in the business of
rewriting the rules every time a case is lost, it seems like
we're stepping into-we're stepping into their house and I
think that's not-is that really, do you really think that's
smart when it comes to rules? I mean rules about how
courts work as opposed to the underlying policies that the
people have sent us up here to do, to implement.
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Rep. Dennis: If it was an issue where we were actually
rewriting a Rule of Civil Procedure or changing the
language of the rule or passing a statute that was in direct
contravention to that rule, then yes, I would have-I would
share those concerns. But I don't in this case because all
we're dealing with is who has the burden of proof, of
proving these elements. We established who has the
burden of proof to prove particular elements one way or
another in a number of cases. In criminal law, for example,
the state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that a crime was committed. If we legislatively
establish an affirmative defense, the defendant has the
burden of proof of proving that affirmative defense to the
court by a preponderance of the evidence. We always, I
mean legislatively, we establish who has the burden of
proof to prove certain elements of any type of offense, be it
civil, be it criminal, what have you. So I don't think we're
delving too far away from that. It's specific to the
application of this Rule 56, but it's not rewriting the rule.
The court didn't change Rule 56. The language of Rule 56
has not changed at all. The court simply dealt with who
has the burden of proof in whether or not a court grants that
motion, and so that's my argument in support of that. If it
was directly in contravention to Rule 56, if Rule 56 said
this, and we passed a law that said no you're not going to
do it that way, you're going to do it a different way, then
yes, I think we would run into some constitutional issues.
However, I don't think this statute does it. If the court
disagrees, then obviously they can find the statute to be
unconstitutional as far as encroaching on their powers. If
that happens in the future then so be it. I don't think it goes
that far as to contravene an existing rule because, like I
said, the rule has not changed. Rule 56 is still the same.
Rep. Stewart: Well, I appreciate that explanation because
I think this is something we're going to revisit over time
and based on past experience I have an inkling that there's
a possibility you may get this bill out of committee whether
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or not I think it's a good idea. But I think that--I'm going
to vote against the bill just because I think that we have to
proceed with great caution when we start telling the
Supreme Court, when we start reversing their decisions
about the rules. And to me, I understand your explanation,
yes we are not literally changing the words in this rule, but,
you know, we are changing their meaning, which to me is
the same thing to a litigant. And just to explain why I'm
focused on this, you know, Rule 56 is not just any old Rule
of Civil Procedure. This is the gate that you have to get
through to get to a jury. So this is the rule that says when
you're some employee, this is what you've got, this is the
hump you've got to get over to have your right to a jury
given to you. You know, and this is not Europe. I mean,
we don't--we live in a country still where juries, our peers,
make the big decisions. We keep pushing power down. I
think you'd agree with me that this imposes a more
restrictive standard for a litigant than the Tennessee
Supreme Court has assigned and so to me I think we should
leave it to their wisdom. The Tennessee Supreme Court, I
think, is a pretty pro-business court and I think we should
leave it to the courts to decide what the rules mean. And
because of that I'm going to vote against your bill.
Chairman: Any other discussion? We're on the
amendment 8296. Any discussion on the amendment? If
not, you're voting on the amendment. All in favor of
amendment one say aye. Aye. All opposed, say no. On the
bill as amended. Representative Dennis, anything else?
Any other discussion? If not, you're voting on 1358 to go
to calendar rules. All in favor, say aye. All opposed, say
no. Let's record it with the clerk, please. Mr. Clerk.
May 20, 2011: House Session, 38h Legislative Day
Clerk: House Bill 1358 by Representative Dennis relative
to summary judgment.
Speaker: Rep. Dennis you are recognized.
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Rep. Dennis: Thank you, Madam Speaker. I move
passage of House Bill 1358 on third and final
consideration.
Speaker: Representative Dennis moves passage. Properly
seconded. Mr. Clerk, call the first amendment.
Clerk: House Judiciary Committee Amendment Number
One. Spread on the members' desks in Regular Calendar
Number Two Amendment Pack.
Speaker: Representative Watson, you're recognized.
Rep. Watson: Thank you, Madam Speaker. This
amendment rewrites the bill and overrules the holding in
Hannan versus Alltel Publishing Company regarding the
standard for summary judgment in Tennessee. Madam
Speaker, I move to adopt the House Judiciary Amendment
Number One and yield to the sponsor for any further
explanation.
Speaker: Representative Watson moves adoption of
Amendment Number One. Properly seconded. Discussion
on the amendment? All those in favor of Amendment
Number One say aye. All those opposed say no. You adopt.
Next amendment, Mr. Clerk.
Clerk: No further amendments, Madam Speaker.
Speaker: Representative Dennis, you are recognized.
Rep. Dennis: Thank you, Madam Speaker. As was
described in regards to the amendment, this bill will codify
the standard of proof for summary judgment on cases in
civil courts in Tennessee. I renew my motion.
Speaker: Representative Dennis renews his motion. Any
discussion on the bill? Is there objection to the question?
Seeing none, all those in favor of House Bill 1358 vote aye
when the bell rings. Those opposed vote no. Has every
member voted? Does any member wish to change their
vote? Take the vote, Mr. Clerk.
[H.B. 1358 passes by a vote of 85-4. The next bill, H.B.
1641, relative to claims for employment discrimination and
retaliatory discharge, is then taken up. The House Judiciary
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Amendment Number One is adopted. The floor discussion
on the amended H.B. 1641 is transcribed below.]
Rep. Dennis: Thank you, Madam Speaker. This bill [H.B.
1641] in conjunction with the previous bill specifically
codifies the standard of proof for summary judgment in
cases involving employment discrimination and retaliation.
With that I renew my motion.
Speaker: Representative Dennis renews his motion.
Discussion on the bill? Representative Miller?
Rep. Larry Miller (D-Memphis, District 88): Thank you,
Madam Speaker. Will the sponsor yield?
Rep. Dennis: Yes.
Rep. Miller: Representative Dennis, you were speaking
pretty fast. I couldn't hear you actually. I heard
discrimination and retaliation. So what are we doing with
the bill as amended?
Rep. Dennis: The bill as amended codifies the specific
burden of proof on a motion for summary judgment in a
civil case involving employment discrimination or
retaliatory discharge. It codifies the standard of proof that
the court uses when it's applying under the Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 56 a motion for summary judgment who
has the burden of proof in proving that a case has an
existing issue of material fact sufficient to get it to a jury to
be heard.
Rep. Miller: Okay, thank you.
Speaker: Representative Stewart.
Rep. Stewart: Thank you, Madam Speaker. Will the
sponsor yield?
Rep. Dennis: Yes, sir.
Rep. Stewart: Just to make clear, this is one of the bills
you brought-am I remembering correctly-- to essentially
reverse a decision by the Tennessee Supreme Court?
Rep. Dennis: Yes. It would. It would reverse--this bill
would reverse the 2010 decision in a case that's called
Gossett versus Tractor Supply that changed the standard of
proof in Tennessee on summary judgment in these types of
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cases away from what had been the existing law in
Tennessee for about thirty years and what is the federal
standard -what it was and still is. It takes us back to what
the federal standard is in these types of cases.
Rep. Stewart: And I don't want to take too much of the
chamber's time. But I will say I am going to vote against it
just because, as we've discussed, I don't think this body
should routinely overturn decisions by our high court
whether or not it's to the advantage of one particular group
or another just because I think separation of powers
suggests that we should be very deferential to them. And I
just thought I'd make that point. Thank you.
Speaker: Representative Hardaway.
Rep. G.A. Hardaway (D-Memphis, District 92): Thank
you, Madam Speaker. Will the sponsor yield?
Rep. Dennis: Yes, sir.
Rep. Hardaway: Would you say that the bill now is more
friendly to the plaintiff or to the defendant?
Rep. Dennis: I wouldn't say that it's more friendly to
either one. When you file a motion for summary judgment
on either side, you're asserting to the court that given all
the facts that are there, after you-after both sides have
shared all their facts, there is no issue of material fact and
the person who's on the other side is not entitled to what
they are requesting. And if the court makes that
determination, that there is no way a jury could-legally-
that a jury could allow this person to win this case, then the
court dismisses the case before it ever gets to the time and
expense of going to a jury. So I would not say it is
particularly preferential one way or the other.
Rep. Hardaway: All right. Then let me ask if-because
sometimes we seek to legislate in order to codify case law.
But in this case, we're trying to, in essence, overturn case
law.
Rep. Dennis: Yes. The court-the Tennessee Supreme
Court, in a three-to-two decision, changed the standard of
proof that had been previously applied in our state for about
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thirty years and the standard that's applied in federal court
on these types of actions, and this is changing it back to
what it was before the court took it on its own initiative to
make that change.
Rep. Hardaway: So everything that was in place before
that federal court decision--excuse me, before they, was it a
state court decision?
Rep. Dennis: State Supreme Court decision in 2010. Yes.
Rep. Hardaway: All right, so, we are postured now
exactly as we would have been before that decision.
Rep. Dennis: Yes.
Rep. Hardaway: No extras in here?
Rep. Dennis: That is the intent of the legislation is to take
us back to the standard that was applied before that case
and the standard that is applied in our federal courts.
Rep. Hardaway: All right. Thank you, sir. Thank you,
Madam Speaker.
Speaker: Representative Gilmore.
Rep. Brenda Gilmore (D-Nashville, District 54): Thank
you, Madam Speaker. Will the sponsor yield?
Rep. Dennis: Yes, Ma'am.
Rep. Gilmore: So, can you tell me the difference between
before this legislation and if this legislation passed, how it
effects?
Rep. Dennis: Sure. As the law was before, in these types
of cases, and under the federal law now, the person who's
bringing the lawsuit--the person who is suing claiming
unlawful termination of their employment or retaliation,
has the burden to show that there is an actual issue of fact
that a jury needs to decide. The Supreme Court reversed the
burden of proof last year and said that, no, the employer
has to prove a negative, has to prove to the court--in order
to avoid going to a jury trial, the employer has to prove that
the plaintiff can't possibly win their case instead of the
plaintiff having to prove that there is an actual case there.
It's kind of technical, but that's the difference and that's
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what we're going back to is the plaintiff having to show
that there is an issue of fact that a jury needs to decide.
Rep. Gilmore: So, in what year was this again?
Rep. Dennis: It was 2010. It was the Gossett versus
Tractor Supply case.
Rep. Gilmore: So, does this--does this legislation reverse
that decision that was made then?
Rep. Dennis: I would say that it better--more that it
clarifies. In a sense it reverses, but it clarifies our standard
of proof and what we're going to use in Tennessee in a
motion for summary judgment to be consistent with the
federal law and the law that we used to apply.
Rep. Gilmore: Okay, and if someone feels like they've
been discriminated on their jobs, does it now make it more
challenging for them to receive some kind of retribution?
Rep. Dennis: I wouldn't say that it's more challenging.
They are going to have to show--in order to get that case to
a jury, they're going to have to show proof to a judge by a
preponderance of the evidence that there is an actual issue
here. There is something that a jury needs to be decided. If
the court looks at the case and there is an actual dispute and
they are entitled to what they are claiming if everything
they say is proven to the judge-to the jury.
Rep. Gilmore: So the standards are being raised now?
Rep. Dennis: It's not really being raised. It's being shifted
back to what it was before 2010 and to what our federal
standard is right now.
Rep. Gilmore: Thank you.
[The previous question is called. H.B. 1641, as amended,
passes by a vote of 67-24, with 4 voting "present, not
voting."]
SENATE BiLL 1114
May 17, 2011: Senate Judiciary Committee
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Chairman (Sen. Mae Beavers, R-Mt. Juliet, District 17):
You're recognized on Senate Bill 1114.
Sen. Brian Kelsey (R-Germantown, District 31): Thank
you. That's number thirty-one in your packets, Senate Bill
1114. And this bill would return us to the federal summary
judgment standard and it would overturn the Hannan case.
It prevents a rush on the federal court for summary
judgment. The--there is an amendment to the bill, which is
drafting code 00718296, which clarifies that it applies only
to defendants who are filing for summary judgment and so
I would move adoption of amendment--well, I guess I'll
move passage of the bill first.
Sen. Mike Bell (R-Riceville, District 9): Second.
Chairman: Seconded by Senator Bell on the bill.
Sen. Kelsey: And then I'll move adoption of the
amendment as well.
Sen. Bell: Second.
Chairman: Okay, motion on the amendment. Seconded
by Senator Bell. And I believe you've already explained
what the amendment does?
Sen. Kelsey: Yes.
Chairman: Okay. Any questions on the amendment?
Senator Barnes.
Sen. Tim Barnes (D-Adams, District 22): I have a
question, and I don't know that much about this, but when
you say that it only applies to defendants, why would it not
apply equally to plaintiffs and defendants?
Sen. Kelsey: Well, because of the particulars of how you
receive summary judgment in the--let me pull up the
amendment, if you don't mind, for one second. It's--what
we're dealing with here is when a defendant files for
summary judgment and then the plaintiff comes back and
responds and then the question is what is the burden on the
defendant at that point. Can you use the "put up or shut
up" rule. And so that's why that is not an issue on the
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Sen. Barnes: Well, yeah, it seems to me that if the other
side, for example, has got a counter complaint, they may be
seeking a summary judgment in their counter complaint. It
seems to me that it would be the same rule should apply
rather than create that disparate treatment, in a way, that in
that circumstance if you got a counter complaint versus a
complaint, it doesn't seem there would be a rational basis
for that different treatment.
Sen. Kelsey: And that is a very valid point and I misspoke
when I spoke in terms of defendant and plaintiff. Actually,
now that I have the amendment pulled up in front of me, it
says--it speaks in terms of the party that has the burden--
that bears the burden of proof at trial.
Chairman: Any other questions on amendment number
one? If not, all in favor of amendment one, say aye.
Opposed? We're back on the bill as amended. Questions
on the bill? If there are no further questions, we're voting
on Senate Bill 1114 and the motion would be to calendar
committee. Madam Secretary would you call the roll?
Secretary: Senator Barnes? Senator Barnes votes no.
Senator Bell? Senator Bell votes aye. Senator Campfield?
Senator Campfield votes aye. Senator Ford? Senator
Kelsey? Senator Kelsey votes aye. Senator Marrero?
Senator Marrero votes no. Senator Overbey? Senator
Overbey votes aye. Senator Yager? Senator Yager votes
aye. Chairman Beavers?
Chairman: Aye.
Secretary: Chairman Beavers votes aye. Six ayes and two
nays.
Chairman: Senate Bill 1114 goes to calendar committee.
May 20, 2011: Senate Session, 38 h Legislative Day
Sen. Kelsey: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. .I believe we're on
House Bill 1358, and this is the bill on the burdens of
production, and with that I renew my motion to passage on
third and final consideration.
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Speaker: Senator Kelsey moves for passage on House Bill
1358. Is that seconded? Discussion on House Bill 1358.
Senator Barnes, you're recognized.
Sen. Barnes: Thank you, Mr. Speaker, members. I have
distributed to the members a letter from AARP that sets out
their opposition to not only Senate Bill 1114, which is
House Bill 1358, but also the Senate Bill 940. And it sets
forth their belief that these bills would make it all but
impossible for victims of employment discrimination or of
any other employment law violation to be able to prove
their case and get their rightful day in court. I'm concerned
about what this does with the burden of proof in summary
judgment. Summary judgment is something that is
developed in Tennessee with Tennessee body of law, the
law that's unique to Tennessee, and I think it's the wrong
direction to go to abrogate Tennessee law and try to impose
legislatively a body of law that is applied in federal courts.
And that's why I oppose this bill. Thank you.
Speaker: Further discussion on House Bill 1358. Senator
Kyle, you are recognized.
Sen. Jim Kyle (D-Memphis, District 28): Sponsor will
you yield? Is this the bill we had up earlier on summary
judgment, Senator Kelsey? If it is, then I heard that debate
but is this a different bill on summary judgment?
Speaker: Senator Kelsey.
Sen. Kelsey: This is the same bill.
Speaker: Senator Kyle.
Sen. Kyle: This is the repeal of the Supreme Court
decision of 2008, is that correct?
Speaker: Senator Kelsey.
Sen. Kelsey: That's correct.
Speaker: Senator Kyle.
Sen. Kyle: Thank you.
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Sen. Lowe Finney (D-Jackson, District 27): I just want to
ask the sponsor if he would give any more thought to
letting the Rules Commission see this?
Speaker: Senator Kelsey.
Sen. Kelsey: Mr. Speaker, I believe the Rules Commission
already had a chance to take a look at it last week. That's
what I was told earlier today and they certainly have had
chances since January, or February I should say, back when
the bill was filed and they had--I believe it literally was on
the Judiciary Calendar, I believe, six weeks in a row.
Speaker: Senator Finney.
Sen. Finney: Mr. Speaker, I have the agenda from the
Rules Committee and it wasn't on the agenda of the Rules
Commission Committee. And the way the Rules
Commission works is at the request of any lawyer, or
anybody, the Rules Commission will take something up.
And as a member of the Rules Commission I can assure
you that it will be taken up. I don't know why it wasn't,
but it's not on the agenda. I can assure you that it would at
least be dealt with one way or the other.
Speaker: Senator Kelsey.
Sen. Kelsey: Well the Tennessee Bar Association had the
ability to take it to the Rules Committee, and at least
somebody on there was aware of this particular bill and this
particular issue. But I think the bigger issue is that the rule
didn't change. It's been the rule, it's been there for a
number of years. It's the same rule that was in place before
the 2008 decision. It's the same rule that's in place after
the 2008 decision. And it will be the same rule that's in
place after the passage of this bill. So we're really not
looking to change the rule. We're simply looking to
change the law on the burdens of production and how that
is interpreted.
Speaker: Senator Finney.
Sen. Finney: This will be my last statement, Mr. Speaker,
and I apologize and I appreciate the patience. It's my
understanding that the bill is actually a broader rule than
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what the previous-- the old law was under Celotex, and that
this would actually be a broader interpretation for summary
judgment, which is why I think it would be appropriate for
the Rules Commission to look at. And I would just submit
that when we start looking at rules of the court it is not
unusual, in fact it is the standard, to allow the courts to look
at their own rules and then figure out exactly how to go
forward within that body. Rather than us do it by statute,
do it by rule, and then those rules actually come before the
Judiciary Committee, if I'm not mistaken. So you would
actually see whatever the Rules Commission promulgates.
They actually have to come before the body and I think we
pass that in January or February--like, right away. So, it's
just my preference when we start telling the courts how to
expedite dockets, how to get cases moving along, that we
let those rules--that we let those courts decide how to do it
rather than doing it by statute because it's very specialized.
And if it--indeed this statute is bigger than the old rule, then
that gives me great pause, because I'm not sure if that was
fully deliberated in the Judiciary Committee, I don't think
it's been fully deliberated here, and that's why it's
appropriate to submit things like that to the Rules
Commission.
Speaker: Senator Kyle.
Sen. Kyle: Well, I have every belief that we're going to
blindly overturn the Supreme Court decision tonight, so I
guess I need to ask a couple of questions. Senator Kelsey,
based upon your reading of your bill that you're
sponsoring, if a lawyer has been denied summary judgment
in the last three years, can they then now go back and re-
file for summary judgment based upon the change of our
law? Or do they--or is the summary judgment motion that
was denied res judicata and can't be revisited? There needs
to be some clarity on that, because I truly believe how you
apply the change of the standard for summary judgment
needs to be uniform in all thirty-one judicial districts. So, I
don't think the bill addresses it, but perhaps maybe it
241
241
8.1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 242
should, maybe it shouldn't, I don't know. But it is but a
rule but I'm sure, as you have indicated, that people have
lost summary judgment motions because of the standard of
the court, and now we're changing that again. The question
is, is how are we going to administer this particular change
now that we are changing the law back?
Speaker: Senator Kelsey.
Sen. Kelsey: No. It will only apply to summary judgment
motions going forward filed after July 1, 2011.
Speaker: Senator Kyle.
Sen. Kyle: Are you saying that a litigant who filed for
summary judgment on an issue and was denied cannot re-
file again after the effective date of this statute with the
new standard?
Speaker: Senator Kelsey.
Sen. Kelsey: Not on that same particular issue. Correct.
Speaker: Senator Kyle.
Sen. Kyle: Is that your interpretation or does that statute
say that?
Speaker: Senator Kelsey.
Sen. Kelsey: That's what the bill says.
Speaker: Further discussion on House Bill 1358?
[The bill passes by a vote of 19-9.]
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